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P R E F A C E 
Works on muslims and the i r leaders have been dealt by 
important write^rs l ike Francis Robinson, Stanley Wolpert, 
Pirzada, K.K. Aziz, Mushir-ul-Hassan, i\1. Mujeeb, W.W. Hunter, 
Peter Hardy and Khaliquzzaman. A stody, however on rnuslim 
leadership in U.P. (1906-1937) has not been dealt with separa-
te ly so far , Hencethis topic has been chosen to highl ight the 
various aspects such as t h e i r aims, t h e i r r i se to power, t h e i r 
working pa t te rn and the i r contr ibut ion. 
In order to f a c i l i t a t e the description of the study, the 
work has been divided, covering the above mentioned oeriod in to 
four p a r t s , v iz . 1906-1916 (Part I ) , 1917-1923 (Part I I ) , 1924-
1929 (Part I I I ) and 1930 - 1937 (Part IV). The main c r i t e r i a 
of t h i s division i s the change which took place in various aspe-
cts of rnuslim p o l i t i c s in 1906, 1916, 1923, 1930 and 1937. These 
years are the turning points in rnuslim p o l i t i c s in U.P. as well 
as in India. One may see many changes in muslim p o l i t i c s during 
these years . Nature, aim and working pat tern of leadership got 
changed, completely or pa r t ly , in these years . 
In introduction a brief history of the advent of Islam in 
India has been given. Nature, tendencies , thought and be l ie fs of 
these new-comers from central Asia are the main points oE study 
in t h i s chapter. The process of the i r intermingling with the 
then Indian society has also been discussed. Di f in i t ions and 
standards of leadership have also been discussed in Introduct ion. 
i i 
In the f i r s t chapter, the circumstances and po l i c i e s 
of muslim leaders who brought the b i r th of muslim league has 
been discussed. The oo l ic ies and a t t i tude of Muslim League 
towards BritisH government and Indian National Congress has also 
been studied in t h i s chapter. The struggle for leadership be t -
ween 'young p a r t y ' and 'old pa r ty ' (two groups of muslims popu-
la r ly denoted as) also has been explained in t h i s chapter. 
In chapter second the p o l i t i c s between 1917 to 1923 has 
been assessed. Young party became vic tor ious and snatched the 
leadership from old par ty . A new class of leadership comes on 
the scene. This was the Ulama. This was the class who dominated 
the muslim p o l i t i c s of t h i s phase. 
Chapter th i rd deals with the po l i c i e s and a t t i tude of 
muslims of U.P. towards the Swarajis ts , Nehru report and Simon 
commission. We see tha t the p o l i t i c s and leadership of muslims 
were scat tered durino these years . 
Chapter fourth deals with the muslim p o l i t i c s between 
1930-37. Muslims a t t i tude towards Gandhi's c i v i l disobedience 
movement, Round Table Conference and communal awards has been 
studied in t h i s chapter. One of the main point of t h i s phase i s 
the government of India Act 1935. Safe-guards for the muslims 
was the main pr inciple of the Act. weightage and reservat ions of 
seats provided in the act r e f l ec t s the Bri t i sh policy of wining 
goodwill of the muslim community. The Provincial Legis la t ive 
Election of 1935 in U.P, i s the main point of study of t h i s 
chapter. Congress was the victor ious party in U.P, and ministry 
I l l 
was formed by G.3 . Pan t , But Muslim l e a d e r s adopted a po l icy 
of a t t a ck on the congress . 
Thus, ^s fa r as I hope, t h i s work w i l l be an i n t e r e s t i n g 
and important add i t ion t o t h e s t u d i e s on Nat iona l movement in 
I n d i a . For the muslims in genera l and s p e c i a l l y in U.P. have 
played a p i v o t a l ro le in the n a t i o n a l movement. The a n a l y s i s 
of mot ives , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p a t t e r n of working of these 
muslim l e a d e r s i s of q rea t i n t e r e s t t o a s tudent of Indian 
H i s t o r y . 
I have u t i l i s e d poss ib ly a l l a v a i l a b l e sources of 
in format ion . I oay my g r a t e f u l thanks in t h i s connection t o the 
a u t h o r i t i e s of Sayaji Rao Hayakwad l i b r a r y R.H.I^., Lytlon Librr:>ry 
A . f .U . , Nat iona l Archieves , F-.'ew De lh i , Na t iona l Library ,Calcuttf:,, 
American I n s t i t u t e l i b r a r y Ramnagar, Library of Ramnagar f o r t , 
Gandhian I n s t i t u t e Rajghat and Nagari P r a c h a r i n i Shabha, Varanns i , 
for t h e i r generous help extended t o me. 
I pay my grea t regard t o my superv i sor Dr. (.Miss. ) K.S. 
Santha, without whose a f f e c t i o n a t e i n s p i r a t i o n and proper guid?;-
nce the study would not have been completed. 
I pay my great regard a l so to my respec ted t e a c h e r s 
Prof . J . P . Mishra, Dr. J . Chaubey, Dr. J . S . Mishra, Dr. Sumitra 
Guota, Dr. Anand Shankar Singh, Dr. Rajeshwar Pandey and Dr. 
Aruna Sinha, for t h e i r b l e s s i n g s . 
I am g r a t e f u l t o Dr. Rakesh Pandey, Dr. Awadh Narayan 
T r i p a t h i and Dr. Shashi Qhusan Tiwari for t h e i r prompt h e l p -
f u l n e s s . 
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INTRODUCTION 
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Right from the early beginning of the History of the 
Human being, 'Leadership* has played an important role t o 
guide the so'ciety. Society without a leader wi l l be a boat 
without rudder. Leadership i s an a b i l i t y to dominate the 
stream of thought of socie ty . Ei ther i t may be good or bad, 
society has to bear the r e s u l t s . Leadership a lso has t o 
bear so. I t seems t h a t the games between leaders and suppor-
t e r s are the main job of our world. Teachers, Sa in t s , family 
heads, and p o l i t i c a l leaders use t h e i r a r t of leadership t o 
show a be t te r path to socie ty . But in some cases se l f i shness 
enters in to leadership and t r i e s to take the society towards 
the h e l l . Now, in the modern democratic age i t i s easy t o a 
common man to follow his own leaders , and prac t ice his own 
reasonable thoughts . 
Leadership i s a concept applied t o the persona l i ty , 
environment r e la t ion t o describe the s i tua t ion when a perso-
n a l i t y i s so placed in the environment t ha t h is w i l l , fee l ing 
and ins ight d i r ec t s and controls others in pursui t of common 
cause. According t o Lapiere and Fransworth - Leadership i s 
behaviour tha t affects the behaviour of other people more than 
t h e i r behaviour affects tha t of the leader .^ What i s popula-
r l y called leadership i s more accurately t o be discussed in 
terms of dominance/^ Leadership i s a foundation on which 
the super-s t ructure of society i s based. 
After the entry of Islam in Ind ia , in 8th century A.D., 
Muslims have been the prominent f igure of Indian p o l i t i c a l 
h i s to ry . Thife in te rac t ion between the Hindustani and Islamic 
cul ture also have taken an important place in our h i s t o ry . 
The revival or changes in the f i e ld s of cu l tu re , r e l i g ion , 
education, economy and even in daily l i f e s t y l e , always take 
place through the movements of the l eade r s . 
How the leadership of the Muslim community has led 
the Society i s the question here . Contribution and p a r t i c i -
pation of the Muslim leadership wi l l be very clear a f te r the 
assessment of the events of our h is tory and the role of 
Muslim leaders . 
A rea l leader i s one, who i s able t o ( i ) a r r ive at a 
correct diagnosis of the i l l s of a group, community or people, 
( i i ) make a r e a l i s t i c assessment of t h e i r a sp i r a t i ons , ( i i i ) 
think of effect ive remedial measures, ( iv) frame a workable and 
p rac t i ca l programme (v) get i t whole hartedly accepted by his 
followers and (vi) lead them successfully t o implement, the 
programme, remove t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s and make them reach the 
objec t ive .^ But one may say t h a t unfortunately Indian Muslims 
have not been able to produce many such eminent l eaders , who 
may have been able to analyse the d i s t r e s s of muslims and 
achieve at l e a s t some measure of success in removing even 
part of t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . Mr. Jinnah proved to be a great 
leader from these c r i t e r i a , but what he did r ea l ly aggravated 
^ 
the plight of muslims, at least of those who remained in 
India. Most of the musllm leaders who have been religious 
ones, have tried to increase the gap of differences between 
the two communities and thereby to add to the plight of 
muslims. 
V»e may categorise the muslim leadership of the period 
of study (1906-1937). Muslim leaders, falling under the first 
category were those, who like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, 
realising that the British had come to stay permanently as 
rulars of India, thought that the best way by which muslims 
could hope to retain power, assume importance and gain a 
dominating position in Indian affairs was by imitating the 
British, acquiring British education and by winning the favour 
of the British. Most of these leaders who believed in pleas-
ing the British were immigrant muslims and what they did was 
mainly for the upper strata of muslim families. This did 
bring some relief to a part of the muslim community, though 
only partially, since it was not a programme for the muslim 
masses, nor was it widely accepted, enthusiastically followed 
or continued for any length of time. This category of 
Muslim leaders was more or less like many leaders of the 
Hindu community of that time, who had also favoured imitating 
following and pleasing the British and thereby winning their 
goodwill. 
The second category of muslim leaders consisted of 
those, who believed in living amicably with the majority 
community and who preached iden t i f i ca t ion of the i n t e r e s t s 
of muslims with those of the main body of Indians . They 
had fa i th in* t e r r i t o r i a l nationalism and common c i t i z ensh ip . 
They were secular , r a t iona l and rad ica l in t h e i r approaches 
towards p o l i t i c a l and economic quest ions . Dr. Ansari and 
Maulana Azad represented t h i s sec t ion . The t o t a l number of 
leaders f a l l i ng in to t h i s category has been qui te large but 
from t h i s group many had changed s ides . They had s t a r t ed as 
n a t i o n a l i s t muslims but. many of them had af ter sometime, 
abondoned t h i s philosophy and turned ant i -h indu. Nat iona l i s t 
muslims had opposed the demand for Pakistan but, as a r e s u l t , 
they had been p i l l o r i e d by fellow muslims and were cal led 
stooges of Hindus. 
Most muslim leaders belonging t o the t h i r d category, 
came in to leadership and succeded in maintaining i t , because 
they mainly fanned the flames of hatred and preached violences 
against the majority community and thus struck a harmonious 
chord, which had always exis ted in the hear t s of most muslims. 
Most of them had openly preached antagonism against Hindus, 
advocated reparatism from the main stream of na t iona l l i f e , 
encouraged extra t e r r i t o r i a l l o y a l t i e s , advised al legiance 
to outside bodies, invi ted the a t ten t ion of the masses to 
draw inspi ra t ion from countries other than India , s t ressed 
the point tha t muslims had very l i t t l e in common with the 
r e s t of India and sec re t ly , and at times not so s ec r e t l y , 
insinuated disturbances, r i o t s , violence, des t ruct ion , rape 
^ 
and bloodshed. Such leaders hardly did anything to make 
the life of Indian muslims any happier, 
Cotnnenting upon muslim leaders, who in the name of 
Islam, were antagonising against hindus, Mahatma Gandhi had 
said, "Religion binds man to God and man to man. Does Islam 
bind muslim only to muslim and antogonises the Hindus ? Was 
the message of the prophet peace only for a between muslims 
and war against Hindus or non-muslims ? Are many crores of 
Muslims to be fed with this which I can only describe as 
poison ? Those who are instilling this poison into the 
7 
Muslim mind are rendering the greatest disservice to Islam." 
Mahatma Gandhi, speaking of Muslim papers stated. 
"I read as many muslim papers as I can ... I find them so 
o 
full of poison and conscious and unconscious unthruths..." 
According to Inder Malhotra, writing to in the illust-
rated weekly of India of 22nd April, 1973, "The Tone of many 
Muslim newspapers and journals and the speeches of the 
leaders ... are highly inflamatory. Although they claim to 
be the champions of the rights of the muslims, they have no 
programme for the economic betterment of the community. All 
that they do is to whip up religious sentiments and further 
isolate the muslims from the Hindus, Their leaders also 
want that Muslims should not join any secular organizations. 
Muslim leaders, who, throughout their life, had supported 
nationalism, were mostly the immigrant Muslims, They were 
not only not supported by any substantial Muslim following 
but they were boycotted, condemned, classed as stooges of 
Hindus and quislings although many of them were great scho-
lars and writerson Islam and most ardent Muslims. 
Even that section of the elite which advocates secu-
larism and modernization had rather curiously hesitated to 
draw the attention of the bretheran of the community to the 
problems that are really sapping their vitality and robbing 
9 
them of the honourable place they can occupy in society. 
As against these, Hindus claim that Hinduism had 
continued to throw up, throughout these centuries, a number 
of leader, big and small, secular and sectarian, political 
and Social, philosophical and religious. Hindus claim that 
the vitality of Hinduism is evident from the fact that there 
have been many profound thinkers and well known philosophers, 
who have come up with different theories claiming to challenge 
even some of the basic concepts of Hinduism and who have led 
powerful revolts against the fundamental principles of the 
vedas, Rishis like Kapil, Kanad and Gautam had, many centu-
ries ago, challenged someof the basic vedic and upanishadic 
concepts. They had amply shown their independent way of 
thinking and their theories were seriously studied, thoroughly 
scrutinized, fully examined and partially or wholly rejected. 
Even after the advent of Islam in India, there have 
been many attempts to reform Hinduism and to place it on a 
new footing. Kabir and Nanak are two very good examples of 
r evo l t s t h a t were organised against t r a d i t i o n a l Hindu views. 
This process* has continued r ight through the centur ies and 
even in the l a s t a number of Hindu reformists had introduced 
far-reaching changes. Ram Mohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, 
Dayanand, Sahajanand, Aurobindo and l a s t but not the l e a s t 
Mahatma Gandhi, had given many severe j o l t s to the widely 
accepted notions and universal ly followed prac t ices of 
Hindus. 
The muslim community in India has remained backward, 
dormant, doc i le , du l l , inact ive and stagnant in almost a l l 
spheres of l i f e . I t has not been able t o produce l eade r s , 
who may have made any appreciable impact on the l i f e of these 
mil l ions of Muslims, or who may have created even the smallest 
dent on the body p o l i t i c of Indian, except perhaps the c r ea t -
ion of Pakis tan. 
Regarding the achievement of Indian Muslims in carving 
out a separate and independent s ta te of Pakis tan , not only 
most Hindus but many others also think t h a t i t was the outcome 
of the deep hatred mutually f e l t between Hindus and Muslims, 
The lo t of Muslims in India has hardly improved as a r e s u l t 
of the creation of Pakistan and so far the poor performance 
of Pakistan in almost a l l spheres i s a pos i t ives proof t h a t 
those leader who had agi ta ted for and achieved Pakistan had 
not been able t o do any r ea l good t o the Muslim masses. 
9. 
Prof. A.A.A, Fyzee, former Indian Ambassador to the 
united Arab Republic, writing in the Times of India of the 
21st January.'l973, stated about leaders of his own Muslim 
community, "The leaders of the Muslims have never really 
gone down to the masses, and have never been able to get 
rid of the budgbears of religion and law. The rank and 
file likewise have always been manipulated by political 
leaders for their own selfish ends," 
Even when Indian Muslims have been in this obviously 
unfortunate position of living amidst hostility and hatred, 
no movement has been started by any muslim leaders or any 
muslim organisation to preach the advantage of harmony, good 
neighbourliness and a programme of promoting friendliness 
with Hindus. Nor have Hindus led any movement to absorb 
Muslims into the main stream of Indian life. 
In the independent India Muslims enjoy the same 
freedom, rights and authority as is done by Hindus. Indeed, 
in fact, muslims, in certain respects, enjoy special additio-
nal rights and advantages as members of a minority community 
and are permitted some unique privileges under their special 
personal laws. More than one Muslim have occupied the 
highest posts of governors in many states in India, including 
some of the biggest states. \ Zakir Hussain was the Chief 
Justice of India and officiated as president of India. The 
number of Muslim ministers in the Indian states has been 
[\ 
l a rge . Besides, many muslims have adorned many high c i v i l , 
m i l i t a r y , diplomatic, academic and s c i e n t i f i c posts in 
Indian goveshment, u n i v e r s i t i e s , public undertakings, f inan-
c i a l and other corporat ions. 
Many Indian muslims had followed Mahatma Gandhi in 
many mat ters , but they did not accept his pr inciple of non-
violence, and did not give up eat ing meat, most probably 
because non-violence, was or ig ina l ly a Hindu p r i n c i p l e . Here 
i t would be be t te r to mention tha t many Hindus, who followed 
Mahatma Gandhi in many other mat ters , also did not accept 
h is views on non-violence and continued t o ea t meat. 
Legally and cons t i tu t iona l ly muslims have a l l the 
r igh t s ju s t equal to Hindus, but in p r ac t i c e , soc i a l l y , 
economically and honourviise they remain completely d i sc r imi-
nated against. The fear of Hindu domination keeps muslims so 
frightend tha t even the most enlightened, highly educated 
and scholarly among them cannot argue r a t iona l ly or maintain 
i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty in many matters concerning t h e i r own 
community or India or about Indianness. 
Even the most n a t i o n a l i s t muslim leaders have to 
stand apart from the mainstream of the l i f e of the Indian 
people. Many such leaders have of course denied t ha t Hindus 
and Muslims const i tuted two separate nat ions in India , They 
have said tha t India was one nation but the Indian nation of 
1ft 
their concept probably had two parallel ways of life and 
two different streams of Indian cultures. In this connection 
it may be of* some interest to see what Maulana Abul Kalam 
Azad, perhaps the greatest and the most consistent of natio-
nalist Indian muslims has to say. In his presidential address 
at the annual session of the Indian national congress held at 
Ramgarh in 1942, the Maulana said, "I am a muslim and this 
thought fills me with pride. The traditions of Islam during 
its career of thirteen centuries go to my heritage. I am not 
willing to give up an Iota of this portion. Islamic education. 
Islamic history. Islamic arts, Islamic sciences and cultures 
constitute the elements of my wealth, and as a muslim it is 
my duty to preserve it. Being a muslim, I have a special 
position in cultural and religious circles and I cannot bear 
it that anyone should interfere in this inner sanctum of my 
soul. We brought with us a great ireasure... We entrusted 
our wealth to this country. We gave to this country the most 
precious of our possessions and one which was greatly needed 
by it. We gave to it the message of democracy and equality," 
This is not much different from the claim made by the 
protogonists of the two nation theory. What the Maulana here 
claims is that as a muslim he is different from other Indians 
and his culture is different from that of the majority commu-
nity and he cannot give up any part of it. The only difference 
between Maulana and Mr. Jinnah would appear to be that the 
\ \ 
former did not use the term different nat ions but said 
different his tory and different a r t s . The meaning of both 
may perhaps "be the same. What the Maulana had said did in 
essence mean tha t Indian Muslims were different from other 
Indians and tha t they should remain so. The Maulana a s s e r t s 
tha t h is he r i t age , his education, h i s to ry , a r t s , cul ture and 
even h i s sciences are those t h a t had t h e i r origin in the 
t h i r t e e n t h century, tha t i s , from the time of the b i r th of 
Islam. I t has , there fore , t o be different from tha t of 
other Indians, who claim a much older he r i t age , cu l tu re , 
education and a r t s and a much ol(3er h i s to ry . Mr. Jlnnah had 
sa id , "The Hindus and the Muslims have two dif ferent . . . 
philosophies . . . customs . . . based mainly on conf l ic t ing 
ideas and conceptions," ^ Even Mahatma Gandhi sa id , "Though 
the majority of Musalmans of India and the Hindus belong t o 
the same •s tock ' , the re l ig ious environment has made them 
d i f f e r e n t . i l 
Most of Hindus and ^iuslims are almost unanimous in 
thinking tha t for the sake of unity with one another, ne i ther 
Hindus nor Muslims have been able t o adopt the ways of l i f e 
of the o ther . I t cannot be said whether east and west sha l l 
ever meet, but i t can cer ta in ly be said tha t a hindu and a 
muslim has not merged with one another. 
Nfejslims have a his tory of over a thousand years in 
t h i s country as t r a d e r s , conqu^rers, miss ionar ies , r u l e r s , 
n 
British subjects and finally as free citizens of secular 
India. Mainly three factors account for their presence 
here. They*are : conquest, immigration and conversion. 
Immigrant muslims came from central Asia, Afghanistan, 
nt! 
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12 I ran , West Asia and coast of Africa. There were immigrants 
also from the t r i b a l t e r r i t o r y of the north-west f r o n t i e r . 
Muslims did not colonise, India en masse, they i n f i l t r a t e d 
slowly in small groups in successive waves, and t h i s went 
on for cen tur ies . 
The main source t ha t accounts for an overwhelming 
number of muslims in India i s conversion t h a t went on through 
cen tu r i e s . Persuation proved to be the more effect ive weapon, 
though force or th rea t of force , allurement of office and 
prospect of social nobi l i ty played an important p a r t . Most 
of the r e c r u i t s came from the intermediate and the lower 
level of Hindu socie ty . To the socia l ly oppressed Hindus 
spec i a l l y , Islam with i t s ega l i t a r i an zeal must have seemed 
a re l ig ion of hope and in many cases t h e i r power of res i s tance 
was not much. These conversions were accomplished mainly 
through the agency of mystics and Sufi s a in t s who were suppo-
sed t o be possesed of miraculous powers. Often the change of 
fa i th took place in groups and at a times whole communities 
accepted the new f a i t h . The Bohras, Khojas and Memons are 
examples of such mass conversion. 
1^  
Most of these converts carr ied t h e i r caste and pre ju-
dices over to t h e i r new f a i t h , which means tha t while the 
conversion .from Hinduism t o Islam may have been a matter of 
moments, the Islamization of the converts was a gradual 
process spreading over centuries* I t was during t h i s i n t e r -
regnum tha t Hindus and Muslims influenced each other upto 
some extent* 
Reffering t o the coming of muslims and t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n , 
Maulana Azqd said in h is p res iden t i a l address at the Rampur 
congress in March 1940: 
"This vast and f e r t i l e land (India) gave welcome t o a l l 
and took them t o her bosom. One of the l a s t of these carvans 
. . . was tha t of the followers of Islam. This came here and 
s e t t l e d here for good. This led t o a meeting of the cultiffe-
currents of two different races . Like the Ganga and the 
Yamuna they followed for a while through separate course, but 
n a t u r e ' s immutable law brought them toge ther , and joined them 
I t 
in a Sangum. This fusion was a notable event in His tory." 
"Islam" as Azad said l a t e r on in the same address, "has 
now as great claim on the so i l of India as Hinduism, Now i t 
need hardly be said tha t there has been a great deal of i n t e r -
action between the two cul tures tha t shows i t s e l f up in the 
spheres of a r t , a r ch i t ec tu re , customs, language and r e l i g i o n . 
Islaras influence on reformers l ike Kabir and Nanak i s well 
known. The evolution of a common language, Urdu and the 
1» 
achievements of the Indo-Sarcenlc a r t s are d i rec t consequences 
of t h i s co-existence. And there are other influence too . " 
But i t i s a moot point whether the two communities have 
achieved the kind of Sangum or fusion tha t Azad spoke so 
confidentaly of. M.R.A. Baig in the "Muslim dillema in India" 
contests Azad's t h e s i s of assimilat ion and says t ha t the 
Creation of Pakistan, the culmination of Hindu-Muslim 
p o l i t i c a l r iva l ry from the eighth century A.D. i s proof 
enough tha t no synthesis between Hindus and Muslims took 
17 p lace . A.A.A. Fyzee also quotes "The aparent unity must 
not make us blind t o differences in r e l i g ion , in morals, in 
language, in food, in dress , i n s p i r i t and in mode of thoughts . 
Now i t i s quite easy t o overemphasise the role of 
d ivis ive powers at the cost of those tha t held the two commu-
n i t i e s together . I t would be wrong t o assume, for ins tance , 
t h a t Hindus and Muslims were in a s t a t e of perpetual confl ic t 
or tha t Muslims in t e re s t were always different from those of 
Hindus or tha t Muslims i n t e r e s t s were the same in different 
regions of the country. 
As recent sociological research has shown, Muslims are 
far from being a homogeneous community. Language, caste and 
economic standing worked together t o devide Muslim from 
Muslim no less than Hindu from Hindu. There i s the 
famil iar d i s t inc t ion of Sayyids, Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans, 
according t o ex t rac t ion . And as pointed out e a r l i e r the 
1^ 
converts took their social system to the new faith. Indian 
Muslims have modified and weakend system of caste of their 
own, which *hey acquired from the Hindus. 
The invaders themselves belonged to different stocks. 
There are doctrinal differences between the Sunnis, who are 
in a majority and the minority sects like the Shias, Bohras 
and others. 
Till recently, Meos of Haryana, for instance, had 
purely Hindu names or tagged on Khan to a Hindu name. And 
they celebrated not only Divali and Deshahara but Janmastami 
also, Mujeeb M, refers to a newspaper report in the states-
man of 11 March 1959 saying that 'a Hindu temple near 
Suralgarh in Rajasthan has Muslim priests who perform the 
worship of the idol and receive offerings from devotees. 
There were furthermore divisions at a social level 
1 Q 
town dwellers and rural dwellers, landlords and t enan t s . . . 
The interest of a Muslim landlord t a l l i ed more with those of 
his hindu counterpart than with those of his poor co-re l ig i -
onist who t i l l e d the so i l . Another factor that contributed 
to these differences was the uneven distribution of muslims 
in different part of the country. 
What held th is heterogeneous community together was 
the sentiment of a common allegiance to Islam and i t s symbols-
20 Mosques, Sufi Shrines and Hajj. This sentiment has been 
1 R 
a great cohesive force among muslims cutt ing across doctr inal 
and other differences within the community and giving them 
a very strong sense of r e l ig ious i d e n t i t y . But t h i s r e l ig ious 
cohessiveness did not mean t h a t t h e i r soc i a l , economic and 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s w^re the same, and what affected the 
muslims of one area o^ c lass did not necessar i ly affect those 
of other areas or c lasses . In fac t , i t has been argued the 
muslim response t o p o l i t i c a l questions often res ted on l o c a l , 
21 Special or temporary i n t e r e s t s . This sentiment can remain 
l a t en t or dormant for generat ions, but i t can also be roused 
22 t o fever pi tch within an inc red ib i ly short t ime. 
The potency of t h i s sentiment to override a l l differences 
and t o uni te muslims was demonstrated several times in recent 
Indian h i s to ry . For example, the Kanpur masque inc ident , the 
Khilafat i s sue , the controversial Sarda marriage b i l l , and 
the biggest of a l l , the demand for a separate homeland for 
muslims. On the l a s t occasion, Jinnah and h is muslim league 
were able to orchestrate through t h e i r promise of Pakistan 
the disparate i n t e r e s t s of a l l sections of the community and 
achieve t h e i r object ive. Their b a t t l e cry was 'Islam in 
danger . ' These fac ts of divis ions and differences within the 
muslims and of the great unifying force of Islam wi l l be kept 
in mind during the analysis of muslim p o l i t i c s af ter 1857. 
But temporily unifying forces between Hindus and 
Muslims are rare t oo , in our Indian h i s t o ry . Hindu-Muslim 
I'? 
s t r i f e and coldness, i s an ancient t a l e t ha t began in 712 A.D. 
when Muhammad Bin Quasim, son-in-law of the Governor of I r aq , 
conquered SJLnd and declared i t a muslim s t a t e . In Quasim's 
Sind Hindus were in fe r io r in s ta tus to muslims and had t o 
pay the j i z i a , A po l l - tax not levied on muslims. Between 
the years 1000 and 1026 Sultan Nlahmud of Gazani in what i s 
now Afghanistan raided India seventeen t imes, broke Idols in 
Hindu temples, took away a s tore of r iches and annexed an 
area around Lahore, A scholar in Mahmud's court who accom-
panied him t o India , Al-Beruni, noted t h a t because of the 
ruinat ion at Mahmud's hands the Hindus "cherished the most 
invetera te aversion towards a l l muslims. 
Al-Beruni also saw that while apparently resigned t o 
t h e i r humiliat ion, the hindus looked upon the invaders as 
outcastes and "recoiled from the touch of the impure barberian 
24 
muslims." Muhammad Ghori (1174-1206) extended muslim rule 
eastward, from his days u n t i l 1857 there was always a muslim 
king on the throne of Delhi . But a hundred years a f te r Ghori 
the muslim t r a v e l l e r Ibn-Battutah observed tha t Hindus in 
Malabar ensured tha t "no muslim should enter t h e i r house or 
use t h e i r u t ens i l s for eat ing purposes" and tha t if a muslim 
i s fed out of t h e i r vessels the Hindus e i t h e r break the 
vessels or give them away t o the mussulmans.^^ 
The Pakis tani h i s tor ian Ish t iaq Hussain Qureshi, has 
given h i s t e r se view of the distance between Hindus and 
1« 
muslims down the ages: 
"They have l ived with minimum contacts . There has 
been l i t t l e intermarriage, because Islam forbids i t with the 
Hindus and the Hindus are bound by t h e i r ru les of ca s t e . 
Except in a small sector of the highly westernized c l a s s , 
in terdining has been unthinkable. The f e s t i v a l s provide no 
socia l occasion for coming toge ther , instead they have often 
given a pretext for r i o t i n g . The communities have remained 
different not only in re l ig ion but in everything, cu l tu re , 
outlook on l i f e , dress , cookery, furni ture and domestic 
u t e n c i l s . There has been no sense of common h i s to ry . The 
heros of the muslim conquest and the rebels against muslim 
domination inspire contradictory feel ings among muslims and 
Hindus. Common bondage t o the Br i t i sh did not always inspi re 
the same feel ings at a l l t ime." ° 
Although India had succeded in in tegra t ing foreign 
elements tha t had entered India before the muslims (Greeks, 
Sythians, Kushans, e t c . ) , but she could not ' Indianise ' the 
Muslims, Unlike the previous invaders the muslims did not 
merge themselves with the Hindus and thus for the f i r s t time 
the population of India was divided in to two separate un i t s 
with marked d i s t i n c t i o n s . This was the h i s t o r i c beginning of 
the Hindu-Muslim problem tha t led af ter more than six hundreds 
27 
years to the creation of Pakis tan . The pat tern of r e l a t i o n s 
1^» 
between Hindus and Muslims since the early days of Muslim 
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rule was essen t i a l ly t h a t of conf l i c t . 
But insp i te of these a l l , not tha t a l l muslims los t 
t h e i r belief in the p o s s ib i l i t y of Hindu-Muslim un i ty . One 
who did not was Khaliquzzaman, who headed the muslim league 
in U.P. and l a t e r in Pakis tan. While not r egre t t ing h i s 
espousal of Pakis tan, he held tha t the muslim presence in 
India had led t o ' the evolution of a common culture and a 
common social l i f e , ' ^ That "the muslims were forced by 
circumstances to seek the p a r t i t i o n of the country" was, in 
h is view, more "a great irony" than an outcome of incompatibi-
l i t y . 
I t was an Irony because says Khaliquzzaman, "the 
30 
muslims had endevoured for centur ies to uni te Ind ia . " 
Though t h i s endevour was linked t o muslim r u l e , which meant 
minority r u l e . Many muslims found Pakistan a t h r i l l but 
p a r t i t i o n sad; they had bBen h e i r s , some of them at any r a t e , 
t o a t r a d i t i o n of a composite Indian or Hindustani cu l tu re . 
This cul ture had influenced Delhi and areas near i t ever 
since the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), a Hindu wife of whom 
gave b i r th t o his son and successor Jahangir . J ahang i r ' s 
Hindu wife was in turn the mother of emperor Shahjahan; and 
even Aurangjeb the devout married a Hindu noblewomen. The 
Mother of the l a s t mughal, Bahadur Shah I I (1837-57) was a 
Hindu too , cal led Lalbai . These Hindu wives were a l l 
y\\ 
converted t o Islam, only exception in case of Akbar, Hindu 
wives during the reign of Akbar were allowed t o p rac t i se 
31 t h e i r own re l ig ious r i t e s inside the palace. They may be 
considered as vehicles for an infusion of Hindu cul ture i n to 
the redfor t . Culture also flowed the other way. Many Hindu 
men took t o the muslim'achkan'and 'pajama' and Hindus of 
both sexes sought favours from the tombs of muslim s a i n t s . 
I t was common for the muslim ru l e r s t o celebrate; Hol i , 
Rakhi, Dussehra and Diwali and to fe te Hindus and Muslim 
toge ther . But the most s igni f icant fusion was over language. 
The cour t , Hindu and Muslim subjects and muslim and hindu 
poets increasingly used a new language tha t was evolving, 
Urdu, which had strong persian and Arabic flavours but was, 
in H a l i ' s words, "based on Hindi ." "All i t s verbs , p repos i t -
ions , conjunctions and the greater par t of i t s nouns," added 
32 Hal i , "are derived from Hindi. In Khaliquzzaman's es t imate , 
"Urdu contained about seventyfive percent words of Hindi and 
33 Sanskrit o r ig in . 
Khaliquzzaman r eca l l s a personal experience as he had had 
of Hindu-Muslim fr iendship, "I had now been the chairman of 
the Lucknow municipal Board for seven years . The Hindu 
members of the board continued t o support me loyaly* Now 
tha t I am at the fag end of my l i f e I have to thank them* 
Pandit Rasblhari Tiwaxi, who was the president of the Lucknow 
Hindu Mahasabha and had always opposed my e lec t ion as 
Chairman, asked me to see him in hosp i t a l . I found him very 
l\ 
weak, suffering from consumption. He took my hands in h i s , 
with t ea r s in his eyes, and asked h i s son, Birgudat Tiwari 
t o touch my feet and t r e a t me as h is father af ter he had 
gone. On the way back t o my house I f e l t very miserable, 
I was meeting nothing but affection from my Hindu fr iends 
personally but in matters of public po l i c i e s I had fa i l ed 
t o convince them. 
Indian muslim was afraid of the future . He was not 
l e s s keen for Ind i a ' s p o l i t i c a l progress , for independence 
from white r u l e , than the Hindu. Perhaps he was keener, foe 
h i s e lders were always reminding him tha t the English had 
toppled a mughal from the Delhi throne t h a t muslims had 
occupied for 650 years . But probably he was afraid of the 
other prominent claimers of the Indian r u l e r s h i p . 
As for HinAj r u l e , the muslim saw r i sk in i t . Only a 
section of Hindus had subscribed t o the composite cu l tu re . 
Wouldn't the r e s t , a majority, y ie ld t o urging t o r e c a l l the 
past ? Might they not see muslims as a l i e n s , indeed as a l iens 
t a r red with the anti-Hindu excesses of men l ike mahmud of 
/ G h a z n i and desire revenge in estimating t h e i r prospects 
under majority r u l e , Ind ia ' s muslims were influenced by 
the i r reading of h i s to ry . 
I t i s a fact t ha t many muslim ru le r levied the J i z i a 
(though several did not) and at l e a s t one (Firoz Shah Tughlak) 
2? 
(1351-1358) fostered conversions by offering t o withdraw 
i t . Most muslim ru le r s had t o ca l l Islam the o f f i c i a l 
r e l i g ion ; without such an affirmation they would have 
al ienated the ulama, the body of Islamic scholars and 
i n t e r p r e t e r s , which was seldom without inf luence, and a lso 
strengthened the hands of t h e i r muslim r i v a l s and chal len-
gers . 
Hindu temples were defaced by muslim r u l e r s — and 
also preserved by them. If some ru le r s permitted the 
sac r i f i ce of Cows, o thers , out of an understanding of Hindu 
sentiment, discouraged cow k i l l i n g . The Hindu assumption 
t h a t muslims were outcastes was not always concealed but 
the muslim ru le r s chose not to react angrily to i t ; they 
jus t ignored i t . And though some conversions, frequently 
shor t - l ived , were obtained at swo^dpoint, and others through 
the cure of honours, decorations and money. 
Akbar's bid for Hindu-Muslim unity was bold, too bold 
in f ac t . Not only did he abolish the j i z i a and c rea te , by 
appointing Hindus t o v i t a l posts in the empire, a mixed 
governing c l a s s , he also allowed his enemies t o charge tha t 
the emperor sought t o d i lu te Islam out of recogni t ion. His 
great grandson Dara Sikoh, the e ldes t son of emperor 
Shahjahan and the apple of h i s f a t h e r ' s eyes, believed in 
what he cal led "The mingling of the two oceans," t r a n s l a t e d 
n 
portions of the Upanishad?and declared tha t the l a t t e r 
were of divine or ig in . But in the b a t t l e for succession 
the broad-minded but weak and moody Dara los t out t o h i s 
self control led and pur i t an ica l younger brother , Aurangjeb. 
Aurangjeb reim|3osed the hated j i z i a . His regime saw 
the destruct ion of many a Hindu temples (Viswanath Temple 
in Varanasi, e t c . ) , the execution of Hindus and Sikhs, 
including the ninth sikh teacher . Guru Tej Bahadur, and 
two Sons of the tenth Guru, and humiliation of many of his 
non-muslim subjects . His c lashes, offensive or defensive 
with the Rajputs, Sikhs and marathas and with muslim 
Chieftains in the south ate the l i f e out of the mughal 
empire, and h is po l ic ies induced hate in Hindus and Sikhs. 
That he rea l ized what had happened, and also sensed h i s 
personal r e spons ib i l i t y , i s indicated in the l e t t e r he wrote 
in his l a s t days to h is favourite son Kam Baksh: 
'Son of my s o u l . . . now I am going alone. I grieve for 
your helplessness . But what i s the use ? I have grea t ly 
sinned, and I know not what torment awaits me . . . Let not 
muslims be s la in and reproach f a l l on my useless head. I 
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commit you and your sons t o God's care , I am sure t roubled. 
If we except Aurangjeb and his unfortunate excess of 
zea l , we can agree with Mujeeb tha t the mughal s t a t e "was 
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Islamic only in the sense t h a t the ru le r was a rauslim and 
the rul ing party mainly rauslim. No doubt the government 
promoted the i n t e r e s t of the rul ing c l a s s , and t h a t c lass 
happened to be mainly rauslims, but the s t a t e was not a 
theocracy. 
If Islam rode across India viith the sword and spoke 
from the throne, i t also walked with the Sufi and spoke in 
gent ler cadences from the hut . The Suf is , Muslim mystics, 
ta lked of the love of God and the brotherhood of man, of the 
shortness of l i f e and the length of e t e r n i t y . Their 
thoughts took root ; t h e i r language did not seem a l i en . 
Numerous Hindu admirers and d ic ip les were drawn to them and, 
af ter t h e i r death to t h e i r tombs. Likewise many muslims 
fe l t a t t r ac ted to the Bhakti saints , '^ 
The Suf i ' s and the Bhakti poets brought Hindus and 
Muslims closer at the g rass roo ts . Affirming often in memora-
ble verse , tha t there was no difference between Hindus and 
Muslims, or between Ram andRahim or between Hinduism and 
Islam, some of these mystics refused to accept e i t he r the 
Hindu or the Muslim label for themselves. The best known 
among them i s , of course, the f i f teenth century saint poet , 
Kabir. The orthodox in both communities warned the fa i th fu l 
against persons who denied the existence of differences and 
questioned the value of ex t e rna l s . That inward bel ief was 
not possible without outward observance was the posi t ion of 
'}^ 
Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, the b r i l l i a n t pu r i s t (1562-1624) 
who reacted against Akber's heterodoxy. But the Sufis did 
not f a l l i n - l i n e . Despite arthodox warning t h e message of 
the muslim sufies and the Hindu Bhakti school reached and 
upl i f ted large sections of the common folk , muslim and 
Hindu, and tended t o uni te them. 
After the decline of the great mughals, and domination 
many markable changes came in muslim p o l i t i c s 
of Br i t i shers over Indian sub-continent ^ o f India. The 
downgoing mughal ar is tocracy saw tha t they had shared power 
t o t he i r increasing dis-advantage with plebians-marathas, 
j a t s and indeed Afghan adventurers. Why should they not acco-
modate the Br i t i sh — who ranked some where betv^een banias 
and marathas ? The Br i t i sh themselves in 1803 were ra ther 
awed by the i r own success and respectful towards mughal 
mughal cu l tu re . Perhaps the Bri t ish were prepared to accept 
the Indian p o l i t i c a l world of the mediatised prince and the 
nominal supremacy of mughal emperor Shah Alam, Shah Alam 
thought that the dream of res to ra t ion of empire would be 
easy through the help of B r i t i s h e r s . But i t was a dream 
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only. ' The Br i t i sh acted upon t h e i r t h e s i s tha t Shah Alam 
was a crowned jpensionary by s e t t l i ng upon him eleven and a 
half lakh of rupees, drawn from the land revenue of areas 
west of the Jamuna, and allowing him to re ta in rul ing powers 
within the area of the Red-fort . In the time of Shah Alam's 
son and successor, Akbar I I (1806-37). The Br i t i sh reinforced 
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t h e i r j^ensionary t he s i s by refusing t o recognise, h i s r igh t 
t o nominate his successor and by Lord Hastings (1754-1826) 
refusing when governor general t o stand in Akbar's presence. 
In the eighteen f o r t i e s the Br i t i sh began t o omit those 
cour tes ies due t o a king which they had formerly shown. 
In 1844 Lord Bllenborough (179 -1871) abolished the 
presentat ion of nazrs , dishonestly concealing the fact t ha t 
the d i rec tors of the East India Company had decided t o 
continue them for the l ifet ime of the then King, Bahadur 
Shah. Eventually, in 1851, Bahadur Shah received the monthly 
Sum of 833 rupees in l ieu of his nazrs . In 1849 Dalhousie 
(1812-60) agreed to recognise Mirza Fakhral-din as h e i r -
apparent on condition tha t at Bahadur Shah's death the royal 
family move out of the Red f o r t . In 1856, however, Mirza 
Fakhral-din died and the new governor general coming would 
only recognises Mirza Muhammad Kalash as Shahzada or prince 
of the house of Timur.'^^ 
The Br i t i sh in India had by 1857 persuaded themselves 
without d i f f icu l ty t h a t the mughals in Delhi were an anomaly 
and t h e i r existence a matter of indifference even to the 
muslim population of the East India company's t e r r i t o r i e s . 
The East India Company f e l t s a t i s f i ed with her success and 
followed a more fea r l ess policy towards Indian subjects.^"^ 
'l^ 
For the muslim eli te in northern India , muslim conquest 
meant the destruction of the way of l i f e more than l i v e l i -
hood. Bishol Heber, wri t ing in 1824 while passing through 
Rohilkhand, provides the occasional observation, "The 
musalman ch ie fs , who are numerous, are very angry at being 
without employment under government, or hope of r i s ing in 
the s t a t e or Army, and are continually breaking out in to ac ts 
of insubordination and violence. The Rohilkhand i s burdened 
with a crows lazy, prof l iga te se l f - ca l l ed Suwars who, though 
many of them are not worth a rupee, conceive i t derogatory t o 
t h e i r g e n t i l i t y and Patan blood to aply themselves t o any 
honest indust ry , and obtain for the most par t a precar ious 
l ivel ihood by sponging on the industr ious tradesman and 
farmers, on whom they levy a sort of blackmail, or as hangers-
on t o the few noble and wealthy families yet remaining in the 
province, of these men, who have no v i s ib le means of mainte-
nance at a l l and no v i s ib le occupation except that of lounging 
up and down with t h e i r swords and shields l ike the ancient . 
Highlanders, whom in many respects they much resemble, the 
number i s ra ted at perhaps, taking a l l Rohilkhand toge ther , 
not lower than 100,000, a l l these men have everything t o gain 
from a change of government." 
In j ud i c i a l and revenue employ, muslims held t h e i r own 
u n t i l the middle of nineteenth century. But now they held 
t h e i r posts at the pleasure of al ien and in f ide l masters and, 
af ter the abol i t ion of Persian as the language of the courts 
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in 1837, in increasing composition with Hindus who had 
learn t English. On revenue adminis t ra t ion, as money was the 
company's pr inc ipa l concern, European control was es tab l i shed . 
In 1772 European co l lec tors were appointed t o the D i s t r i c t s 
of Bengal* Although they were withdrawn in 1774 they were 
f ina l ly r e ins ta ted in 1785. The consequence of angl ic i sa t ion 
of the revenue system for the muslims in Bengal was not that 
they los t employment but tha t they los t income, Hindus had 
44 dominated revenue employment under the mughals in Bengal. 
In Chittagong d i s t r i c t in L777 there were only five muslims 
t o fortytwo Hindu employees in the revenue of f ices . 
Lord Comwallis 's (1738-1805) reorgenisat ion of the 
company's government in Bengal s tarkly revealed tha t muslims 
would not be subordinate par tners but merely subordinates. 
In 1790 cornwallis abolished the office of n a ' i b nizam. 
muslim judges were dismissed and European judges were appoin-
ted , who were also given charge of the pol ice as magis t ra tes . 
The career prospect of muslims were l imited to appointments 
as nat ive commissioners (amins, s a l i s or munsifs) in minor 
c i v i l s u i t s as advisory quazis . 
In the north western jsrovinces, composed of the t e r r i -
t o r i e s coded by the nawab of Awadh in 1801 and those obtained 
by the defeat of the marathas subordinate j ud i c i a l o f f i c i a l s . 
In 1850 they held 72^ of the j ud i c i a l posts open to Indians , 
t ha t i s , up t o the post of Sadar Amin and including almost 
a l l the appointments in the l a t t e r par t .^^ They were equally 
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dominant in the subordinate revenue service. In 1853 Banda, 
Gotakhpur, Muradabad, Azamgarh, Gurgaon, Ghazipur and 
* 48 
Bharathana are named as having muslim deputy collectors, 
and in 1856 Farrukhabad, Ghazipur, Jalaon, Meerut, Mutta, 
49 Aligarh, Mainpuri, Etawa, Gorakhpur and Sahjahanpur, 
Muslims were very numerous too among the tahsildars, or 
Indian collectors of revenue, at the tehsil level. Majority 
of inspectors of police in northern India were muslims as 
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were a majority of the rank and file,~^^ 
Br i t i sh rule profoundly changed the re la t ionsh ip of 
the landed classes to the land in India . In some provinces 
muslims proved special ly vulnerable to B r i t i s h - induced 
change, in others l ess so or not at a l l , as Br i t i sh aggre-
rian policy varied from province to province. Much depended 
on how far muslims in the eighteenth century had transformed 
themselves in to zamindars and on whether they enjoyed incomes 
from j a g i r s or from grants of revenue free land. In Bengal 
Muslim did not become as s ignif icant a proportion of the new 
landlord class as t h e i r numbers among the population might 
suggest, in the North-West provinces a muslim landlord class 
excercised an influence and power which pers i s t ed in to the 
twentieth century,*-^ 
A class of muslim landholder commonly believed t o have 
suffered great ly from Br i t i sh rule was the holder of revenue 
free land or the rec ip ien t of land revenue from the cu l t iva to r s 
of a specified area. Such grants were made on a considerable 
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scale by muslim rulers. In order to receipts from lands 
revenue, the East India Company issued, from 1793 onwards, 
regulations for the investigation and resumption of those 
holdings which did not possess unimpeachable title deeds 
properly registered with the collector. Muslims in Bengal 
were worse hit than others by resumption proceedings.^ 
In the upper provinces, Muslim grantees were certainly 
not destroyed as a class before 1857. The revenue proceedings 
for 1859, recording confiscations of holdings for rebellion 
in 1857, mention, for example 255 muslim Muafidars in 
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Shahjahanpur district and 109 in Shikarpur paragana.^^ In 
Meerut district, there were 350 muslim and 21 Hindu Muafidars 
mentioned in a return of 22 Nov. 1858.^ 
The Britishers desired a land system which would case 
the task of collecting the state's traditional share of the 
gross produce of the soil, and create a loyal class of land-
holders. To fulfill this requirement a permanent settlement 
with Zamindars were made in 1793 during the reign of Cornwa-
llish. The long term effect of the permanent settlement was 
to depress the status of the cultivator whether Hindu or 
Muslim. No proper attempts were made by Cornwallis to ascer-
tain the extent of the lands,^~' to which zamindars were given 
proprietory titles, and this enabled the zamindars to deprive 
cultivators of their customary rights to graze the pasture 
land and to use the waste land. 
:^ i 
Probably the mosltms were better able to bear the 
introduction of landed proprietorship, (permanent settlement) 
in north western provinces than in Bengal. Muslims were to 
be found alongside Hindus as tenants, occupancy cultivators, 
village zamindars, revenue farmers, revenue officials and 
accountants, Benares provides a classic illustration of the 
interpretation of Hindus and muslim in rural society. The 
Raja of Benares was a Hindu Chief, obliged to furnish troops 
and money for his muslim overlord, the Nawab of Awadh. He 
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employed both Hindu and Muslim mill to collect revenue. 
In Ghazipur in 1989 Jonathan Duncan (1756-1811) made settle-
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ments with both Hindu and Muslim tribes. In a revenue 
settlement in Rohilkhand in 1802, eleven of the revenue engag-
ers were muslim and eight Hindu. 
In brief, we may say that establishment of British 
rule in India affected different classes of muslims in 
different ways. For a minority it destroyed not a livelihood, 
but a way of life, and damaged not so much their pockets as 
their Jjride. For the mughal court at Delhi and the muslim 
aristocracy attached to it, life under British patronage was 
probably materially no worse than life under maratha patronage-
but the patronage was made more galling by a generation of 
British functionaries who put a low price upon the mughal 
past and the mughal present in the market of utility, who 
scorned gentility and poetry and those who did not live labo-
rious lives. 
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Afterall we may say that by 1800 an irreversible 
changes took place in temporal setting of Islamic rule in 
India. Marathas, Sikhs and English Bast India Company had 
overborne Mughal Military power and become the effective 
rulers, even in the territory of Delhi itself. Muslim ruling 
elites were neither rudely supplanted nor did they all 
immediately suffer hardship; indeed some of their members 
quickly made themselves, with personal profit, indispensable 
to the new masters. By 1803 the East India Company had 
occupied Delhi and Agra, the historical centres of Mughal 
imperial power, and had begun to control the application of 
Islamic law to muslim society. In their savage repression 
of mutiny and rebellion in 1857-1858, the British demonstra-
ted that any future muslim success and prosperity must be 
on terms laid down by British rulers. Moreover, muslims were 
obliged to live under censorious rulers who made it possible 
for christian missionaries publicaly to attack their religion 
and for any one to allege that muslims were behind in the 
race of progress because they were muslim. Infidels had 
conquered muslims before but had often surrendered to Islam 
later. Now western imperialism intellectual and moral as 
well as political, seemed to proclaim that either God was 
not omnipotent or that he was punishing his would-be servants 
for failing to be true and faithful servants.^^ 
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But Some muslims were prepared t o object publlcaly 
t o the way his tory was going in ear ly nineteenth century 
India . They were those who as muslim scholars did not care 
t o see the express commands of God openly disregarded, 
those upon whom Bri t i sh rule was quicker t o take effect and 
those who had no expecta t ions , as the former rul ing e l i t e 
of the upper provinces had, t ha t the Br i t i sh would recognise 
t h e i r mer i t s . 
Muslim scholars (Ulama) had been slow to react pub l l -
caly t o Br i t i sh r u l e , perhaps because the East India Company 
had only very gradually departed from the medieval modus 
Vivendi between the re l ig ious and the p o l i t i c a l establishment. 
Unt i l 1790, penal ju s t i ce in Bengal continued t o be dispensed 
according to the revived shar ia norms of Aurangjeb's time 
and regulat ion I I of 1772 had provided t h a t 'in a l l s u i t s 
regarding inher i tance , succession, marriage and caste and 
other usages and i n s t i t u t i o n s , the law of the Quran with 
respect t o muhammadans... sha l l be invariably adhered t o . * 
But in the l a s t decade of eighteenth century and in the 
f i r s t decade of the nineteenth, the East India Company began 
by l eg i s l a t i on t o subs t i tu te i t s own ru les of evidence, 
def ini t ions of offences and pena l t i es for those of the shar ia . 
The leading Delhi scholar. Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824), son 
of Shah Wall-Allah, protested at t h i s formal interference 
with the substant ia te content of the Islamic holy law, by 
declaring those areas of northern India under Br i t i sh supre-
macy t o be Dar-Al-Herb (the abode of war).^^ But t h i s was 
an academic ru l ina bv an academif^lan +. A O O C A 'I ' t^a ^ A«i« <* i«4 k^w« 4Ne 
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of those obliged t o l ive under non-muslim laws administered 
by non-muslims, 
Saiyid Ahmad of Rai Barei l ly (1786-1831) made a more 
act ive ca l l t o muslims t o stand up for Islam as a public way 
of l i f e , but even he did not openly r e s i s t the East India 
Compart/ in i t s t e r r i t o r i e s . "^  
Saiyid Ahmad was born in to an obscure family, possibly 
in minor of f ic ia l serv ice . ^ Tradi t ion has i t tha t he found 
reading and writ ing d i f f i c u l t , but t h a t in 1807 he had been 
accepted as a pu^il by Shah Abd-ul-Aziz and i n i t i a t e d in to 
the Naqshbandl, Qadiri and Chis t i o rders . From about 1809 
t o 1818 he was a trooper under the pindar i ch ie f ta in , Amir 
Khan, l a t e r the nawab of Tonk; probably there was nothing 
t o dis t inguish him outwardly from other pindar i freebooter . 
The l a t e r story tha t he t r i e d to influence Amir Khan against 
making peace with the Br i t i sh i s apocryphal. ^ After the 
suppression of the p indar i s , Saiyid Ahmad returned t o Delhi 
where he attached himself to Shah Abdul-Aziz. He formed 
t i e s with Shah Ismail (1781-1831) and maulwi Abd-ul-Haiy, 
nephew and son-in-law respect ively of Shah-Abdul-Aziz. Between 
the middle of 1819 and July 1821 he stayed in Rai Barei l ly 
and began preaching during t h i s period. 
Saiyid Ahmad s ta r t ed the journey t o mecca, in Ju ly 1821, 
t o perform Haj j . He returned t o India in November 1823. The 
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next two years were spent in teaching, organising h is 
followers and col lect ing funds in the upper provinces. In 
January 18261, however, he l e f t Rai Bare i l ly and af ter a 
c i rcui tous journey of nearly th ree thousand miles through 
Rajputana, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan with h i s 
followers he reached Gharsadda in the Hastnagar d i s t r i c t . 
From there he declared a j ihad against the Sikh ru le r of 
the Punjab, Ranjit Singh, In a night a t tack upon Sikhs near 
Naushera the Mujahidin were successful and Saiyid Ahmad was 
joined by neighbouring Pathan Chiefs , including the Sardars 
of Peshawar, 
Saiyid Ahmad was declared Imam in January 1B27. I t was 
d i f f i cu l t to impose unity upon the Pathan tribesman and af te r 
a betrayal by one of the Peshawar Sardars , yar Muhammad Khan 
the Mujahidin were defeated at Shaidu near Akora in March 
1827. Saiyid Ahmad now toured the Pathan t r i b a l areas gathe-
ring r e c r u i t s and moved h i s headquarters to Panj ta r . He 
defeated Yar Muhammad Khan and was able to e s tab l i sh himself 
a t Peshwar in 1830. The local Pathan resented control by 
ou t s ide r s , even in the name of Islam, and rose against 
Saiyid Ahmad's tax co l l e c to r s . Murdering many and forcing 
him t o return t o Panj ta r . In iMay 1831 at Balakot on the 
Kaghan r i ve r , in an area where he was t ry ing t o e n l i s t the 
local chiefs against the Sikhs in Hazara and Kashmir, he. 
Shah Ismail and nearly six hundred of h is followers were 
killed.^*^ 
'!,'^ 
Saiyid Ahmad described h i s path as the T a r i q a - i -
Muhammadi, the Muhamnadan mystical pa th . Although he p roc l -
aimed the love of a prophet for God t o be superior t o t h a t 
of mystic, because a prophet i s concerned t o create the good 
Society on ear th whereas the mystic i s concerned only with 
h is own sou l ' s welfare; the path of sainthood and the path 
of prophethood are complementary. Saiyid Ahmad and Shah 
Ismail condemed pilgrimage t o hindu holy p laces , pa r t i c ipa t ion 
in hindu f e s t i v a l s , consulting Brahmins and resor t ing to 
6Q ast rologers and fortune t e l l e r s , "^  He t r i e d to weaken the 
Indo-Muslim prejudice against widow-remarriage. But he did 
70 not se t up as a faqih or canon lawyer, 
Saiyid Ahmad le f t behind him among Indian muslims what 
the prophet had l e f t behind him in Arabia. From February 
1829 the Holy law governed, or so i t was recorded, the 
community of mujahidin. As the prophet, according t o muslim 
t r a d i t i o n s wrote l e t t e r s t o the great powers of h is day ca l l ing 
upon them to accept h is prophethood, so Saiyid Ahmad, according 
t o reformist t r a d i t i o n , wrote l e t t e r s to muslim ru le r s in 
cent ra l Asia under the t i t l e of Amir-al-muminin, ca l l ing upon 
them t o recognise his Khi lafat . He described how Hindustan 
had fal len under the rule of Chris t ians and how he would 
s t r i ve t o free i t and to es tab l i sh the supremacy of the 
Shal la t over i t . ^ ^ 
The surviving Mujahidin af ter the f i e ld of Balakot 
eventually found a refuge in remote S i t tana where they 
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continued t o Obey the mandates of t h e S h a r i a , c o l l e c t i n g t h e 
Ushr or T i the for benevolent purposes and levying f i n e s fo r 
non-a t tendaoce a t p r a y e r . Before h i s death Sa iy id Ahmad had 
sent a number of d e p u t i e s , inc lud ing two b r o t h e r s , Maulwi 
Wilayat Al i (1791-1853) and Inaya t Ali (1794-1858) of P a t n a , 
t o organise t h e i nd i spensab le t a i l of t h e army of t h e f a i t h f u l 
on the f r o n t i e r . They in t u r n sent m i s s i o n a r i e s on mission 
t o tour I nd i a both t o preach and t o organise ' f i s c a l c i r c l e s ' 
under c o l l e c t o r s t o c o l l e c t funds which would e v e n t u a l l y be 
forwarded t o the Muzahidin on the f r o n t i e r . 
The B r i t i s h were e a r l y appr i sed of Sa iy id Ahmad's 
campaigns aga ins t t h e S ikhs , through t h e i r p o l i t i c a l agents 
in Sikh t e r r i t o r y . After h i s death they c o r r e c t l y gauged 
t h a t h i s fo l lowers in tended the even tua l overthrow of B r i t i s h 
r u l e , but recognis ing the r e fo rmis t r e l i g i o u s aims as not 
n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l wi th t h e longterm p o l i t i c a l a ims, t hey 
72 thought p rosecu t ion would be savour of p e r s e c u t i o n . 
Contemporary with Sa iy id Ahmad, t h e r e arose in Bengal 
another r e l i g i o u s movement. I t was F a r a i z i movement founded 
by H a j j i S h a r i a t Allah (1781-1840).'^'^ H a j j i Ahmad had 
e a r l i e r l i v e d in t h e Hejaz for about e igh teen y e a r s . He 
sought t o t e a c h Benga l i , Muslims t o observe t h e o b l i g a t o r y 
d u t i e s of Is lam, t o abandon reverence for p i r s , and t o 
for shake 'Hinduized ' l i f e ceremonies , on t h e ground t h a t 
t h e r e were no proper ly c o n s t i t u t e d muslim r u l e r s and quz i s 
in n ine t een th century I n d i a , t h e F a r a z i s abandoned Fr iday 
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and Id p r a y e r s . Under Ha j j i S h a r i a t A l l a h ' s son Dudu Miyan 
(1819-1862) v io lence broke out between t h e movements l a r g e l y 
peasan t s fol lowing and t h e l a n d l o r d s . 
Throughout the n ine t een th century a v a r i e t y of Sunni 
s c h o l a r s and t e a c h e r s , i nc lud ing Maulana Karamat J aunpur i 
(D. 1873), a fol lower of Sa iy id Ahmad Barelwi w i l l i n g t o 
accept B r i t i s h r u l e , devoted themselves t o r i d Is lam in 
Bengal of P o l y t h e i s t i c a t t i t u d e s and p r a c t i c e s , while 
d i sag ree ing among themselves about t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of 
Tasawwuf, or about which school of j u r i sp rudence should be 
fo l lowed. 
In the fa r south among t h e Moplas, Ulma such as Sa iy id 
Alawi (D. 1843) and h i s son Sayyid Fadl (D, 1900) , through 
c r e a t i n g no formal o r g a n i s a t i o n , pe rpe tua ted l o c a l muslim 
t r a d i t i o n of J i h a d and martyrdom so t h a t the v i o l e n t Mopla 
ag ra r i an oppos i t ion t o Hindu l a n d l o r d s , and t o the B r i t i s h , 
which continued throughout n ine t een th cen tu ry and during t h e 
Mopla r e b e l l i o n of 1921, was expressed in t h e idiom of a 
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r e t u r n t o the e a r l i e s t days of Is lam, 
But renewal of I s lam, by a t tempts t o r ev ive t h e be l i eved 
p a t t e r n s of a model e r a , occuied mainly as a peaceful process 
of educat ion by the 'Ulama' . They p r o g r e s s i v e l y took over 
t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s h i p of muslims in I n d i a under non-muslim 
r u l e . Shah Abd-al-Aziz had begun t o a s s e r t t h a t l e a d e r s h i p 
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by delivering rulings (Fatwah) to the many muslims seeking 
assurance in a period of rapid change. The position of 
•Ulama' was* strengthend in the course of Sunni Shia contro-
versy - Shah Abd-al-Aziz's Tulfat-al-Ithna 'AShariyah (A 
offering to the twelvers) was of major significance — and 
in public debate with christian missionaries. After 1857, 
the Ulama at Deoband proved adept at using the post, tele-
graph, railways, and the press to communicate their teachings 
to the Urdu knowing muslim public. Their leaders, Maulana 
Muhammad Qasion Nanawatwi (1832-1880) and Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi (1828-1905) stood for the Hanafi school, subjecting 
local Custom to a careful critique in the light of the model 
practice of the prophet and seeking always to ensure that 
believers kept the divine tawhid (unity) before them. The 
Deobandi leaders assumed the status of Sufi Saikhs and 
initiated disciples. But the special efficacies (Karamat) 
that were attributed to them were depicted as being exercised 
to influence people to follow the Sunnah. The Deobandis were 
opposed to treating the tombs of Saikhs as centres of worship 
or intercession. Since some leading Deobandis claimed initia-
tion Into all the main Sufi orders in South Asia, Deoband 
encouraged comprehensiveness and consolidation of intellectual 
and experimental traditions. Although they accepted the 
British as rulers, the Deobandi weighed their culture and 
usually found it wanting, Muslims were not to accept their 
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contemporary world on its own terms. 
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The Ahl-i-Hadith (people of Haditli) were another 
group of •Ulama' aining to reform custom and t o purify 
convictions*soiled by customs. Led by Siddiq Hasan Khan 
(1832-1890) and Saiyid Nadir Hussayn (D. 1902) they derided 
the authori ty of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
in favour of a l i t e r a l interpretat-ion of Quran and Hadith. 
At the Same tiiT»e they opposed the Sufism of the shr ines . 
However, the Ahl-i-Hadith 's treatment of the prophet Muhammad's 
hadith as an impl ic i t revelat ion which elaborated a u t h o r i t a t i -
vely the e x p l i c i t revela t ion of the Quran exposed them to the 
charge of introducing a dualism in to God's communication with 
human. 
Titu mirled a movement named ' L o l l a r d ' . I t was the 
most violant movement of Bengali Muslims at required Br i t i sh 
Mil i tary action for suppression. Born in 1782 in chandpur 
in the twenty-four paragana, Titu mir was described as a 
wres t ler and as leading in the Calcutta d i s t r i c t u n t i l about 
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1815 the l i f e of 'a bad and desperate c h a r a c t e r , ' Appare-
n t ly he acted as a 's trong arm-man' for some Hindu Zamindars 
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at Madia and was imprisoned for an affracy. But by 1827 he 
was campaigining in favour of a purified Islam in a idiom 
similar to that of Saiyid Ahmad Barelwi and Hajji Shari-al-
Allah. His sphere of operation was mainly in West Bengal. 
He directed his follower to grow beards and to tie their 
dhotis in a distinctive fashion.^^ 
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The reform movement of Saiyid Ahmad Barelwi and of 
the fa raz i s contributed t o the gradual transformation of the 
Indian muslijn community from an aggregate of be l ievers in to 
a p o l i t i c a l association with a wi l l for j o in t ac t ion . Their 
reformist movements of the nineteenth century en l i s t ed 
muslims outside the former rul ing c i r c l e s of whom Saiyid 
Ahmad was openly c r i t i c a l for t h e i r wil l ingness t o act as 
col laborators of the B r i t i s h ^ - in ef fect t ry ing t o achieve 
a ju s t e r and more God-fearing society by popular co-operation. 
The muslim reform movements of the nineteenth century 
helped t o transform muslim a t t i t ude towards Hindus. They 
were e s sen t i a l ly re jec t ions of medieval Islam in India in 
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favour of ear ly Islam in Arabia. They were not only move-
ments confinded t o the l ib ra ry and t o the study, t h e i r expo-
nents did not merely formulate i n t e l l e c t u a l posi t ions against 
monism, but went out and preached against the customs which 
so many muslims shared with the Hindus- in tercess ion at the 
tombs of s a i n t s , consultation of Brahmins, even vegetarianism 
and aversion t o the remarriage of widows, Muslims in India 
were to be made aware of what they did not share with t h e i r 
non-muslim neighbours. India could be made by the reformers 
to feel not l ike a home, but l ike a h a b i t a t . The re l ig ious 
and Social activism of Dudu Miyan and Titu ^it in Bengal could 
r e su l t in a soc ia l and economic conf l ic t assuming a conniunal 
82 guise . 
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The mili tancy of Saiyid Ahmad and Dudu Miyan's 
followers was t o have profound long-term ef fec t s on Br i t i sh 
p o l i t i c a l s t re tegy in India . I t helped t o reinforce the 
Bri t i sh belief af ter 1857, tha t muslims were by nature 
fana t ica l and i r reconci lable and could not be kept quiet 
by a judicious mixture buffets and boons, not necessa r i ly , 
however, t o be administered to the same muslims. For the 
reformist movements, with t h e i r a t tacks on landlords and 
t h e i r disrespect for family and pos i t ion , alarmed t h e ' b e t t e r 
c l a s s ' muslim. The Br i t i sh saw t h i s and by offering favours 
t o those muslims with something t o loose were able t o i s o l a t e 
and Contain the a c t i v i t y disaffected. 
Because in thinking about muslims a f te r 1857, the 
so-cal led wahabis were for the Br i t i sh the great unthinkable 
tha t was always thought, the Br i t i sh were usual ly ready t o 
meet the demands of ' r e spec tab le ' muslims more than half way. 
But i t took the trauma of the mutiny and Rebellion of 1857-58 
t o open up these p o l i t i c a l perspect ive . Before 1857 Br i t i sh 
po l i c i e s were generally speaking 'community-blind', muslims 
were members of 'a fa l len r a c e ' or in George Campbell's words 
The most gentlemanly and well-mannered of those seeking 
employment under the company. By 1888 however, for the then 
viceroy, Lord Dufferin, they had become 'one ofthe two mighty 
p o l i t i c a l communities of our Indian "Cosmos." 
A most important and changing point comes to the Indian 
h i s to ry . I t was the great rebel l ion of 1857. I t was a 
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trauma for the both — muslitns of northern India and B r i t i s h . 
The Savage Br i t i sh supression of the niutiny resu l ted in 
destruct ion of Delhi as a centre of muslim cu l tu re . The 
decendants of great mughals were dispersed by execution 
and e x i l e . At l a s t the educated muslims rea l i sed tha t the 
Br i t i sh were not only in India to stay but also they intended 
t o stay on t h e i r own terms. The l a s t i l l u s i o n s t ha t B r i t i -
shers were the mayors of the mughal palace were d iss ipa ted , 
the i l l u s ion t h a t an education in persian and Urdu and in 
the muslim re l ig ious sciences would serve both a muslim's 
e ternal and his^wccldly welfare were torn away. Most of the 
Br i t i shers observed the muslims as a rebel in 1857. Dr. 
Metcalf has summed up the typ ica l Br i t i sh a t t i t u d e , ^ 
"The f i r s t spark of disaffect ion i t was generally 
agreed, were kindled among the hindu sepoys who feared an 
at tack upon t h e i r cas te . But the muslims then fanned the 
flames of discontent and placed themselves at the head of 
the movement, for they saw in these r e l ig ious grievances 
the stepping stone to p o l i t i c a l power. In the Bri t i sh view i t 
was muslim in t r igue and muslim leadership tha t converted a 
sepoy mutiny in to a p o l i t i c a l conspiracy, aimed at the 
ext inct ion of the Bri t i sh R a j . " * 
Sir William Mular Writes : "the musalmans, while they 
thought t h e i r ca'jse had a fa i r chance of f inal success have 
frequently compromised themselves by flaggantly t r a i t o rous 
4 * 
a c t s . At Aligarh, for ins tance , the nruslims were for a 
considerable time dominant; they forcH)ly converted many 
Hindus; they defied our government in the most insolent 
manner, a l l the ancient feel ings of warring for the f a i t h , 
reminding one of the days of the f i r s t Khalifas , were 
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resusc i t a ted , 
John Lawrence (1811-79) on 14 June 1857, wrote to the 
governor general , Lord Canning (1812-62), "The Mohommendans 
of the regular cavalry when they have broken out have d i sp la -
yed a more ac t ive , vindict ive and fena t ic s p i r i t than the 
Hindoos - but these t r a i t s are cha rac t e r i s t i c of the race;"^ 
Charles Raikes (1812-85) col lector at Agra, wri t ing while 
passions were s t i l l ranging, saw the muslims as innately 
hos t i l e to the Br i t i sh . "The green f lag of Mahomed too 
had been unfurled, the mass of the followers of the false 
prophet rejoicing t o believe tha t under the auspices of the 
Great Mughal of Delhi t h e i r los t ascendancy was to be recove-
red, t he i r deep hatred to the chr i s t i an got vent , and they 
rushed forth t o k i l l and destroy."®^ 
Muslims par t ic ipa ted warmly in the revol t of 1857. I t 
was they who rode off fronn Meerut t o Delhi t o set up Bahadur 
Shah at the head of the r ebe l l i on . Bahadur Shah a lso had no 
objection, but i t was very natura l for hira because there was 
no reason to love Europeans, who were going t o reduce h i s 
family af ter h is death t o a house near Qutub Minar. By 
n igh t f a l l on 11 May 1857, the day a f te r the mutiny at Meerut, 
i^  
a salvo of twenty-one guns at Delhi announced tha t Bahadur 
Shah had assumed the ^Aantle of A.kbar, Shahjahan and Aurangjeb. 
within Delhi i t s e l f seemed almost as if the great days of 
the mughals had come again, A proclamation was issued in 
the mughal name ca l l ing upon a l l who wished t o save t h e i r 
r e l ig ion t o join the troops and not to leave t h e i r re l ig ion 
90 t o jo in the troops and not to leave any unbelievers a l i v e . 
Events in Awadh, too , seemed t o confirm the muslim 
character of the r i s i n g . There the sepoys r a l l i o d under the 
standard of Bir j i s Qadir, a minor son of the exiled king of 
Awadh (Wajid Ali Shah, 1847-56) and his mother Hazarat Mahal 
(D. 1879), who was one of the Indian heroes of 1857. The 
chief commissioner of Agra, colonel H. Fraser (D. 1858), 
advised against abandoning Lucknow af te r the Bri t i sh storm 
of Delhi in September, as i t would be 'reoccupied as the 
Head of the Mahomedan r e b e l l i o n ' . The famous 'Times' cor res -
pondent, William Howarad russe l (1820-1907), spoke of Begum 
Hazrat Mahal as ex is t ing a l l Awadh to take up the i n t e r e s t s 
of her Son and as declaring undying war against the Br i t i sh , 
Countryside events also pointed out to the Muslim 
character of the r i s i n g . 'The Mahomedan v i l l ages in the Doab 
and the people in the neighbouring of Aligarh were by far the 
worst in the d i s t r i c t . They seemed to have r isen as i f by 
singfiil. In Aligarh 'The fanat ica l lower mussalmans, jooluhas 
r a i s e d ' the cry of "Deen Deen" . ^ One Ghiyath Muhammad Khan 
Jfl 
proclaimed himself at Aligarh as subadar on behalf of 
Bahadoi Shah I I . The muslim population of Rohilkhand, 
composed of ,the d i s t t i c t of Bare i l ly , Muradabad, Shahjahan-
pur, Badaun and Bijnor, had strongly resented Br i t i sh rule 
since company annexation in 1801. They had r io ted against 
taxa t ion in 1816 and troops had to be cal led i n . Khan 
Bahadur Khan (1790-1859), grandson of Hafiz Rahmat Khan 
(1708-74), the l a s t independent muslim ru l e r of Rohilkhand, 
assumed the t i t l e of Nawab-Nazim on behalf of Bahadur Shah I I 
and appointed a pathan chief, Mubarak Shah, as governor of 
Badaun* At Allahabad, the old cap i ta l of a pr inc ipa l mughal 
province, af ter the mutiny of the 6th native infantry s t a t i o -
ned the re , the discontentented muslim ar is tocracy and the 
muslim ci ty population joined hands and soon the green f lag of 
Islam was waving over the Kotwali. 
Members of the muslim re l ig ious classes were prominent 
in r evo l t . 'The Maulvi of Faizabad' Ahmad-Allah Shah (D.1858) 
a natura l leader of men, harassed Sir Colin Campbell's (1792-
1863) forces during the hot season's campaign in 1858 for the 
conquest of Awadh, although he was without any formal mi l i t a ry 
t r a i n i n g . One Maulana Rahmat-Allah assumed leadership of the 
go 
revol t in Muzaffarnagar.^"^ 
Sir George Campbell describes the bitter British feel-
ings towards muslims which he encountered in the north 
western provinces as follows. 
i' 
" I t was at Meerut t h a t I f i r s t r ea l i sed the strong 
feel ings against the muhamdans which had grown up in the north-
western provinces. We thought t h a t the mohamadans had no 
execuse from the caste grievance which was the immediate 
occasion of the mutiny and were disappointed when the mohoma-
dan Sepoys in the regular regiments went with the r e s t . Then 
we thought tha t the i r r egu la r cavalry, a superior c lass and 
largly Mohomedan, would have stood by us and when a good many 
of them went too we f e l t agrieved. When our power was comple-
t e ly upset in the N.W.p, and a l l signs of our rule had disap-
eared, i t was not unnatural tha t in some places the Mohomedan 
whom we had succeded within the memory of man shouldtry to set 
up in our stead, the more as the Sepcy rule was nominally t ha t 
of the old emperor of Delhi . We were very b i t t e r against those 
94 Mohomedan pretenders. 
Nevertheless appearences were deceptive and were recog-
nised such by Lord Camning, and others in high p laces , with 
profound consequences for the future of muslims in I n d i a . ^ 
The c i v i l r i s ings in Awadh, Bihar and centra l India were mostly 
Hindu-led. The majority of the rebel l ions t a l lugdars of Awadh 
were H i n d u . ^ The Rani of Jhansi (D, 1858) t a t y a tope (D.i859-
59) and Nana Saheb (1820-59) were a l l Hindus. In the Gorakhpur 
region the commissioner, C. Wingfield (1820-92), noted tha t i t 
was cer ta in t r i b e s of the higher castes of Rajputs who displayed 
the most marked h o s t i l i t y . ^ ^ 
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Muslims themselves were as divided by personal , e thn ic , 
c lass and regional a f f i l i a t i o n s as were Hindus. Among muslim 
princes and a r i s t o c r a t e s , Nawab of Rampur, Karnal, Muradabad 
and Dacca remained loya l , while the Nawab of Farrukhabad and 
Danda turned ' r e b e l . ' ^ Some muslim o f f i c i a l s went one way, 
some the other . In the Aligarh and Rohilkhand areas they 
mostly joined the r ebe l s , on the other hand, the d i s t r i c t 
of Mathura, a predominantly Hindu area,was held for the 
Br i t i sh by a muslim deputy col lec tor and the loyal ty of Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan as Sadar Amin at Bijnor, in t ry ing to held 
the d i s t r i c t for the Bri t ish ass i s ted by a muslim Tehsi ldar , 
became, par t of the Saga of the 'Loyal Muhammadans' of Ind ia . 
Here, a balanced observation of S i r George campbell, 
wri t ten in July and August 1859, wi l l help in making opinion 
about the par t ic ipa t ion and po l ic ies of muslim in the revol t 
of 1857. 
"The Pathans and Rajputs and Boondelas whose countr ies 
has been acquired within the l a s t f i f ty years have made a 
considerable, but I believe i t wi l l be found not a r ea l ly 
formidable f igure; while the mohomedans and zamindars of Bihar 
and par t of Benares whose subjection t o us i s of a date twenty 
years e a r l i e r , have generally not joined in the rebel l ion at 
A formal assessment made for canning ear ly in 1859 
under the t i t l e 'note by L. Bowring (1824-1910) on the causes 
4>> 
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of the mutiny and on t h e p a r t taken in i t by the Mahomendans 
he ld t o t h e same judgement. 
I n s p i t e of the r e a l f a c t and c o n t r o d i c t o r y o b s e r v a t i o n s , 
t h e main point was the r e s u l t and B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s towards 
Mahomodans. While the r i s i n g was a t i t s h e i g h t , George camp-
beel expressed the fear t h a t the B r i t i s h might degrade muslims 
as a c l a s s . "^^  William Howard Russel recorded in 1858 t h a t , 
'The Mahomodan element in I n d i a i s t h a t which causes aS most 
t r o u b l e and provokes t h e l a r g e s t share of our h o s t i l i t y . . . . 
our antagonism t o the fo l lowers of I s lam i s f a r s t ronge r than 
t h a t between us and t h e worshipers of Lord Shiva and Vishnu. 
They a re unques t ionably more dangerous t o our ru le , '^^^ Af ter 
t h e cap ture of Delhi i n September 1857 a d i r e vengeance be fe l l 
t h e muslims t h e r e . As t h e famous Urdu poet Ghal ib (1797-1869) 
wro te , 'Here t h e r e i s a vas t ocean of blood befor me, God 
alone knows what more I s h a l l have to behold . ^ Bahadur Shah 
was t r i e d and e x i l e d t o Rangoon. L i e u t i n e n t Hodson (1821-58) 
sumarily shot t h r e e mughal p r i n c e s and l a t e r twenty four 
Shahzadas were t r i e d and execu ted . Zahi r Dihalwi (1835-1911) 
wrote in h i s Das tan- i -Ghadar , 'The Engl i sh s o l d i e r s began t o 
Shoot whom-so-ever they met upon the way . . . Miyan Muhammad 
Amin Panjakush, an e x c e l l e n t w r i t e r , Maulvi Imam Baksh Sabhai 
along with h i s two sons . . . were a r r e s t e d and taken t o Raj ghat 
g a t e . They were shot dead and t h e i r dead bodies were thrown 
i n t o the Yamuna. 
5n 
The prime minister Palmerston (1784-1865) wrote to 
Canning t h a t every c i v i l building connected with Mohomedan 
t r a d i t i o n shoyld be level led to the ground without regard to 
antiquarian veneration or a r t i s t i c p red i l ec t ion . 
But we see, on the other hand t h a t Br i t i she r s not only 
followed the policy of discrimination but a balanced policy 
a l so . Muslim pension-holders were pa r t i cu l a r ly vulnerable t o 
Bri t ish wrath. Yet in January 1859 the Governor-General sanct -
ioned the continuance of a large number of pensions of the royal 
l O R 
family of Awadh, A large number of muslim pensions were 
fo r fe i t ed , but then so were many Hindus. In Gorakhpur, for 
example, one proceeding records the loss of pensions by twenty 
three Hindus as against six muslims. In Jalon d i s t r i c t a l l 
the pensions l i s t e d as forfe i ted in one proceeding had been 
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received by Hindus. ^ In Bareilly d i s t r i c t , however, a 
consolidated return of fo r fe i tu res gives ninety-f ive muslim 
fo r fe i tu res to two Hindus.^•'•^ In Aligarh d i s t r i c t fo r fe i tu res 
of or confirmations of pension were more nearly balanced 
between Hindus and Muslims. 
Jag i rdars received similar t reatment . The Nawab of 
Dadr i ' s j ag i r was declared fo r f e i t to the Raja of Jhund, on 
the ground tha t the Nawab set cavelry t o a s s i s t the rebels a t 
Delhi . But as the Nawab was old and feeble and had perhaps 
been coerced, Canning himself decided t o award him a monthly 
T i l 
112 pension of one thousand rupees. The j a g i r s of Saiyid 
Atta-Allah Khan in Allahabad and Saharanpur d i s t r i c t s were 
continued u n l i l h is death, but they were then to be resumed, 
1 1-5 
as h i s Son had helped the r e b e l s . 
Thus we see t h a t any absolute conclusion about the 
Bri t ish a t t i tude towards muslims wil l be wrong. The co-re la t ion 
between d i rec t consequences and po l i c i e s may be the exact 
conclusion. After a l l , we see t ha t c r i t e r i a s t o decide the 
po l ic ies of Br i t i she rs af ter 1857, l i e in the event of 1857, 
And on some extent in the p o l i t i c a l awaking among Hindus. 
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CHAPTER > I 
BIRTH OF MJSUM LEAGUE AND LEADERSHIP IN U . P . 
UPTO 1916 
SECTION 'A' 
During the revolt of 1857, the Muslims, "for historical 
and ideological reasons," were more violently anti-British 
than the Hindus. They took the rebbellion as a jehad against 
the British, The proclamations issued in Oudh under the seal 
of Birjees Quadir and at Allahabad by Maulavi Liaqat Ali 
testify to the fact that the muslims looked upon the revolt 
as a holy war against the enemies of Islam, The proclamation 
issued at Oudh was addressed to all the mussalmans residing in 
Oudh, Kuthair, Rampur and Moradabad, It said "All the Musal-
mans should unite and he firm in their faith and they will 
surely obtain victory over English as God has said in the holy 
2 
Quaran 'it is for me to give success to the Musalmans.' The 
proclamation issued at Allahabad by hAaulvi Liaqat Ali said, 
'you all should act according to the following precept quoted 
from Quaran': 
The real paradise lies beneath the strokes of swords. You 
will then obtain salvation and the honour of martyrdom, which 
is eternal life... consider jehad as your duty and engage in 
it under a leader whither he be good or bad."^  
• 
The Maulvi of Faizabad also preached jehad against the 
British. "It had become generally known that the king was 
with the mutinneers and thought that to fight against the 
s« 
English was to fight for the religion of the prophet. Some 
British officials, directly connected with the movement like 
James outram^ therefore, declared that the revolt of 1857 was 
due to muslim conspiracy which made capital out of the Hindu 
grivances,~^ 
The revolt was suppressed by 1859. The British punished 
all those who had taken part in the revolt but their heavy 
hand fell more particularly on the muslims. The mohammedans 
sewn up in pig-skin, smeared with park fat and were burnt alive, 
Hindus were defiled by cow's meat being forced down throats. 
The repression of the muslims was both ruthless and callous. 
They were reduced to the position of illiterate masses with 
p 
their spirit broken and their pride humbled to the dust. 
They were not given government employment. During 1852 and 
1868 out of 240 natives admitted as pleaders of the high court, 
there was only one musalman. The muslims were not admitted 
to the police services, they could not enter the Army. The 
pathetic condition of the muslims has been described by W.W. 
Hunter in the following words: 
"If ever a people stood in need of a career, it is the 
musalman aristocracy of lower Bengal. Their old sources of 
wealth have run dry. They can no longer sack the stronghold 
of a neighbouring Hindu nobleman; send out a score of troopers 
to pilage the peasantry, levy tolls upon travelling merchants, 
purchase exemption through a friend at court from their land 
^ M 
t a x , ra i se a revenue by local cases on marriages, b i r t h , 
harvest homes, and every other incident of ru ra l l i f e , co l l ec t 
the excise oo t h e i r behalf, with fur ther g r a t i f i c a t i o n s foc 
winking at the sale of forbidden l iquors during the sacred 
month of Ramzan," He further said, "A hundred and seventy 
years ago i t was almost impossible for a well-born musalman 
in Bengal to become poor, at present i t i s almost impossible 
g 
for him to continue r i ch , " 
Wahabis, who had involved the Br i t i sh ru l e r s of India in 
several cost ly wars on the f ron t i e r , were s t r i c t l y punished. 
There was network of conspiracis in provinces by these Wahabies. 
Between 1864 and 1871, there were f ive great s t a t e t r i a l s , as 
a resu l t of which dozens of muslims were awarded cap i t a l punish-
ment, t ranspor ta t ion for l i f e , and heavy sentences of imprison-
m e n t / ^ 
During and af ter these a l l calamit ies explained above, we 
see many muslim leaders who came forward with t h e i r ideas and 
ideologies , t o preserve and promote the Islam in India . They 
t r i e d the i r best to modernize the thoughts of muslims. The 
' s o u l - l e s s , dry and r ig id ly pur i tan ic Wahabi d i s i p l i n e ' los t 
much of i t s impact on the Indian muslims af ter 1857. But the 
Dar-al-ulum, founded a t Deoband in U.P. in 1866, though o f f i c i -
a l l y adhering t o the Hanafi School, followed the Wahabis in 
most matters of r i t u a l and ceremony. I t a t t r ac ted students 
fil> 
not only from different par t s of India but from the neighbour-
ing muslim countries as wel l , Maulana Shibl i Nomani founded 
12 the Nadwat-al-mamain Lucknow. I t adopted a more r e a l i s t i c 
13 and prograssive outlook than the Deoband academy. 
Abdul Latif , in 1863, founded the muhammedan l i t e r a r y 
Society. I t sponsored discussion on re l ig ious , social and 
p o l i t i c a l question in the l i g h t of modern ideas and encouraged 
the muslims to take to western education. I t was primari ly 
in te res ted in matters re la ted to muslim education but i t was 
consulted by the government on p o l i t i c a l and administrat ive 
matters affecting the i n t e r e s t s of muslims, Abdul Latif was 
also anxious t o remove the an t i -Br i t i sh feel ing in h is 
community, 
Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928) lawyer, po l i t i c i an and h i s t o -
r i an - in t e rp re t ed Islam from the Shia point of view in h i s 
book 'The Sp i r i t of I s l am ' , 'The e th ics of Islam' and 'A 
short h is tory of the Saracens ' . National muhammedan associa-
t ion was founded by him in 1877, i t followed the p r inc ip le of 
s t r i c t and loyal adherence to the Br i t i sh crown. I t s p r inc ipa l 
object was the promotion by a l l legi t imate and cons t i tu t iona l 
means of the well-being of the musalmans of India . Their 
reorganizat ion was to be sought by moral revival and by cons-
t an t endevours to obtain from the government a recognition of 
t h e i r j u s t and reasonable claims. He (Ameer Ali) regarded 
Islam as a superior re l ig ion of mankind - and Muhammad as 
•the great reformer the world has ever produced, ' He made a 
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hal t ing attempt to reconcile the Shia theory of the Immamate 
with the Sunni theory of ca l ipha te . 
Sir MuhaThmad Iqubal (1873-1938)- scholar , un ivers i ty 
teacher , lawyer, po l i t i c i an was primari ly a philosopher and 
a poet. In the re l ig ious and cu l tu ra l spheres he was a reviva-
l i s t , anxious t o recover what his community had l o s t . But h i s 
programme of reconstruction of Islam centred round i t s emanci-
pation from the narrow in te rp re ta t ions of the modieval t heo lo -
17 g ians . He was a bel iever in pan-Islamism. He said , "Islam 
was n o n - t e r r i t o r i a l in character , and i t s aim was t o furnish a 
model for the f inal combination of humanity by drawing i t s 
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adherents from many races." This ideal was a prominent 
feature of muslim religious thought in India from the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
But inspite of the efforts of these all muslim leaders, 
majority of the community was unhappy and bitter with the 
British government. 
Muslim government servents and landlords felt the press-
ures of change in the late nineteenth century rather more than 
any other group. Their power was reduced, their culture was 
most openly held of small account, and their religion was most 
strongly attacked. In the nineteenth century, those who wished 
to improve their position or to protect it against the effects 
of change, were rarely rich or powerful enough to do so by 
their own efforts. 
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To cope with problems of above mentioned changes, societ-
ies were formed all over U.P. In 1861 the Benares institute 
was founded. In 1864 Ghazipur scientific society, in 1867 the 
Allahabad institute, in 1868 the British Indian Association of 
Moradabad, and in the same year, the Lucknow Jalsa-i-Tahzib 
were established. By 1870, over twenty associations existed 
which were devoted in various ways to discussing and dealing 
with the problems thrust on U.P, society by British rule. 
These societies usually met in the house of a leading member. 
Attitudes and activities of these societies were inspired by 
one of those, the Aligarh scientific society. This society was 
dominated by one man, and he was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. 
It was at this time that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan emerged 
among the muslims, who completly transformed the attitude of 
the muslims tov^ ards the British from one of hostility to 
19 hospitality. Syed Ahmad received traditional Urdu education 
and in 1837 to the great surprise of his friends and relatives, 
he joined the British service. Twenty years later in 1857, 
he was Sadar Amin of Bijnor, Rohilkhand. 
Syed Ahmad was an admirer of the British government and 
21 the British people. He admired the western system of educa-
tion also. He loved his community and was unhappy to see the 
miserable condition of the muslims after the revolt of 1857. 
For days, weeks and months together he was contemplating new 
planning how to lift his community from such a degradation. 
Syed Ahmad thought that this situation could be tackled by 
weaning the rulers from their policy of suppression to support 
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of the muslims and by changing the a t t i t ude of the muslitn 
community from res is tance t o co-operation with the Bri t i sh 
government."^^^ With t h i s purpose in view, he wrote 'Asbab-e-
Baghawat-e-Hind.' (1858) and the 'Loyal Mohammendans of Ind i a ' 
in two par t s (I860). 
In h i s "Loyal Mohammendans of India" he strove to prove 
tha t the muslims were not responsible for the mutiny, but 
these were the Hindus who were dis loyal to the government, nor 
were the muslims responsible for any crucelty against the 
Europeans during the c r i s i s of 1857. He said , "Now the season 
of dire extremity to which I allude is tha t which befe l l the 
mohammedans in 1857-58. There was no a t roc i ty commited then 
of which the blame was not imputed to mohammedans, although 
23 the pa r t i e s r ea l ly gui l ty may have been Ramdeen and Matadeen. 
Syed Ahmad's philosophy can be summed up in th ree phrases: 
"Loyalty t o the Br i t i sh , devotion to education and aloofness 
from po l i t i c s l ' He preached and pract ised loyal ty to the 
Bri t ish r u l e r s . He wanted the muslmans to be loyal t o the 
Bri t i sh on account of reasons. F i r s t l y i t was the only way 
out to wipe off the stigma of muslim ins t iga t ion of the mutiny 
and t hus , t o disabuse the Br i t i sh mind tha t the musalmans were 
t h e i r old and t r a d i t i o n a l enemies. Secondly he knew tha t Hindus 
were numerically larger to the musalmans. Thus every advance 
towards democracy would mean the depression of the musalmans 
t o the rule of the Hindu majority. I t was because of t h i s reason 
tha t he opposed the introduction of parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s ; ^ ^ 
as well as the increase in the recruitment of Indians t o the 
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public services by open competition. His loyal ty to the 
Br i t i sh government surpassed the natural urge of a musalman 
towards pan-Islam movement. Sir Syed did not sympathise 
with the Pan-Islam movement and advised his co - r e l i g ion i s t s 
t o keep aloof from i t because the movement was a n t i - B r i t i s h , 
He did not want the musalmans t o lose the sympathy of t h e i r 
Br i t i sh ru l e r s though through h is wri t ing he had t r i e d t o 
shi f t the blame of the mutiny on the shoulders of the Hindus. 
His second slogan was "devote yourself to education. 
This i s your only sa lva t ion ." Here Sir Syed was r igh t in 
advising the musalmans t o acquire western education if they 
were to complete with other Indians for jobs and preferments. 
He l i b e r l i s e d his views on Islam in the l i gh t of western 
education. He was coutiously ra t iona l in respect of abs t rac t 
theology. He t r i e d t o reconcile Darwin's theory of evolution 
with the Quarinic t ene t s of creation and f a l l of Adam. He 
was prepared to re jec t t ha t par t of the muslim t r a d i t i o n 
(Hadis) which he considered f i c t i t i o u s . But he was a conser-
vative in respect of r i t u a l and his views on jehad (Holy War), 
27 slavery and polygamy indicated his orthodoxy, 
Syed Ahmad rendered the grea tes t service to h is community 
in the f i e ld of education. Though h is own education was i n i t i -
a l ly confined to Arabic and pers ian, he rea l i sed as ear ly as 
1863 tha t 'English i s the language t o which we should devote 
our a t t en t ion . He boldly s ta ted (1872):- "The old Muhamadan 
fi^ 
books and the tone of their writings do not teach the followers 
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of Islam - independence of thought, perspicuity and simplicity 
... Undetected by the opposition of the orthodox muslims he 
persued a gradually developing programme for popula-
risation of English education in his community. 
Syed Ahmad established a scientific society at Ghazipur 
in 1864 and two years later founded the Aligarh Institute, 
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associated with the society. The main task of the society 
was to translate important English works into Urdu. Aligarh 
Institute published a weekly oaper, the 'Aligarh Institute 
Gazatte', which contained news and views likely to popularise 
English education among the muslims. Schools were established 
or) 
at Moradabad and Ghazipur, 
Thirdly, Syed Ahmad advised his co - r e l i g ion i s t s t o keep 
aloof from p o l i t i c s . He was against the Indian National 
Congress and he did not want the muslims to jo in i t . He 
opposed to the congress because he considered i t to be a n t i -
Br i t i sh and co-operation with the congress would have meant 
a l iena t ing the Br i t i sh . Thus, he opposed the congress and i t s 
po l ic ies tooth and na i l and advised h i s people t o keep away 
from the congress. "The congress ag i t a t i on , " Said Sir Syed, 
"if i t i s unchecked, wil l end in a mutiny followed by horrors 
and massacres in comparison to which the mutiny of 1857 was 
mere c h i l d ' s p l a y , . , and may f ina l ly end in a disas t rous 
catastrophe,"-^^ 
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Though Syed iShmad supported the Bri t i sh government and 
opposed the Indian nat ional congress, yet he was for Hindu-
Muslim uni ty . He did not l ike tense r e l a t i ons betv^een the 
Hindus and the muslims. "I have frequently sa id , " wrote Syed 
Ahmad Khan in one of his a r t i c l e s on 'Hindu-Muslim Rela t ions , • 
"That India i s a beautiful and Hindus and Muslims are her two 
eyes. The beauty l i e s in the proper safety of these two eyes. 
If one of them i s l o s t , t h i s beautiful bride wi l l become ugly 
and one-eyed." 
Opinions are divided as to the effect of Syed Ahmad on 
rauslim p o l i t i c s in the country. There are some who look upon 
him as a separa t i s t and a 'communalist' , Who worked for his 
community only. On theother hand, h i s recent biographer desc-
r ibes him as a na t iona l i s t and a p a t r i o t . ^ There i s no doubt 
t h a t Syed Ahmad wanted t o u p l i f t his community from the degra-
dation in to which he had found i t a f ter 1857, t o achieve t h i s 
object , \\B t r i e d to bring the muslims nearer t o the Br i t i sh 
government by advising them t o remain loyal t o the government. 
Through h is wr i t ings , pa r t i cu l a r ly the 'Loyal Mohammedans of 
I n d i a , ' he t r i e d to convince the Bri t ish government t o 
prove t h a t the Hindus were responsible for the mutiny and not 
the muslims. Syed Ahmad firmly believed tha t India i s not 
inhabited by one na t ion ," He preached Hindu-K*jslim unity but 
he did not work for the good of both the Hindus and the Muslims 
or of the country as a whole. The overal l effect of h i s 
teachings was that the muslims did not join the congress, and 
became loyal to the British government. They also began to 
think that they had separate political interest from those of 
the Hindus, This was a very unhappy development in the body-
politic of this country and the credit or discredit for this 
goes to Syed Ahmad. 
Syed Ahmad succeeded in keeping the bulk of the muslims 
away from the Indian national congress. The musalmans by and 
large were poor, illiterate and deeply religious people. They 
badly needed economic and cultural regeneration and that was 
not possible by opposing the government or by not acquiring 
western education. Syed Ahmad uplifted them. He was in the 
good books of the British government and due to his influence 
as well as due to imperial considerations the British govern-
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ment dropped its anti-muslim policy." This was beneficial 
to the muslims. 
Syed Ahmad played an increasingly important role in 
promoting the separetist tendency (among the muslims) along 
communal lines, during the last years of his life (1885-98). 
In 1885 he founded the 'Mohammedan Educational Congress*, the 
Word Congress was changed to •conference' in 1890, In 1888 
he founded the 'united Indian patriotic association mainly' 
with a view to oppose the congress. This was followed by the 
foundation of the Muhammadan Anglo-oriental defence association 
in 1894, 
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These developments na tura l ly pleased the Br i t i sh r u l e r s . 
As ear ly as 1883 the government of the north-western provinces 
hoped tha t Aligarh would be of the grea tes t importance from a 
p o l i t i c a l as well as an educational point of view. In 1887 
the secretary of s t a t e wrote t o lord Dufferin tha t ' the 
38 divis ion of re l ig ious feel ing i s to our advantage,• 
Syed Ahmad's death in 1898 temporarily weakend, but did 
not c r ipp le , the p o l i t i c a l movement of which Aligarh had been 
the centre during the l a s t twenty years of his l i f e . I t was 
i nd i r ec t l y strengthened by the slow penetrat ion of Pan-Islamic 
ideas introduced by Jamaluddin Afghani and the emissaries of 
the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I I . During curzons vicroyal ty 
Aligarh College es tabl ished contact with Pers ia under o f f i c i a l 
auspices, and some Persian noble families ac tual ly sent t he i r 
boys t o Aligarh for education. 
The Indian muslims sympathy for Pan-Islamism alarmed the 
Br i t i sh government. I t was f e l t tha t t h i s Pan-Islamic t rend 
should , be counteracted. Another — and more important -
factor was the fear t h a t the muslims might be won over by the 
congress, Nawab MU)hsin-ul-Mulk, secretary of Aligarh College, 
who had s t a r t ed in 1901 an ineffect ive body cal led the 
Mohammedan p o l i t i c a l organisat ion, r ea l i zed tha t the i n a c t i v i t y 
of the elder muslim leaders was driving the younger muslims 
' t o throw in t h e i r lo t with advanced ag i t a to r s of the congress , ' 
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Moreover, Morley was thinking of constitutional reforms, 
if elections were introduced on a larqe scale the muslims 
would be swamped by the Hindus under the influence of the 
congress. 
After the death of Syed Ahmad there were three alterna-
tives open to the muslims. They could, if they desired, still 
keep aloof from politics. Secondly they could join the Indian 
National Congress, Thirdly they could form a political party 
of their own. The first alternative was no longer possible 
because the Indian National Congress had become slowly but 
surely a very big political party and had been able to build 
up pressure on the government. The government also appeared 
to be in a mood to concede some of the demands of the congress. 
There was a posibility of the extension of theelective princi-
ple in the forthcoming reforms. If the muslims still continued 
to keep away from politics, there would be no body to safe-
guard their interests because the muslims looked upon the 
congress as a Hindu body. Moreover there was a possibility 
that if the muslim leadership still adhered to the old policy 
of aloofness from politics, some of the politically conscious 
muslim might join the Indian National Congress. It was 
therefore not possible under the circumstances to remain, away 
from politics. 
The secondalternative that the muslims should join the 
National Congress was not only unacceptable but also repugnant 
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t o the musllms. The Congress leaders and the nat ional organs 
of public opinion were invited the muslim youths to join the 
congress and,the nat ional mainstreams. 
The Mohammedans on the other hand stood firm in t h e i r 
opposition t o the congress. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Nawab 
Vikar-ul-Wulk who succeeded Sir Syed to the Muslim leadership 
at Aligarh, continued his policy of opposition t o the congress, 
The muislim press also supported the same idiology. The 'Al 
Bashir» of Etawah of 23rd Apri l , 1900 said tha t Syed Ahmad 
Khan understood a l l the t r i c k s of the Hindus and» the re fo re , 
he apprised the musalmans of the same, and the r e su l t was t ha t 
he was always abused by the Hindus," The Nizam-ul-Mulk of 
Moradabad, dated 3 i s t March, 1901 said tha t the l a t e Syed 
Ahmad Khan acted very wisely in preventing the musalmans from 
joining the congress in a body. However, some na t iona l i s t 
muslim papers l ike the 'Urdu-i-Mualla' of Hasarat Mohani had 
been asking for Hindu-Muslin co-operation against the govern-
ment. The paper in i t s issue of May, 1906 c r i t i c i s e d the 
shorts ighted views of the muslim communal paper and advocated 
muslim co-operation with the hindus, and the congress. But 
the na t i ona l i s t muslim leaders and papers did not have much 
effect on the muslim community, and muslim opposition t o the 
congress continued. Thus the t h i r d a l t e rna t ive i . e . the 
musllms should form a p o l i t i c a l party of t h e i r own remained 
and tha t was adopted* 
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The i n i t i a t i v e was taken by Nawsib Habibulla of Dacca 
who, favoured by curzon with a generous loan, had taken up 
leadership of the p ro-par t i t ion (Bengal) movement and provoked 
muslim res is tance to the swadeshi movement. He couldnot join 
the Simla deputation, but he issued a c i rcu la r l e t t e r t o some 
prominent muslims in different provinces containing a scheme 
for a 'muslim All-India confederacy. ' A meeting was held at 
Dacca on 30th December, 1906, I t was decided t o form a p o l i t i -
cal associa t ion, called the All-India fAuslim League, with 
three objects : 
(a) To promote among the musalmans of India fee l ings of 
loyal ty t o the Br i t i sh government and to remove any misconcep-
t ions t h a t may a r i se as to the in ten t ions of government with 
regard t o any of i t s measures, 
Cb) To protect and advance the p o l i t i c a l r i gh t s and i n t e r e s t s 
of musalmans of India and respect fu l ly t o represent t h e i r needs 
and asp i ra t ions t o government, 
(c) To prevent the r i s e among musalmans of India of any 
feel ings of h o s t i l i t y towards other communities without 
prejudice to the other objects of the League. 
The Aga Khan was elected the permanent president of the 
League, I t s headquarters were es tabl ished at Aligarh but i t s 
cent ra l office was shif ted t o Lucknow in 1910.^^ 
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SECTION *B* 
During the years 1907-9 the main programme of the Muslim 
League was to fight for consolidation and extension of separate 
electorates. Its political activities were directed not 
against the foreign rulers but against the congress and the 
Hindus. Its leaders, belonging to the upper class, had little 
in common with the muslim masses, and they did not fight for 
the removal of their grivances particularly those in the 
economic field. 
The secretary of state for India, Lord Morley, informed 
the house of commons in 1906 that the Viceroy, Lord Minto, was 
about to appoint a small committee to consider the question of 
extending the representative element in the Legislative council. 
This stirred the muslim leaders who were unwilling to make 
common course with the congress. They had anticipated that 
the forthcoming constitutional advance was likely to confirm 
and extend the elective principle, ^ To meet that situation, 
a deputation of muslim leaders headed by the Aga Khan presented 
an address to lord Minto on October 1, 1906, 90 days before 
the foundation of the All India Muslim League. The deputation 
emphasised that in "all elections, whether for the Legislative 
• 
councils or for Local Bodies, the muslims must be separately 
represented and their representatives separately elected by 
purely muslim electors," I t was also pointed out that the 
extent of the muslim community's representation must be 
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"commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but 
also with their political importance and the value of the 
contribution which they make to the defence of the empire." 
The deputation pointed out that the muslims have a separate 
entity from the rest of their countrymen. It is true that we 
have many and inportant interests in common with out Hindu 
fellow - country-men, and it will always be a matter of the 
utmost satisfaction to us to see these interests safeguarded, 
by the presence in our Legislative chambers of able supporters 
of these interests, irrespective of thetr nationality. Still 
it cannot be denied that we Mahommedans are a distinct commu-
nity, with additional interests of our own which are not 
shared by other communities, and these have hitherto suffered 
from the fact that they have not been adequately represented 
even in the provinces in which the Mahommedans constitute a 
distinct majority of the population. 
The muslim deputation had a favourable response from 
the viceroy who gave the following reply: "The pith of your 
address, as I understand it, is a claim that in any system 
of representation whether it affects a municipality, a 
District Board o^ Legislative council, in which it is proposed 
to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the 
mohammedan community should be represented as conmunity. You 
point out that in many cases electoral bodies, as now consti-
tuted, cannot be expected to return a mohammedan, and that if 
7 1 
by chance they did so i t could only be at the sac r i f i ce of 
such a candidate 's views t o those of a majority opposed to 
h i s own comuunity whom he would in no way represent , and you 
j u s t l y claim t h a t your numerical strength both in respect to 
the p o l i t i c a l importance and the service i t has rendered t o 
the empire e n t i t l e you to considerat ion. I am e n t i r e l y in 
accord with you; please do not misunderstand me. I make no 
attempt to ind ica te by what means the representat ion of commu~ 
n i t i e s can be obtained, but I am as firmly convinced as I be l -
ieve you t o be, tha t any e l ec to ra l representat ion in India 
would be doomed t o mischivious fa i lu re which aimed at granting 
a personal enfranchisement regardless of the be l i e f s and 
t r a d i t i o n s of the communities composing the population of 
t h i s continent'! 
Thus the pr inciple of communal representat ion was accepted 
by the representa t ives of the Bri t i sh Crown in India . The 
secre tary of s t a t e for India lord Morley was not in agreement 
with the plan of separate e lec to ra te submitted by the govern-
ment of India in the beginning. But the muslim league persued 
i t with vigour. During the f i r s t two years of i t s existance 
v iz . 1906-7, the resolut ions passed at the control and Branch 
Muslim Leagues Continuously harped on one point - and tha t was 
the subject of communal representa t ion . I t even threatened 
the government with withdrawal of loyal ty if i t s demands were 
not conceded. The muslim league opposed the scheme of the 
secretary of s t a t e for India for j o i n t e l e c to r a l colleges and 
ins i s t ed on representat ion on a purely denominational bas i s . 
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The tnuslim league s ta r ted an agi ta t ion "in the press and on 
platform in England and in India to ex t rac t communal represen-
t a t i o n . ' ' ^ UX» Amir Ali and Syed Hasan Bilgrami pursued i t 
with the secretary of s t a t e at London through l e t t e r s published 
in the ' t i m e s ' , London, but when 'they did; not prove s u f f i c i -
ent , the muslim league approached the viceroy Lord Minto with 
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a memorial and i t had the desired e f fec t . The government 
of India supported the muslim demand and the secre tary of 
s t a t e accepted them. The act of 1909 "embodied in substance 
the concessions v i r t u a l l y promised by Lord Minto t b the muslims, 
This set the seal of the government's approval on the theory 
of two nations or two races or two separate communities with 
d i s t i n c t i n t e r e s t s and outlook. 
The Indian national congress and the na t i ona l i s t press 
f e l t unhappy over t h i s development. The 25th Indian National 
Congress held at Allahabad in 1910 strongly deprecated "the 
expansion or application of the pr inc ip le of separate communal 
e l e c t o r a t e s to munic ipa l i t ies . D i s t r i c t Boards or other loeal 
bodies.^^ 
An Indian musalman writ ing to the "Hindustan review" of 
Apr i l , 1909 sa id , "the attempt on the part of my co re l i g ion i s t s 
t o create an i r reconci leable ulcer in India i s not very lauda-
ble . . . t h i s wi l l ver i tab ly be the opening of Pandora's Box 
and India wi l l then be confronted with a grave s i tua t ion of the 
f i r s t - r a t e magnitude."^^ The t)udh Akhbar', Lucknow 3 is t Jan . 
1911, observed tha t separate e l ec to ra t e s granted to the muslims 
It; 
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would accentuate ra ther than lessen Hindu•-^Auslim dif ferences . 
The 'Leader* of Allahabad, 8th February, 1911 said tha t sepa-
r a t e e l ec tq ra te s would be productive of far greater harm than 
good to the country. The Tohfa-i-Hind, ' Bijnor, 18th J u l y , 
1911 remarked that the i n t e r e s t s of the Hindus and the Muslims 
did not differ so widely as to ju s t i fy the grant of separate 
54 e l ec to r a t e s to the muslims. 
But the muslims on the whole, pa r t i cu l a r l y the muslim 
league, were happy at t h i s development. They had planned and 
worked for separate e l ec to ra te s and they were happy tha t t h e i r 
e f fo r t s had been crowned with success. The Editor of the 
•Aligarh I n s t i t u t e Gaze t t e , ' 21st June, 1911, welcomed the 
grant of the separate e l ec to ra te s to the muhammedans and 
urged tha t "the pr inciple of separate e lec t ion which the 
government has accepted and introduced for the l e g i s l a t i v e 
councils should be extended t o local Bodies a l so . The 
•Al-Bashir' of Btawah, 4th Ju ly , 1911 supported the grant of 
the separate e l ec to ra te s and opined tha t i t would reduce the 
chances of f r i c t ion between the Hindus and the musalmans. The 
muslim league also f e l t s a t i s f i ed and happy over the acceptance 
of i t s demand for separate e l e c t o r a t e s . I t thanked the govern-
ment and demanded " that the pr inciple of communal represen ta t -
ion be extended t o a l l self-governing public bodies,' 
I t has often been said tha t the Br i t i sh were responsible 
for creat ing Hindu-Muslin differences and for engineering the 
Simla deputation of the muslims to demand separate e lec tora te* 
I t i s d i f f i cu l t t o accept the view t h a t the Br i t i sh government 
of the Angl9-Indian o f f i c i a l s were alone responsible for 
creating Hindu-Muslin differences. The differences between 
these two major communities of India had exis ted in the pas t , 
the Bri t i sh government accentuated them and prof i ted by such 
dif ferences . This i s abundantly clear from the evolution of 
muslim p o l i t i c a l conciousness in the country. The Wahavi 
movement was a sor t of muslim reaction t o the disappearance of 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power from the country. The muslims had always 
looked upon themselves as belonging t o the one ' ru l l i ng r a c e ' . 
They had therefore , not l iked the establishment of Br i t i sh 
power in India at the i r cost . The Wahabi movement was not 
only a n t i - B r i t i s h , i t was also anti-Hindu. The founder of 
the movementSsiyidAhmad actual ly declared jehad against the 
Sikhs and died fighting against them. Again during 1857 though 
Hindus and Muslims co-operated with each other but at times 
they Would lay aside there uni ty and renew t h e i r old feuds.^ 
After the suppression of the revolt of 1857, muslim regenera-
t ion took place under the leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 
who stood for muslim separatism from the Hindus. Sir Syed 
opposed the nat ional congress and the idea tha t India was 
inhabited by a single nat ion. Thus we find t h a t Hindu-Muslim 





The demand for separate e lec to ra te also originated from 
the muslims on account of t h e i r differences with the Hindus, 
The muslims were in a minority and any advance towards repre -
senta t ive i n s t i t u t i o n s would have meant Hindu domination, 
which was unacceptable t o the decendants of the 'once rul ing 
r a c e . ' Long before the Simla deputation, Mohammad Yussf of 
Bihar had talked t o separate e l ec to ra tes in 1883; Sir Syed 
a l so had emphasised these fact tha t representa t ive i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of the Br i t i sh type would mean muslim subordination to Hindu-
majority r u l e . Thus the muslims wanted t o protec t t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t and with t h i s end in view they demanded separate 
e l ec to ra te and formed a p o l i t i c a l party of t h e i r own. The 
formation of the Muslim League andthedemand for separate 
e l ec to ra t e were not inspired by the Bri t i sh government, though 
the Bri t ish governmentas an imperial power f e l t happy over the 
Hindu-Muslim differences and prof i t t ed by them. 
The separate e lec tora te were not gif ted t o the muslims 
by the Br i t i sh government. The muslims had demanded and 
worked hard for separate e lec to ra te both in India and England. 
Muslims being in minority wanted separate e l ec to ra t e s t o 
pro tec t t h e i r i n t e r e s t from Hindu domination, and the re fo re , 
they demanded^planned and worked tor tnem. The whole responsi-
b i l i t y for separate e l ec to ra te s and the Simla Deputation res ted 
on the muslim leaders of the time and the Br i t i sh government, 
as an imperial power, took fu l l advantage of Hindu-Muslim 
l'\ 
dissensions and used the muslims as i t s t o o l s t o further 
t h e i r imperial i n t e r e s t s . The Morley-Minto reform was an 
attempt t o extend and improve the exis t ing system of control 
by a new method. They (Br i t i shers ) endevoured t o put power 
not into the hands of these who demanded reform but in to the 
hands of those on whose co-operation the Raj had long r e l i e d . 
They did t h i s chiefly by making local self-government bodies 
the e lec tora tes for council s e a t s . In the united provinces 
tvjelve seats were created along these l i n e s . 
Additional const ra ints were imposed on muslim p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y by introduction of separate e l e c t o r a t e s . Although 
separate e l ec to ra te had never been generally demanded before, 
and they had only been introduced in one or two munic ipal i t ies 
in the Punjab. Why then were they introduced at t h i s time ? 
Hither to the debate on t h i s question has been about whether 
the muslims rea l ly wanted them. Most Pakis tani h i s to r i ans 
have said that they did. Many Indian h i s to r ians have accused 
the government of pull ing s t r ings behind the scenes t o arrange 
for them to be demanded. This scenario i s too simple. I t 
does not make sense to supposethat the Simla deputation 
demanded concessions i t s members did not want. Nor t h a t the 
• 
government introduced a new system of e lec t ion without being 
sure t h a t i t would be worked pos i t ive ly by those i t was 
designed t o a s s i s t . On both s ides of the debate, the weakness 
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is the assumption that 'the moslim community' can be treated 
as a coherent unit at this time, 
• 
The power of separate e lec tora te for muslims in the 
Morley-Minto reforms stimulated the fur ther development of 
Muslim p o l i t i c s . Muslims turned t h e i r minds t o communal orga-
n i sa t ion as never before. Many associat ions were founded t o 
improve aspects of muslim l i f e and socie ty . Many new menbers 
joined the muslim league. Muslim demands for the extension of 
separate representat ion t o municipal and d i s t r i c t boards gained 
new force . A great campaign for the economic and p o l i t i c a l 
regeneration of the muslims was contemplated. A campaign for 
a muslim univers i ty a t Aligarh was ac tual ly launched. The new 
energy displayed by muslims drew a strong response from Hindus 
who deeply resented the concessions which had been made to the 
r i v a l community. Local menifestations of communal antogonism 
mult ipl ied, Hindus agi ta ted against the suggestions t h a t sepa-
r a t e representat ion should be extended t o municipal and d i s t r i c t 
board, an All-India Hindu Sabha was founded; Hindu Universi ty 
Campaign was prosecuted with even grea ter vigour than i t s r i v a l . 
The resu l t was tha t muslims redoubled t h e i r e f fo r t s t o organise 
eg 
themselves.^ The most important effect of the new posi t ion of 
the muslims, however, was tha t government began t o t r e a t them 
l e s s c i rcuspect ly . The muslims have had a large s l i c e of cake, 
the feeling went, now i t i s the turn of o the r s . This change in 
the government's a t t i t ude divided the U.P. muslims in to two 
main groups. Those who were prepared t o defend muslim i n t e r e s t s 
a t a l l cos t s , and those who were no t . 
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After the death of Sir Syed Ahmad, two main groups among 
muslim p o l i t i c i a n s in the U.P, had begun to emerge. F i r s t 
was the *youpg gentlemen of progressive tendenc ies ' and second 
'the men of property and influence. ' After 1909, government 
frequently employed these categories in surveying the p o l i t i c a l 
scene, and the muslims used them too , often describing them 
as the 'young pa r ty ' and the 'old p a r t y ' . The policy of 
Syed Ahmad Khan - t o remain loyal t o the Br i t i sh Raj and not 
t o join congress was fa i th fu l ly carr ied on u n t i l 1914 by h i s 
d i sc ip les in both Aligarh college and the muslim league, 
respect ively the centre and organ of muslim p o l i t i c s in India . 
The Aga Khan who spent most of his time on the French Riviera , 
in his brief v i s i t s to India preached loyal ty t o the Raj . 
Viqar-ul-Mulk , who in 1907 succeeded Mohsin-ul-Mulk as 
secre tary of Aligarh College, would not advise his co- re l ig ion-
i s t s to join congress even when, as in 1911 when the pa r t i t i on 
of Bengal was revoked, he rea l i sed i t was f u t i l e to rely any 
fin 
longer on the Bri t ish government. 
A se r ies of f ac to r s , however, led to a change in muslim 
a t t i t ude from a pro-Bri t ish t o an t i -Br i t i sh cas t . In 1910 the 
muslim league removed i t s headquarter from Aligarh t o Lucknow-
away from the anti-congress and pro-Br i t i sh influence of both 
the Br i t i sh pr inc ipal and the orthodox secretary of Aligarh 
College. In the annual session of the same year held a t Nagpur 
the League was inclined t o confer freely with congress on the 
solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. The p o s s i b i l i t y of hold-
ing a conference of Hindu and muslim leaders had e a r l i e r in 
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the year been discussed in London between Aga Khan and wedder-
burn, the congress president for the 1910 session which was 
held at Allahabad. The conference of forty muslims and 
s ixty Hindu leaders was held in January 1911 at Allahabad. I t 
yielded no p rac t i ca l r e s u l t s bu t i t did show t h a t the muslim 
leaders were wil l ing to confer with congress on matters 
affecting the common l i f e of both communities. 
In 1911, and short ly afterwards Muslim League came to be 
dominated by a group of p o l i t i c i a n s , chiefly of the Shia sec t , 
who l ived and worked in Lucknow, The group's patron was the 
Rajs of Mahmudabad, one of the larges t ta luqdars of Oudh, and 
one of the few members of h is c lass with an i n t e r e s t in na t ion-
in 
a l i s t po l i t i c s^ l914 , he became the leagues permanent pres ident . 
Apart from the Raja, most members of the group were lawyers 
and professional men. Most prominent among them was Wazir 
Hussan, a man of exeptional i n t e l l e c t u a l and organisat ional 
a b i l i t i e s , who became the League Secretary in 1912. To him 
belongs the credi t for changing the League's Creed in 1913, 
and according to the Raja he was also one of the chief authors 
of the scheme of reforms which the congress and league submi-
t t e d to t h e government. Another important member was Samiullah 
Beg, an advocate of the Lucknow Bar and the group's link-man 
with the U.P. Congress, The oldest statesman of the group was, 
Syed Nabiullah, the Chairman of the Lucknow Municipal Board, 
who had been called to the bar in England in 188ps. Within the 
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U.P. , the group's p o l i t i c a l ambition were focused on the 
provincia l council , and from 1912 to 1914, i t was engaged in 
building up . i t s influence within the province. But af ter the 
outbreak of the world war, in co-operation with a number of 
other p o l i t i c i a n s , i t cameto assume a l l India importance, 
prominent among the p o l i t i c i a n s with whom the Lucknow group 
co-operated at the time ware Mahommed Ali Jinnah, Hassan Immam, 
Ali Imam and Muzharulhaq a l l sat on the v iceroy ' s council in 
the years before the war, and t h e i r associat ion with other 
Indian p o l i t i c a l leaders in t ha t body provided a basis for 
subsequent Congress-League co-operation. 
But congress league co-operation was not achieved e a s i l y . 
Indeed in many par ts of the U.P. the po l i c i e s adopted by the 
Lucknow group only met with qual i f ied approval. This was 
because of the different l eve ls of development of the muslim 
community in different par t s of the province. The province 
of Oudh, of which Lucknow was the c a p i t a l , was in two ways an 
©xeption: F i r s t l y , in tha t the landed leadership of the 
community was in a fa i r ly th r iv ing condition, and secondly, in 
t ha t Lucknow, both as a t r a d i t i o n a l muslim centre and as a 
service centre for the colonial regime, was na tu ra l ly a focus 
for the more educated andinte l l igent musllms. In the province 
of Agra, on the otherhand, both in the more populous western 
divisions of ivieerut and Rohilkhand, and in the divisions further 
e a s t , the landed posi t ion of the coiwnunity was under severe 
a t tack , and educational advancement was very l imi ted . I t i s 
of course, difficult* to claim overwhelining r e l i a b i l i t y for 
such genera l iza t ions . The evidence for degrees of educational 
s* 
advancement i s by no means exhaustive. Nor i s i t t rue to say 
tha t a l l muslims were losing land in the province of Agra. The 
Sheiks appear t o have been genuinly in many d i s t r i c t s , demons-
t r a t i n g in a l l probabi l i ty tha t those imuslims who were increa-
sing t h e i r holdings were also changing t h e i r t i t l e s t o r e g i s t e r 
t h e i r claims t o higher socia l s t a t u s . But the questions asked 
in the U.P. l eg i s l a t i ve council by muslim members from the 
different const i tuencies , i t i s noticeable t h a t those represen-
t ing the more economically and educationally backward divis ions 
tend to demand more and special treatment for t h e i r community. 
However, almost at t h i s stage almost a l l the muslim leader 
were pro-Bri t i sh and some of them blamed the Hindus for the 
general economic backwardness of the muslim community. 
Before the year was out the muslim a t t i t ude began to change. 
In October - November 1911 I t a l y went to war with Turkey in 
T r ipo l i . The Sultan of Turkey was also held to be the s p i r i -
tua l head, ca l iph, of the muslim world. His empire included 
a par t of south-eastern Europe and almost the whole of the 
near e a s t . There was, of course, no love los t between the 
Chris t ians of south-eastern Europe and t h e i r overlord the 
Sultan. Even the Arabs cared l i t t l e about t h i s outdated 
re l ig ious bond between them and the Sultan. But those who most 
resented the temporal and s p i r i t u a l authori ty of the Sultan were 
the young Turks, the movement which in due course was t o depose 
him and abolish the ca l ipha te . 
But the Indian muGlims h^d been l ivinq as a minority in 
a predominantly Hindu country, and for the l a s t hundred years 
or more under a Chris t ian government. The fAuslims in India 
were on the whole poorer than the members of the majority 
community. Usually the f i l t l i i e s t par t of the tovm or a c i ty 
would be inhabited by muslims or untouchables. The Hindu 
consnunity was self-contained. No non-HindU could embrace 
Hinduism, Fo^ these reasons, ••nd in order t o maintain their 
separate i den t i t y , the muslims in India had become more 
fana t ica l ly observant of t h e i r r e l ig ious r i t u a l s and bonds 
than muslims any where e lse in the world, ^or an Indian 
M j^sllms the oFferinq of orayers to Allah was not only a Solemn 
duty hut »lso an assert ion rind declarat ion of h is r l qh t s aqalnst 
the Hindus, 
The news tha t a chr i s t ian power was at v^ar with the c a l i p -
hat aroused f i r s t amonq the few middle-class muslims sympathy 
and concern for tha safety of turkey. Then followed in November-
December 1911 the announcement at the Delhi Durbar of the revo-
of Bengal. For the f i r s t time tfje rul ing monarch of 
cation of the pa r t i t ion^Br i t i sh \Mas v i s i t i n g Indi^ . This 
occasion vms chosen to placate the Hindus, especia l ly of Bengal, 
who had been agi ta t ing against the p a r t i t i o n ever since i t was 
effected in 1905, This •Master strole ' of pol icy, as Gokhale 
termed i t , gave to the Hindus not only a 'sense of r e l i e f ' 
Ac, 
but a new note of hope and gladness in their hearts. But 
the muslim leaders took it as a betrayal of trust on the part 
of the British government. They were shocked. Sullen and 
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aggrived. The revocation of p a r t i t i o n meant t o them the loss 
of a muslim majority province and the reinstatement of Hindu 
supremacy in the p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e of Bengal and 
Assam. The ground was thus paved for the growth of a n t i -
Br i t i sh feeling among the muslim middle c l a s s . 
In 1912 Turkey became involved in the f i r s t world war. 
In the Same year Russia, then an a l ly of Br i t a in , perpetrated 
massacres in pers ia . To the Indian muslims i t seemed as if the 
whole of the chr i s t ian world was against the crescent , which 
was struggling for surv iva l . Bri tain was iden t i f ied as the 
leader of the chr i s t i an powers, Ant i -Bri t ish feeling was i n c r -
easing among the expanding muslim middle c l a s s , whose members 
were equally opposed to the upper-class muslims who had h i t he r -
to followed a pro-Bri t i sh pol icy. The Leaders of the middle-
c lass muslims at t h i s stage were Shibli Nomani and hAuhammad 
Ali from Ut tar Pradesh, and A.K. Azad from Bengal. All three 
were orthodox mu41ims who believed t h a t re l ig ion should be 
the basis of p o l i t i c s , and they were advocates of Pan-Islamism. 
They were at the same time anti-Aligarh and anti-l^uslim league. 
In his journal 'Al -Hi la l ' in July 1912, Azad attacked Aligarh 
college as a c i tade l of reac t ionar ies and in one of h i s speeches 
called the men of Aligarh 'he re t ics and hypocrites* who hjjd in 
the l a s t forty years co-operated with the 'Satans of Europe t o 
Weaken the influence of the Islamic Caliphate and Pan-Islam. 
Shibl i Nomani attacked Aligarh College as an i n s t i t u t e for 
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t ra in ing in slavery. Thoy attacked the tnuslim league because 
i t had no goal and did not represent the aspi ra t ions of the 
muslim middle, c l a s s . These men were more in Sympathy with 
Congress, perhaps not so much for i t s nationalism as for the 
fight i t had so far waged against the Bri t i sh Raj . 
The complacency of the muslim league was broken. To t ry 
t o prevent these angry men from joining congress the League in 
1913 defined for the f i r s t time i t s goal , which was t o ahhieve 
for India a ' s u i t a b l e ' form of self-government within the 
Br i t i sh empire. The term ' s u i t a b l e ' smacked of meekness and 
Shibl i Nomani commented tha t i t was simply a cloak for the 
old pro-government pol icy. 
Of the t h r e e , Muhammad Ali (U.'P.) played the leading ro le 
in arousing among educated muslims sympathy and concern for 
69 Turkey. He was deeply r e l i g ious , aggresive and unscrupulous. 
His an t i -Br i t i sh feeling was further in tens i f i ed when t h e gover-
nment disapproved of the proposal to name the projected Aligarh 
University a Muslim Universi ty . Any act of the government 
having the remotest effect on muslim i n s t i t u t i o n s and r i t u a l s 
was now construed as a del ibera te aggression against Islam. 
The demolition of a portion of a Mosque at Kanpur by the public 
works department was used by Ali t o arouse an t i -Br i t i sh feel ing 
among the ordinary muslims of the c i t y . 
on 30 May, 1913 the f i r s t Balkan war was concluded by the 
Treaty of London. According to t h i s Treaty Turkey coded a l l her 
«x 
dominions in Europe west of the Bnos-Media l ine and a lso the 
Island of c r e t e . The Indian hAuslims regreted t h a t t h e i r 
Caliph shouljd be forced to lose t e r r i t o r y but they hoped tha t 
Turkey would not be involved in any future war, for the d i v i -
sion of t he i r loyalty between turkey and Bri ta in was painful 
for the average educated muslim. Ali knew t h a t in the event 
of a war between Br i ta in and Turkey, he and h i s followers would 
cer ta in ly support Turkey no matter now j u s t or unjust her 
reasons for entering in to war against Br i t a in . 
On 4 August 1914, Great Bri ta in declared war on Germany. 
M i ' s fears came t r u e . On 31st August he set a wire to the 
Sultan of Turkey, 
Pacing our fa i th and confidence which we the Indian 
muslims have in the Khalafat, we respect fu l ly urge upon your 
majestly e i the r to support Bri ta in or to keep neutra l in t h i s 
// 
war. 
On 4 November 1914, Turkey joined Germany againat Br i t a in . 
The decision of the Caliph could not be questioned. Ali and 
h i s followers ranged themselves with Turkey against theRaj. 
Ant i -Bri t i sh feeling mounted but the muslims had no strong 
p o l i t i c a l organisation e i the r t o express t h e i r feel ings or t o 
launch a movement against the Bri t ish government. The fAuslim 
league was meek and loyal t o the Br i t i sh . The muslims thus 
gathered round individual leaders but none of them had the 
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vis ion , strength or resources to canalise emotions in to a move-
ment. In December 1914 Muhammad All and his Brother Saukat Ali 
sent a team />£ muslims to t r i b a l areas on the north west fron-
t i e r t o secure arms from the gun fac tor ies which could be used 
against the Br i t i sh , but the team returned without success. 
Then l e t t e r s were sent t o the king of Afganistan entreat ing 
him e i the r to at tack India or t o persuade Germany to at tack 
India. In May 1915, the Ali brothers were ar res ted for 
openly jus t i fying Turkey's entry into the war against B r i t i sh . 
The muslims were l e f t he lp less . A leader with courage and 
vision was needed, but a proper leadership among muslims was 
in the making. 
younger section of r i s ing muslim leader , who dis l iked the 
l oya l i s t p o l i t i c s of the Aligarh group and the leadership of 
big nawabs and zamindars, adopted many new p o l i c i e s . The 
mi l i t an t ly na t i ona l i s t Ahrar movement was founded at t h i s time 
under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Al i , Hakim Ajmal Khan, 
Hassan Imam, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and Mazhar-ul-Haq. Some 
young scholars influenced by the Deoband school of Muslims 
s tudies in U.P, were affected by na t i ona l i s t sentiments. Among 
them the most prominent was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 
In 1913 there was a s igni f icant change in the prograrrene of 
the muslim league. The th ree objectives adopted in 1906 were 
replaced by the following (1) The promotion among Indians of 
9ft 
loyal ty to the Bri t ish Crown. (2) The protect ion of the 
r igh t s of muslims. (3) Without detriment t o the foregoing 
objec ts , the*attainment of the system of self government 
sui table to India . For the f i r s t time the muslim league 
spoke of self government for India. I t was a c lear reputa-
t ion of Sir Syed Ahmad's p o l i t i c a l idea l of unqualified 
h o s t i l i t y towards co-operation with the Hindus as also of the 
leadership of the Aligarh a r i s t o c r a t e . The young generation 
of the muslims was moved by the winds of change: pursui t of 
a common p o l i t i c a l objective along with Hindus became poss ib le . 
But the task was not easy. There was indeed, among 
middle c lass muslims a general feeling of h o s t i l i t y towards 
the Br i t i sh government. But in the congress there were 
different groups while different shades of opinions and i t 
was doubtful whether the n a t i o n a l i s t s of congress would 
support the Pan-Islamism of the muslims. Besides, Gandhi had 
so far worked on his own, outside the congress and the muslim 
league. Beneath the surface unity of congress there was a 
s i l e n t struggle among i t s leaders for a l l - I n d i a leadership . 
If Gandhi wanted to capture the leadership of congress and 
wri te the muslims and hindus i n to a nat ional movement h© needed 
a nat ional cause. This i s what he was looking for , and at 
the end of 1918 he found one. 
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Here i t would be worth while to look b r i f ly over league 
and congress p o l i t i c s since 1915. After the Surat s p l i t in 
1907 the moderates secured afirm grip over congress and held 
i t under t i g h t control u n t i l 1915. Thisthey did by draft ing a 
new const i tu t ion for congress in April 1908. Art ic le one of the 
const i tu t ion defined the objects of congress which were to 
secure, through cons t i tu t ional means, self-government for India 
within the empire. All who wanted t o be or remain members 
of congress were to accept a r t i c l e one of the cons t i tu t ion . 
The ext remis ts , as expected, did not accept and therefore 
they remain excluded from congress u n t i l December 1915. Anot-
her reason for moderate supremacy in congress was the e x t r e -
mist leader T i l ak ' s imprisionment for Sedition in 1908 for six 
years . When Tilak was released in June 1914, h is heal th was 
bad and he was far less extremist in h i s p o l i t i c a l views. 
Negociations with Gokhale for the re -ent ry of T i l a k ' s party 
in to congress were s ta r ted in 1914 by the English theosophist 
Mrs. Annie Besant, who had by then shif ted her a c t i v i t i e s from 
71 the s p i r i t u a l and social to the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of India, 
But Gokhale par t ly due to his own fears and pa r t ly due to 
^jressure from Sir Pheroz Shah Mehta, was re luctant t o l e t the 
extremists into the congress. Gokhale died in February and 
Mehta in November 1915. In December of the same year , therefore , 
the congress at i t s Bombay session modified i t s const i tu t ion t o 
enable the extremists to rejoin the congress. Tilak and h is 
followers joined congress in 1916, af ter e ight years of 
9^ 
e x c l u s i o n , and i t was the un i t ed congress which he ld i t s 
s i g n i f i c a n t sess ion in Lucknow in Oecember of the same y e a r . 
The outbreak of the f i r s t world war in Aug s t 1914, and 
the e n t r y of tu rkey a g a i n s t B r i t i s h f u r t h e r s i g n i f i e d Muslim 
h o s t i l i t y towards B r i t i s h r u l e . There was a growing d e s i r e 
among muslims t o j o i n hands with congress a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h . 
The muslltn league was w i l l i n g t o modify i t s separa t i sm and 
come t o an agreement vdth congress . The fu tu re Crea tor of 
P a k i s t a n , Mohammad AliJ innah (1876-1948) , was in 1915 an 
ardent congressman, a n a t i o n a l i s t , an ambassador of Hindu-
Muslim-Unity, a sp i r ed t o be , i n h i s own words, 'The Muslim 
Gokhale», When in 1913 t h e muslim league defined i t s o b j e c t -
i v e s and expanded i t s v i s ion fo r the f i r s t t ime ,J innah j o ined 
i t but on condi t ion t h a t he would not be induced t o be d i s l o -
72 yal t o the l a r g e r n a t i o n a l cause . 
With a view t o b r ing ing the League nea re r t o congress he 
managed t o hold the League 's annual se s s ion of 1915 a t t h e 
Same time and p lace as t h a t of congress . Thus, the s e p a r a t e 
s e s s ions of the League and Congress , were he ld in December a t 
Bombay, and they continued t o be so h e l d , i n the same month 
and same p l a c e , u n t i l 1919, t h e congress and l eague , succeeded 
in s t a r t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s fo r an agreement, which was concluded 
in 1916 a t t h e i r Lucknow s e s s i o n s , and hence commonly c a l l e d 
t h e Lucknow p a c t . The scheme was a f u l l c o n s t i t u t i o n for 
I nd i a demanding, among o ther t h i n g s , self-government a t an 
93 
e a r l y d a t e . The important f e a t u r e of t h e scheme was t h e 
agreement on the mode and percentage of muslim r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
in t h e p r o v i n c i a l and c e n t r a l r e g i s l a t u r e s . Congress agreed 
t h a t the muslims should continue to be e l e c t e d by t h e i r 
s epa ra te e l e c t o r a t e s , , a system which was in t roduced in 1909 
and soon a f t e r vehemently c r i t i c i s e d by t h e congress , T i l a k 
andJ innah, however, hoped t h a t the scheme of s e p a r a t e e l e c t o -
r a t e s would have but a sho r t l i f e and a time would come when 
the muslims needed t h i s no more and t h e r e would be no d i s t i n -
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c t i on in p o l i t i c a l l i f e between Hindu and Muslims, 
Thus in December 1916, while t h e war was s t i l l c o n t i n u i n g , 
t h e congress- league scheme presen ted a u n i t e d I n d i a t o the 
B r i t i s h Ra j . This of course , among o ther f a c t o r s , \^as 
r e spons ib le for ga lvan i s ing B r i t i s h Government i n t o formula t ing 
t h e next s e t of reforms for I n d i a . 
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CHAPTER - I I 
MUSLIM LEADERSHIP IN U .P . DURING KHILAFAT 
AND NON CO-OPERATION MO /^ElVffiNT 
Political action upto 1916 had been determined increas-
ingly by the prospect/further reform of the legislative 
councils. In August 1917, the Secretary of State, Montegu, 
declared that the British government had decided to take 
•substantial steps' in the direction of the 'pregrassive 
realisation of responsible government in India as an integral 
part of the British empire,»^ In April 1918, together with 
the viceroy, he published a report which recommended the 
devolution of considerable power to Indians in the provinces. 
These two events, which assured many Indian politicians that 
power was not very far from their grasp, had an important effect 
on political alignments," 
Two main groups among muslim politicians in the U.P, had 
begun to emerge in the decade after Syed Ahmad's death. The 
"young gentlemen of progressive tendicies" and the men of 
property and influence." After 1909, government frequently 
employed these categories in surveying the political scene 
and the muslims used them too, often describing them as the 
young party and the old party. 
After 1914 'The old party' became unimportant,^ In 
future the province was going to be governed by those who • 
could command a majority in the provincial council. It was 
clear that the policy of relying on government to protect 
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musllm i n t e r e s t s , for which the 'old party* stood, was un l ik -
ely to be e f fec t ive . Nevertheless, 'old pa r ty ' men did not 
allow reform to go through without a f i gh t . When the govern-
ment called for memorials on reforms, two leaders of the U.P. 
muslim league, Ibni Ahmad and Syed Abdur Rauf of Allahabad, 
and the large muslim landlords of Aligarh, led by Muzamilullah 
Khan of Bhikampur, organised with government encouragement a 
^U.P, muslim defence associa t ion . The Associat ion 's address 
presented t o montegu and chemsford declared t h a t any large 
measure of self-government which might c u r t a i l the moderating 
and adjusting influence of the Bri t ish government would be 
nothing short of a cataclysom,' and demanded t h a t , if devolu-
t ion took place, muslims should have f i f t y percent represen-
p 
t a t i o n . This l ine was supported by other muslim groups a l so . 
They were — the muslim associat ion for the protect ion of the 
Mohemdans of Gorakhpur, the Anjuman-i-Islamia of Saharanpur 
and the Mohammadan of Rohilkhand,' But Br i t i sh influence was 
being cur ta i led and there was no chance of muslims being given 
equal representa t ion . The lack of r e a l i t y in the defence 
Associa t ion 's pol icy, even as a bargaining pos i t ion , ind ica tes 
tha t the old party had reached the end of the road. Members 
of the 'Old Pa r ty ' now began to leave the main stream of the 
muslim p o l i t i c s , Aftab Ahmad Khan joined the Secretary of 
S t a t e ' s Council, Syed Abdur Rauf became a judge of the Punjab 
Chief Court, and Ibni Ahmad disappeared from view. 
9^» 
Several young party leaders also l e f t the mainstream of 
muslim p o l i t i c s , Wazir Hassan's (1874-1947) aim was to ensure 
tha t p o l i t i c a l reforms were carr ied out. This required a 
t i gh t hold upon muslim league. Yet in 1917 i t was coming 
increasingly under a t tack . He had t o face a d i rec t assaul t 
on his control of the league from Lucknow i t s e l f . Raja Ghulam 
Husain, Mahomed A l l ' s follower, was i t s organiser , his news 
12 paper. The new Bra , the Vehicle, In a se r i e s of a r t i c l e s 
e n t i t l e d ^Reconstruction', he launched a campaign for the 
transformation of the league in t o an ' e f f i c i en t vehicle for 
the expression of the wi l l of the muslim community. He did 
not deny Hassan's l i b e r a l p o l i c i e s , but the Secretary had 
placed a dead weight on the development of muslim p o l i t i c s -
'New e r a ' s t a t e s ; -
"The All-India Moslem League in i t s frame work and 
organisation has inevi tably led to the growth of p o l i t i c a l 
despatism - an exclusive ring of a few favoured p e r s o n a l i t i e s , 
who have coalesced in to a form of d ic ta torsh ip and have 
supressed, however unconsciously, a l l healthy development of 
p o l i t i c a l thought in the democracy of Islamic India. The 
resu l t i s t ha t muslim p o l i t i c s i s s p l i t in to 'warring c l iques ' 
revolving around masterful and self-seeking p e r s o n a l i t i e s ; 
There were t o be no more wazir Hassans. In his blueprint 
for the new league, Hussain recommended tha t the same man 
KM) 
should be e l i g i b l e for the post of secretary only every 
Is other year . -^  
Wazir rfassan warded off these a t t acks , but they did not 
diminish. When the montegu-chemsford report was published 
in April 1918, 'young party^ opposition t o Hassan c rys ta l i sed 
around i t . Most thought they had l i t t l e chance of winning 
seats or min is t r ies in the new counci ls . Moreover they were 
concerned by the Report 's h o s t i l i t y t o separate representa t ion , 
and were being increasingly alarmed by the fa te of turky in 
17 the war. With nothing to gain from supporting reform, they 
joined the congress in condemning them. Their a l l iance was 
commented by a new and r ea l pa r t i c ipa t ion in congress a f f a i r s , 
T.A.K, Sherwani (D. 1935) and Manzar All Sokhta became promi-
nent in provincial congress a c t i v i t i e s , Ansari, Asaf Ali and 
Hakim Ajmal Khan gained leading posi t ions in the Delhi congress 
committee, while Khawza Abdul Mazid and Syed Hyder Mehdi were 
e lected to All-India Congress Committee, 
Wazir Hassan had to t read warily t o keep the league on 
the side of the reform. In May 1918, i t looks as i f congress 
and league were about to hold a special session to discuss the 
19 
motegu-chemsf ord repor t . Wazir Hassan was not h e a r t i l y 
prepared for a special session, because of h is weak posi t ion 
on 
of secretaryship of the league, ' '^ 'We do not t h i n k ' , he to ld 
the congress secre tary , ' tha t we should hold a special meeting 
of the Al l - India Moslem League but we would ca l l a meeting of 
the council of the All - India Moslem League to confer with the 
nil 
21 
cong re s s , Hassan had p r e f e r ed Bombay as a s u i t a b l e p lace 
fo r the s e s s i o n . He won over t h i s po in t but had t o accept a 
f u l l sess iorr . The congress l e a d e r s were in hur ry but he to Id to the 
congress s e c r e t a r y t h a t , i f they wanted t h e support of t h e 
Raja of Mahmudabad (Pres iden t of the League) and h imsel f , t he 
e a r l i e s t they could have a j o i n t s e s s ion was the f i r s t week 
in September, They wanted time »to gauge f u l l y the p u b l i c 
22 Opinions a s we l l as the views of t h e p r e s s . In the meantime, 
Harcourt Bu t l e r , r e c e n t l y i n s t a l l e d as l i e u t i n a n t governor 
of t he U.P . i s sa id t o have made Mahmudabad'ssupport for t h e 
reforms c e r t a i n by promising him, i f he behaved h imsel f , t h e 
Home membership in the f i r s t government formed under t h e new 
d i s p e n s a t i o n . Whether t r u e or n o t , t h e Raja behaved him 
s e l f , and the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n s of t h e league over which he 
p r e s i d e d in September refused t o j o i n t h e congress in condemn-
24 ing the reforms r e p o r t . As a r e s u l t a t t ack on Hassan and 
now the Raja i n t e n s i f i e d . They came t o a head at t h e Delh i 
Muslim League sess ion in December 1918. In the s u b j e c t s 
committee, Hassan, with t h e he lp of Nabiu l lah and J i n n a h , 
b rave ly defended h i s p o l i c y aga ins t the a s s a u l t s of Hakim 
Ajmal Khan and Ansari urging t h a t 'no th ing which might i n j u r e 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in Ind ia or which might compromise t h e i r n a t i o -
26 ' 
n a l p o s i t i o n should be d o n e . , . . ' In the league counci l 
Hassan s t i l l had enough in f luence t o get t h e Raja and himself 
r e - e l e c t e d as p r e s i d e n t and s e c r e t a r y , and t o defea t an at tempt 
27 t o change t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . But in t h e league s e s s i o n s , he 
1 ( 1 ? 
and his patron came In for such a drubbing t h a t Mahmudabad, 
having received treatment i l l - b e f i t t i n g a taluqdar and a 
nobleman, ' l e f t Delhi in d i s g u s t . ' They resigned from the 
league, they could no longer reconcile the growing h o s t i l i t y 
t o government and t o themselves of many league members with 
t h e i r own hopes of receiving the rewards of col labora t ion , and 
t h e i r own views of what was best for the muslims. 
As the old leaders l e f t the league at Delhi , new suppor-
t e r s arr ived, the Ulama, The odd alims had attended the 
sessions before, for ins tance , Shibl i had come to press the 
Waqf question, but never befoi^e had session been graced by so 
many of the re l ig ious l eaders . They had been invi ted by Ansari 
in order to add t h e i r weight t o his p ro te s t s regarding the 
29 Khi lafa t . In the sessions they were fe ted, being given a 
paean of praise in welcome and a prominent place on the p l a t -
form. One of them, Maulvi Ghulam Mohiuddin of Kasur rep l ied 
saying tha t 'up to t h i s time the Ulamas had considered the 
re l ig ion and p o l i t i c s of MuSalmans were in different th ings 
but in fact they were one and the same in Islam, Their p o l i -
t i c s was the i r religion,"^^ Ansari and Hakim Azamal Khan took 
up t h i s theme by t ry ing , without success, to a l t e r the aims of 
the league from protecting the r igh t s of Indian muslims t o 
protect ing the re l ig ious as well as the p o l i t i c a l r igh t s of 
muslims both outside and inside India . Not a l l 'young p a r t y ' 
men, however approved of t h i s attempt to connect re l ig ion with 
111^  
politics. Khaliquzzaman told an intelligence agent 'that they 
were playing with fire in uniting with the Ulamas. They 
would either.be swept off their legs or carry the whole of 
32 
muslim, India with them, Khaliquzzaman's warning was 
not wrong. Over the next four years, the Ulama were to be a 
33 powerful force in both muslim and Indian politics. 
But who were the Ulama ? how they became a distinct 
group ? the following assessment is useful : 
"They were not a hierarchy or an order; if they were 
professional body, they were without, so to speak, a registera-
tion council or a court of discipline. They were a class by 
their education, ... they did not possess equal qualifications 
or individual parity of esteem. Not much more than pretension 
united the product of one of the great teaching centres, say 
the Firangi Mahal in Lucknow, and the village mulla who, though 
he could recite the Quran in Arabic, could hardly understand 
who he was reciting ... As long as a man followed a traditio-
nal Syllabus of study and accepted the ijma of his learned 
predecessors, he would be accepted as an Alim, 
The Ulama, therefore, were those who followed the tradi-
tional education of Islam, 
Most Ulama depended on religion to make their living,"^ ^ 
A few eked out an existence in Industry or trade; early in 
its history the Deobandi School suspecting that it would be 
111^  
hard t o find work for i t s graduates, opened a department 
37 teaching small handicraft i n d u s t r i e s . Some had a l t e rna t ive 
means of sup'port. Shibl i inher i ted wealth from his fa ther 
38 and received a grant from the Nizam, Na-sarat Husain, one 
of Mahmud-ul-Hasan«s companions during h i s Malta internment, 
39 
owned 'a comfortable l i t t l e e s t a t e in Fatehpur d i s t r i c t , ' 
Salamalullah of Firangimahal owned property in Lucknow and 
Abdul Bari held a small zamindari. But most derived a l l 
t h e i r r e l i g ion . Some were journa l i s t and w r i t e r s , l ike 
Maulvi Habibur Rahman of Deoband, but the great majority 
were missionaries or t eachers . 
The Ulama looked to no governing body or h ie ra rch ica l 
chief for guidance. Nevertheless, they were not without 
organisat ion. They had a l l been taken through the D a r s - i -
Nizamia at one of the schools, and the pa r t i cu l a r t r a in ing 
they received imposed something of a pat tern upon t h e i r 
44 thinking and act ion, Ulama organisat ion, the re fo re , 
tended t o be derived from the schools, ' '^ In the U.P. there 
were three schools of primary importance: Maulana Ahmad 
Reza Khan's school at Bare i l ly , Fingi Mahal tucked away in 
an al ley of the Chowk at Lucknow, and the Dar-ul-Ulum a t 
Deoband, 
The elements of organisation among Ulama were also 
4 8 
sources of d iv i s ion ,^" Apart from a na tura l r i v a l r y , 
r e l i g ious schools were at loggerheads with each other over 
111^ 
education and doctrine. Deoband concentrated on the tradi-
tions, textual commentary and disputation, Firangi Mahal on 
Islamic law,and its methodology. Deoband accepted the old 
Islamic order in principle and tried to revive and purify it; 
the school rejected any interpretation of the canon law 
(Ijlihad).^ Firangi Mahal on the other hand attempted to 
compromise with modern developments: it permitted re inter-
pretation^ . Deoband and Bareilly were forever locked in the 
most bitter doctrinal battles. Although, Bareilly like Deoband, 
was of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence and rejected reinter-
pretation, its support of worship and intercession at tombs 
and its belief in the miraculous powers of saints were naturally 
C O 
anathema t o the Pur i tan ica l Deobandis, "^  The Ulama of Firangi 
Mahal also objected to the Barei l ly dogma. The Sunni school 
of ulama were prepared to a l ly only in doing down t h e i r hated 
sec tar ian r i v a l s , the Shia mujtahids. Much more 'Fatwa-power • 
was expended in trying to get the be t t e r of r i v a l schools than 
in tackling the implications of Br i t i sh rule for the f a i th fu l . ^^ 
A united platform of ulamas was immensely d i f f i cu l t to achieve. 
In much the same way within individual schools ulama were 
divided over doctrinal i s sues , and t h e i r differences were shar-
pened by b i t t e r personal r i v a l r y , ^ The NadwaT-ul-Ulama^of 
Lucknow was for many years rent by s t ruggles between orthodox 
and reformist p a r t i e s , and in 1913 Shibl i almost destroyed the 
i n s t i t u t i o n in a petty attempt to score off a doctr inal r i v a l . ^ ^ 
Deoband was divided over the question of i t s curriculum, and 
also by a s t r a igh t forward struggle for power between r i va l 
l!)K 
factions. 'Ubaid Ullah and his friends,' wrote Mahmud-ul-
Hasan, principal from 1890 to 1914, 'wished to teach Arabic 
history, not.Indian.^^ I did not approve of it. I thought 
it would have a bad effect. It (The Deoband School) was 
founded to promote ^iety and religion and bringing in a secular 
subject like history would injure it in the minds of its 
supporters. I told Ubaid Ullah and his friends they had no 
money. The school which was for "Namaz Rauza," would become 
an ordinary school. Having failed to achieve reform from 
within, Obeid Ullah sindhi left the college and attacked it 
from without. He formed the jamiat-ul-ansar• 'to improve the 
management of the college...' This meant cutting down the 
powers of the superintendent, Hafiz Mohamed Ahmad, who natura-
lly resented this and issued a fatwa declaring obeidullah a 
Kafir. The college divided into factions and remained 
divided against itself throughout the period, 
Firangi Mahal split irreparably over the question of what 
its attitude to government should be. Two parties developed 
when the Balkan wars broke out, their positions hardend during 
the first world war and were maintained during the Khilafat 
movement. The first known as the 'madarassa party', consis-
ted of Abdul Bari, his disciples, relations and pupils of Ahe 
madarassa Nizamia. The second known as the 'Bahr-ul-ulum 
party', consisted of the two brothers, Maulvi Abdul Mazid and 
Abdul Hamid, and their followers. -^  Abdul Majid and his party 
strongly objected to the extreme line taken by Abdul Bari over 
the Balkan wars and resined from the madarassa Nizamia.^"* Abdul 
Mazid was not the supporter of the war. The rivalry between 
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t h e two groups , r a p i d l y became imbued with them. The bad 
blood i t c rea ted lay behind many of the c o n s p i r a c i e s among 
Lucknow Ulama. In 1916, for example, government r eques t ed t h e 
Raja of Jahangirabad t o d ismiss Niohomed Bash i r , a fol lower of 
Abdul B a r i . Bash i r , t.he Maulvi in charge of a Mosque under the 
R a j a ' s c o n t r o l , had encouraged by Abdul B a r i , pe rmi t t ed f a n a t i * 
ca l d iv ine t o include the Sul tan of Turky in the f r iday Sermon 
(Khutba) . " Raja of Jahangi rabad found himself caught in the 
horns of dilemma. D i r e c t i v e s from h i s zenana, where Abdul 
Bari was much admired, i n s t r u c t e d him t o do n o t h i n g . The 
government considered i t i n t o l e r a b l e even tua l l y Raja had t o 
,68 
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t a k e a c t i o n . The 'Madrassa P a r t y ' were fu r ious a t 'what 
they regard as a v i c to ry for Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majeed . . . 
They at tempted to revenge themselves by drawing p u b l i c a t t e n t -
ion through t h e columns of the Indian Dai ly t e l e g r a p h , t o the 
'Scanda lous ' condi t ion of the Lucknow Idgah, of which Abdul 
Mazid was the prayer l e a d e r . ' In 1919, they appear t o have 
had a hand in the internment for t he d i ssemina t ion of s e d i t i o u s 
pamphlets of Barkatulah Raza, a member of the s t a f f of the 
70 F i r ang i Mahal K h i l a f a t i s t paper , 'Akhuwat'. For every fatwa 
Abdul Bari produced in favour of the Kh i l a f a t movement, non-
cooperat ion and Hindu-Aluslim u n i t y , they f i r e d off one in 
71 
o p p o s i t i o n . The Lucknow b a t t l e of Fatwas achieved A l l - I n d i a 
importance when t h e 'Bahr-ul-Ulum p a r t y ' fu rn i shed the major 
government fatwa r e f u t i n g ' the r e l i g i o u s fatwa of the ulamas 
of All I n d i a ' , which made non-co-opera t ion mandatory on a l l 
72 
muslims. For t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s the b r o t h e r s , Abdul Hamid 
and Abdul Mazid, were a l l rewarded by t h e government. Medals 
denoting the t i t l e of Shams-ul-Ulama dangled from t h e i r t u r b a n s , 
llix 
while for his anti Khilafat work Abdul Majid was one of the 
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most re«(arded men in the province. At a provincial-Durbar 
in 1922, he received from Harcourt butter both a robe and a 
sword of honour, 
Ulama were incapable of working together. It was difficult 
for Ulama to take a united standover large issues; they could 
not even present a united front to the secularising processes 
introduced by British rule. -- For every alim who issued a 
fatwa that India was dar-ul-herb there would be one who declared 
that it was dar-ul-Islam. For every alim who opposed the govern-
ment there would be one who declared his loyal support. When 
the Ulama entered the politics of Muslim League, it could not 
be all Ulama, only particular factions.76 Nevertheless, their 
entry was received with considerable forboding: even factions 
of Ulama had influence which secular politicians feared, Islam 
was stock in their trade. All muslims came within their ken, 
political or non political, literate or illiterate, male or 
female.^'' 
Evidently the allience of a group of Ulama with some of 
the leading muslim league politicians, which was heralded at 
Delhi in 1918, was likely to extend greatly the Depths of. 
Muslim society which political agitators could plumb."^ ^ 
•There were excellant reasons for ulama to be discontented 
with British rule. Theoretically every muslim activity was 
subject to their approval, yet the whole tendency of government 
Kl^i 
Was to interfere with their authority and steadily to reduce 
their influence in muslim society. The immense growth of 
administrative activity both encroached on those aspects of 
government over which they had power and created new areas 
over which they had none, Ulama preserves - Mosques, Shrines, 
religious, practice and susceptibility - were all beginning to 
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come within the purview of local bureacracy. Moreover this 
bureaucracy, though the increasing association of local inte-
rests with local government by means of elections, was coming 
under the control ofmmuslims who had secular training, and of 
Rn Hindus. ^ ^ Government was also interfering with muslim personal 
law. Indeed, by legislating against the muslim right to make 
waqfs, it limited an important source of Ulama income. But by 
far the most important encroachment was the establishment of a 
government educational system which taught mainly secular sub-
jects. These subjects became essential for most forms of 
employment, and so muslim boys were steadily enticed away from 
81 the religious education of Islam. 
Ulama attacked most bitterly the protagonists of English 
education and secular values, Syed Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh 
School. At the same time they tried to reinforce Islamic 
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education against the new influences. Their endevours t^ ook 
two forms: a puritanical assertion of the traditional forms 
of education and an attempt to come to terms with western 
learning. Deoband represented the first response. Soon after 
the mutiny, a group of Ulama from Shamli in Muzaffar Nagar, who 
had fought against the British, decided that now the important 
t i n 
vic to r i e s were going t o be won not on the ba t t l e f ie ld but 
in the classroom. To revive and strengthen the Islamic 
Sciences, the Shamli group, founded in 1867, the dar-ul-ulum at 
Deoband. They es tabl i sh a syllabus which contained only t r a d i -
t i ona l Islamic learning though they were not en t i r e ly opposed 
t o modern knowledge and t r i e d to set up branch i n s t i t u t i o n s 
84 elsewhere in the province. The dar-ul-ulum of the Nadwat-ul-
ulama, founded in Lucknow about t h i r t y years l a t e r , represented 
the second response,"^ Sh ib l i , the major force in the i n s t i t u -
t i o n , ins i s ted on the learning of English. He believed tha t 
a knowledge of English was v i t a l t o maintain t he i r proper role 
in modern muslim society. 
Tradi t ional Islamic education was found eventually to be 
overwhelned by the new western learning. But the Ulama r e s i s -
ted the process with some success. The top i n s t i t u t i o n of 
R7 
t r a d i t i o n a l learning became more popular. In 1908, Abul Bari 
set up the Madrassa Nizamia at Firangi Mahal, up to t h i s point 
the Lucknow school had played l i t t l e par t in the educational 
e f fo r t . Between 1907 and 1912 enrolment a t Deoband leapt from 
267 t o 600 and the Dar-ul-ulum buildings were extended,^® At 
the same time Nadwa au thor i t i e s pressed vigorously for expan-
sion,*^ and on 1st December, 1908 the foundation of an ambitious 
building was l a i d . ^ ° 
The reforms of morley minto and the great outburst of 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , brought forth another ulama organisat ion. 
Ill 
the Majlish Muid-ul- Is lam,^^ I t was e n t i r e l y on F i rang i Mahal, 
I t s c o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e d t h a t i t was 'an I s lamic a s s o c i a t i o n 
which s e e k s , t o promote t h e way of the Sha r iga t for the b e n e f i t 
of t he muslim. By means of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n , t h e ulama of 
F i r a n g i Mahal can j o in with o the r ulama of t h e i r p e r s u a t i o n 
GO 
t o work among t h e I s l amic p e o p l e , " I t s aim were dec la red 
t o b e : 
( a ) To t r y t o work for the r e l i g i o u s p rog re s s of t h e I s l amic 
community wi th in the laws of t h e c u r r e n t government, and 
t o he lp t h e Is lamic community, 
(b) To help the muslims a t t a i n p rog res s in worldly m a t t e r s , 
whi le keeping in mind the i n j u n c t i o n s of t h e S h a r a i t , 
(c) To propagate the i n j u n c t i o n s of the S h a r a i t among the 
93 Is lamic community and t o overcome oppos i t ion t o i t . 
The Maj l i s was t o meet once a month, not n e c e s s a r i l y in 
Lucknow, and the remarkable p rov i s ion was made t h a t t h e occasion 
could t ake t h e form of a genera l meeting open t o non-members, 
94 both muslim amd non-muslim, Abdul Bar i was apoin ted p r e s i d e n t 
and Sa lamatu l lan , s e c r e t a r y . The Maj l i s was impor tan t because , 
fo r t he f i r s t t ime , a formal o r g a n i s a t i o n was imposed over t h e 
OR, • 
connect ions and a l l e g i a n c e of an ulma schoo l . 
The a t tempts t o organise in order t o meet t h e t h r e a t s 
which modern educat ion and p o l i t i c s p re sen ted t o p r i e s t l y 
\n 
a u t h o r i t y were t h e work of the leading ulama from the g r e a t 
o6 
schools of t he p r o v i n c e , ' But not Ulama were a f f i l i a t e d t o 
t h e g r e a t schools and not a l l who were a f f i l i a t e d were moved 
by t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e s . Many, in f a c t , had t o l i v e and get on 
i n l o c a l s o c i e t y , on which they often depended for t h e i r income, 
and could not afford the luxury , however much t hey r e g r e t t e d , 
i t , of preaching r i g i d adherence t o orthodox I s l am. The 
Sa i jada-Nashins ( s i t t e r s o n t h e ca rpe t or head Ulama) of the 
Dia ra Shah Ha j tu l l ah a t Allahabad, Wohamad Husain and h i s son 
Wilayat Husain who succeeded him, are a case in p o i n t . Far 
from a t t a ck ing Aligarh and a l l i t s works, Mahomed Husain 
appears t o have been in f luenced by i t . The a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Saj jada-Nashins of owed more t o t h e p o l i t i c a l needs of t h e 
minor i ty community they l ed in Allahabad than any gene ra l 
97 pe rcep t ion what Ulama should do. 
The cons iderable development of communal awareness from 
1810, der ived mainly from t h e morley-minto reforms and t o a 
l e s s e r ex t en t from the growth of Pan-Is lamism, helped t o br idge 
the gaps between the Ulama of the leading schools and o ther 
groups in muslim s o c i e t y . Contacts between leading and l o c a l 
no 
Ulama became more frequent. Groups in Firangi Mahal and 
Deoband began to organise political support. 
No less significant of the future of muslim politics was 
the development of connections between the leading Ulama schools 
l is 
and the young western-educated muslims. Remarkably the f i r s t 
attempts at rapprochment appear t o have been made between those 
deadly enemies, Aligarh and Deoband, Mohsain-ul-Mulk set up 
an Arabic department and made overtures to the Ulama , Abdul 
102 Bari , his biographer, praised him highly for h is diplomacy. 
Vikar-ul-Mulk increased in the re l ig ious content of the Aligarh 
syl labus . Students had to pass a paper on'Islamic Re l ig ion ' , 
and if they played t ruant from daily prayers they were threated 
with expulsion. But a f t e r a l l these en thus ias t i c steps 
104 proved not so successful* 
As secular leaders attempted to give effect in the Aligarh 
curriculum to t h e i r rapprochement with the Ulama, some Ulama 
attempted to give i t tangible from v/ithin the orthodox system. 
Under the patronage of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Vikar-ul-Mulk, 
obeidullah Sindhi, who had been asked to leave Deoband for h i s 
unorthodox ideas on the curriculum, set up the Nazaral -ul -
Maarif-ul-Qurania (Academy of Koranic Learning) in the Fatehpuri 
Masque at Delhi . He aimed to redress the balance of secular 
education by teaching the Koran to English-educated muslims, 
and hoped t o es tabl i sh h is system on an a l l - I n d i a bas i s , 
Deoband and Aligarh, however were too far apart in aims 
as well as in geography for these t e n t a t i v e approaches t o r e s u l t 
ln6 in united p o l i t i c a l ac t ion . The effect ive rapprochment 
betvueen secular and re l ig ious leaders occured in Lucknow, 
between young party men and the Ulama of Firangi Mahal. I t 
i s probable tha t there has always been connections between the 
1H 
leading ulama of Firangi Mahal and the prominent men of the 
107 Nawabi c i t y . Important 'young pa r ty ' men cer ta in ly had 
associat ions, with the school. The Raja of Muhmadabad was a 
d is tant r e l a t ive of Abdul bari and, of course, helped t o 
inR finance i t s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Mushir Husain Kidwai 
regarded Abdul Bari as a pi r and his bro thers , Eshanur and 
Saidur Rahman, were to work for the Maulana Mohammad Ali 
109 during the Khilafat movement. 
During world war I the 'young pa r ty ' leaders maintained 
t h e i r close associat ions with the f i rangi mahal ulama. At 
the outbreak of the war, Deoband and the Nadwa passed fervent 
resolut ion of loya l ty , and maintained t h i s stand throughout 
the war. But Abdul Bari and Firangi Mahal, again under the 
influence of the 'young pa r ty ' were more d i f f ident . In 
September, 1914, the Maulana and Raja of Mahmudabad sent t e l e -
grams to Sultan begging him to remain neutra l or join Br i t i sh . 
The Sultan was not impressed. VJhen Turkey actual ly entered the 
war, Abdul Bari played the davious games as the 'young party*. 
At the beginning of 1915, Abdul Bari allowed the Ali brothers 
to wri te a se r ies of l e t t e r s in the 'Hamdard' under h i s signa-
t u r e , refuting Abdul Haq of Ca lcu t t a ' s fatwa which had la id 
down tha t Turkey's war was p o l i t i c a l , and therefore did not 
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concern good muslims. When the Sherif of Mecca revolted 
the Maulana, despite considerable pr ivate rese rva t ions , ful ly 
supported the muslim league 's resolut ion of condemnation, 
and t r i e d to wheel Deoband behind him. For h is pains he was 
l is 
snubbed with the suggestion that he was *a busy body who 
could not read his Keran rightly. '"'"^'^  Whenever there was a 
crisis, when.ever the voice of orthodox wass needed to add 
weight to the politics of protest, Abdul Bari could be relied 
upon to play his part, it was an alliance without precedent. 
Aligarh'sbrlghtest sons and Lucknow's most learned divines 
stood shoulder to shoulder on the issues of the day. Syed 
Ahmad Khan must have turned in his grave. There were to most 
remarkable developments in U.P. muslim politics during the 
world war I - alliance between the young party leaders and the 
congress and the increasing involvement of the Ulama in the 
politics of the muslim league. Lucknow pact of 1916 was led 
by the first and the second led to the attendance of the Ulama 
at the 1918 League session. The two years that followed the 
war were to bring changes that were no less notable. Ulama 
became much more than useful agitational tools to be deplayed 
by western-educated politicians, indeed from time to time they 
took the lead in muslim politics. The muslim League disappea-
red from the view completly, being overwhelmed by the new all-
India Khilafat organisation. Hindus began to play a much 
biggar part in muslim affairs, Arya samajists such as Swami 
Shraddhanand and pandit Neki Ram were to be found addressing 
muslim meetings, Muslims, on the other hand, began to play 
a greater part in the congress. Indeed, so great did their 
influence become in the organisation that they were mainly 
u^ 
responsible both for the powerful posi t ion t h a t Gandhi a t t a i -
ned in Indian p o l i t i c s by September 1920 and for the congress 's 
tJecision t o "boycott the new reformed counci ls . 
At the beginning of 1919 such extra-ordinary developments 
seemed unl ike ly . The major issue in muslim p o l i t i c s was the 
Khi lafa t . In October 1918 Turkey waS overcome by Allenby's 
armies. Soon af ter Constantinople was occupied by the A l l i e s , 
the Bri t ish Prime ^Ainister, hotly supported by the Archibishop 
of canterbury, began to use the language of the crusades, and 
in August, 1920 by the Treaty signed at sevres , the Sultan was 
reduced to the s ta tus of a Br i t i sh puppet. 
was 
Ottoman empire/shared out between Br i t a in , France, 
Greece, I t a ly and the Arabs, This set t lement , and those that 
followed i t , were not the r e su l t of any lack of s e n s i t i v i t y to 
muslim demands on the part of those responsible for Indian 
a f f a i r s . The government of India emphasised continually and 
strongly t h e i r disastrous ef fec ts on the Indian rauslims. The 
Secretary of State ruined his health and his p o l i t i c a l career 
in urging the cabinet to adopt the Turkish cause. But a l l 
t o no ava i l , Turkish af fa i r s l ike council reforms and other 
matters tha t concerned Indian Muslims, were not decided f ina l ly 
by the India office but by the Bri t ish parliament. 
The agi ta t ion t o preserve the Khilafat and the holy 
places of Islam from t h e i r fa te i n i t i a t e d the l a s t c l imatic 
phase of Indian Pan-Islamism. I t revealed more c lear ly than 
w 
any other agi ta t ion those who supported Pan-Islamism and 
the reasons why they found i t a t t r a c t i v e . Most muslims were 
to Some extent moved by the demise of the l a s t great muslim 
power, even though the Khalifa was no more than a 
name in many Mosques in the U.P, he was not even mentioned 
in the Khutba. But t h e i r wil l ingness to ag i t a te for t he 
Khilafat was d i rec t ly re la ted to t h e i r p o l i t i c a l posi t ion in 
India . 'Old pa r ty ' men, who expected to gain power under the 
empty expressions of concern, 'No one can deny tha t every 
muslim i s concerned about the future of Turkey , . , ' , Ibni 
Ahmad to ld Ansari in December 1919; 'We differ only on one 
point , i . e . how to convey our feel ings t o the a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The young party leaders who le f t the Muslim League at Delhi in 
1918, and those who followed them over the next two years , 
took up much the same posit ion on the issue as 'old pa r ty ' 
men. Raja of Mahmudabad led a moderate party over the Khila-
fat movement question. Those who agi ta ted vigorously were 
'young par ty ' men and the Ulama. Most 'young pa r ty ' men had 
no chance of influence in the new counci ls . They needed the 
weight of the muslim iden t i ty in order to compensate for 
t h e i r weakness. Their object in agi ta t ing over the Khilafat 
was t o ensure t h a t the muslim iden t i ty remained the powerful 
t o adopt in Indian p o l i t i c s t ha t i t had been, "The important 
consideration Muhammad All i n s i s t ed , " i s the temporal power 
of the Khalif, as one of his chief functions i s t o defend the 
11^ 
faith and to put into jeopardy the strength of those who put 
lip 
us into jeopardy. Ulama of course were, not interested in 
power in India as a whole. They just wanted to control Indian 
Muslims, Those who agitated did so for religious reasons, 
though some found that agitation could; improve their personal 
positions and many came to hope that through it they would be 
able to restore their influence in the community generally. 
Despite the essential differences in aim between the Ulama 
and 'young party' men, their alliance was the key to the extra-
ordinary vigour of the Khilafat agitation. 'Young party' men 
provided a guiding hand, but the Ulama were the driving force 
behind the agitation and its ever more radical development. 
The Khilafat campaign was in effect launched by Dr. Ansari and 
Hakim Ajmal Khan who, in their speeches to the 1918 League and 
congress sessions respectively, voiced the concern about 
Turkey which had grown amongst the muslim during the year. 
Words, however, were translated into deeds by Abdul Bari, 
As soon as the Delhi conferences had finished, he went into 
action trying to draw as many Indian Ulama as possible behind 
him. In January, he issued an questionnaire designed to 
obtain opinions on the Khilafat, Ansari helped to distribute 
it, using his influence to make sure the Deoband is received 
119 
a copy. Those who signed were largely of the Firangi Mahal 
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connection. The most radical opinion, part of which argued 
that if there is any danger of infidels gaining possession 
of the holy places, all Muhammadans must fight. Jehad is as 
impera t ive as praying and wash ing ' , came from eleven F i r a n g i 
Mahal Ulama e i t h e r r e l a t e d t o or c l o s e l y a s soc i a t ed with 
131 Abdul B a r i , Abdul Bari was opposed by some Ulama of 
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Allahabad, Kanpur and Delhi and as u sua l by Ahmad 
Reza Kharn of B a r e i l l y , Maulvi Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid of 
124 F i r ang i Mahal and a l l the Ulama of Deoband, 
After i s su ing h i s fatwa, which enjoined the f a i t h f u l 
t o perform jehad t h e r e was any danger of t h e i n f i d e l c o n t r o -
l l i n g the Khal i fa oi t h e holy p l a c e s , Abdbl Bar i t r i e d t o 
a r r a n g e , a meeting of Ulama of d i f f e r e n t s c h o o l s . He was 
supported by Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan , and some Delhi 
Ulama, but opposed by Deoband, and the meeting did not 
immediately m a t e r i a l i s e d . Mean while he t r i e d t o organise a 
v i l l a g e campaign in the U.P, and with the he lp of a p r o f e s s i o n a l 
e d i t o r founded a r a d i c a l j o u r n a l , the 'Akhuwatl In Apr i l 
19L9, the Maulana Muhamad Ali was s p i l l i n g i dea s a l l over the 
12Q p l a c e : an Indian muslim mission t o I s lamic c o u n t r i e s , a 
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deputa t ion t o the v iceroy ^^^ an a l l - I n d i a conference of 
muslim t o meet in Lucknow t o d i scuss the Kh i l a f a t problem. 
His own paper (Hamdard) became i n c r e a s i n g l y a n t i - c h r i s t i a n 
and ant i -government , and from time h i n t e d a t j ehad^^^ . Even 
the eve r -conf iden t Harcourt But ler ( L i e u t i n a n t governor) began 
t o be concerned about the way the Maulana was using h i s 
i n f l u e n c e . He wrote t o the v i c e r o y . 
l?n 
"I am trying to influence him through the people on whom 
he relies financially. My problem is to keep the Musalman 
women right,* If they get a handle, as they did over the 
cawnpore masque incident, they will force their husbands and 
male relations to do something for Islam, No government in 
the East can control a combination of priests and women. Hence 
1*^3 the importance of not making a martyr of Abdul Bari',' 
The editor of Akhuwat made a mistake at this point. He 
tried attacking the Shias instead of the government. This 
gave the administration an excuse to act. It moved rapidly, 
invoked the press act and locked away some of the mi sows in 
log 
the Abdul Bari'gang'. A month later, it managed to intern 
Rarkatullah Raza of Firangi Mahal who was suspected of being 
the author of leaflets encouraging jehad. The government 
need not have concerned itself about Abdul Rari's capacity 
for martyrdom. The sight of the C.I.D. poking around Firangi 
Mahal unerved him. He rushed up to Nainital to see Butler, 
professed his innocence, protested his loyalty, and at the 
end of the interview broke down completely. 
While Abdul Bari and his followers had already pressed 
far enough ahead to get entangled with the law, others were 
• 
beginning to move. Iri fifarch a Khilafat committee had been 
founded in Bombay city under the presidency of M.M. Chotani, 
one of Abdul Bari 's disciples, and most of the committee, 
including the president were drawn from the rich muslim 
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merchsnts of t h e c i t y . The committee conducted meetings and 
organised a deputat ion t o the governor . Even t h e A l l - I n d i a 
muslim leagud a f t e r a long t ime , began t o a c t . I t supported 
t h e d e p u t a t i o n s , commanded i t s branches t o do s o , and t a k i n g 
up Abdul B a r i ' s i d e a , organised an a l l - I n d i a conference a t 
Lucknow on 21s t September 1919 t o d e m o n s t r a t e . . . t he t r u e 
depth and i n t e n s i t y of musalman f e e l i n g for the Sul tan of 
Turkey and h i s empire.^^ 
The conference of Lucknow was a remarkable occas ion . 
Never had so many muslims from ou t s ide the province and so 
many Ulama a t tended a meeting under the ausp ieces of t h e 
muslim l eague . Indeed the ocassion seems t o have been domi-
na ted by Ulama, Apart from those a c t u a l l y working in the 
F i rang i Mahal seminary, leading d iv ines such as Khwaja Hassan 
Nizami of D e l h i , Mahomed Fakir of Allahabad, Abdul Mazid 
share r of Madras, Mahomed Saj jad of Bihar and Abdul Mazid of 
I'^T Budaun were t h e r e , Maulvi Sanaullah of Amritshar i n t r o d u -
ced t h e Chief r e s o l u t i o n ' t h a t t he s p i r i t u a l p o s i t i o n of the 
Sul tan as Khal i fa was i nd i s sou lub ly bound up with h i s temporal 
power and t h a t the c r ea t i on of small s t a t e s out of the compo-
nent p a r t s of the Turkish empire , with non-muslim powers as 
mandator ies , was an i n t o l e r a b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e with t h e K h i l a f a t . 
F i r a n g i Mahal Ulama passed a r e s o l u t i o n t o f ix 17 October as 
Kh i l a f a t day and e s t a b l i s h an A l l - I n d i a c e n t r a l K h i l a f a t 
Committee in Bombay with branches throughout I n d i a . The F i r a n g i 
Maha l ' s , with Khaliguzzaman's h e l p , drew up t h e commit tee ' s 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
12^ 
The conference made clear that Ulama had become 
influential in Muslim politics. In December 1918, Ansari and 
Ajamal Khan had introduced Abdul Bari and his followers in 
order to make political capital outof them, but in doing so they 
had unleashed the forces which overwhelmed them. By September 
1919, the Ulema were beginning to take the lead in Muslim 
politics, and the creation of the.central Khilafat Committee 
at the Lucknow conference gave them the means by which they 
might well take control of them. 
By deciding to hold Khilafat Day, the Lucknow conference 
brought Gandhi to a prominent position in Muslim politics. Just 
a week before, Gandhi had displayed his willingness to exert 
himself for the Khilafat. At a Muslim mass meeting in Bombay 
he had berated his audience for being so lackadaisical. . 
Moreover his interest was soon felt in more than words. The 
idea of holding a Khilafat Day on which 'all Muslims should 
fast and pray and suspend all their business and close their 
shops .... and hold monster meetings and pass resolutions of 
protest against the contemplated betrayal of Turkey, was most 
probably his . In the event, the 'Day' was not a great 
success, but nevertheless it heralded a degree of organisation 
in the Khilafat Movement of a new order. 
In the weeks following the first Khilafat Day, the U.P. 
Khilafatists became increasingly dissatisfied with the limited 
vigour with which the Bombay leaders of the Khilafat organisa-
tion prosecuted the agitation. They decided to snatch the 
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i n i t i a t i v e themselves and, e a r l y in November 1919, t he Delhi 
Kh i l a f a t Committee announced t h a t they would hold an All I n d i a 
Kh i l a fa t Conference at Delhi on 23 f^ovember t o determine how 
Muslims should p r o t e s t aga ins t t h e dismemberment of Turkey. This 
was t o be follov<ied on 24 November by a j o i n t Hindu-Muslim 
conference . Gandhi was t h e only Hindu i n v i t e d t o both 
conferences . His i n v i t a t i o n informed him t h a t not only the 
Kh i l a f a t ques t ion but the ques t ion of cow p r o t e c t i o n as wel l would 
be d i scussed a t the conference, and i t would, t h e r e f o r e afford 
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a golden oppor tun i ty for a se t t l emen t of the cow q u e s t i o n . 
The i n t e n t i o n of the Delhi Muslims was obvious . They hoped t o 
do a deal with Hindu l e a d e r s on cow q u e s t i o n s i n order t o win 
t h e i r support for t h e i r new Khi l a f a t a g i t a t i o n p l ans and Gandhi 
was t o he lp them do t h i s . 
Majority of those who a t tended t h e conference of 23 
143 November were U.P . Mijslims. R e s o l u t i o n , passed in t h i s 
conference were t o send a deputa t ion immediately t o "England t o 
make t h e i r case regarding t h e Kh i l a fa t and Turkey one l a s t t ime ; t o 
boycot t t h e peace c e l e b r a t i o n s planned by Government for 13 
December; p r o g r e s s i v e l y t o boycot t B r i t i s h goods; and ' i n t h e 
event of a s a t i s f a c t o r y s e t t l emen t of t h e Turkish ques t ion not 
t ak i ng p l a c e ; witnhold a l l coopera t ion from the B r i t i s h 
144 Government. Two committees were appointed t o make sugges t ions 
t o the next Kh i l a fa t conference about the p r a c t i c a l working of 
the l a s t two r e s o l u t i o n s t h e i r composition i l l u s t r a t e s the 
prominence of t h e Ulama and U .P . men g e n e r a l l y . The boycot t 
of B r i t i s h goods committee cons i s t ed of vSyed Zahur Ahmad, Hasrat 
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Mohani, Zafar-ul-mulk Alvi , Maulvi Akram Khan, Maulvi Munira-
zamman, Seth Abdullah Hasmi, Haji Ahmad Khat t r i .Maulana Sanaul lah , 
Agha M. Safdar,^ Maulana Arif Hansi , Tajuddin and Maulvi Wahomed 
S i j j a d , of whom at l e a s t t h r e e were from the U.P . and f ive were 
Ulama. The non-cooperat ion committee cons i s t ed of Maulanas 
Abdul T a r i , Abdul Majid, Sanaullah and Wilayat Husain, p lus 
Hakim Ajmal Khan, Syed Hussain, Riza Al i , Hasarat Mohani, 
Kamalluddin J a f a r i , Mumtaz Husain, '^azlulhaq and Seth Abdullah 
Hasmi of whom four ulama, s ix vvere younq p a r t y men and nine came 
from II .P. ^"'^ 
Gandhi supoorted the dec i s ion t o boycot t t he peace 
c e l e b r a t i o n s . He a l s o supported t h e r e s o l u t i o n t o wi thhold 
coopera t ion from the Government. But as fa r as p rog res s ive 
boycot t of B r i t i s h goods was concerned, Gandhi was not prepared 
t o fo l low. Over t h r e e q u a r t e r s of Bombay muslims merchants 
many of whom financed the Kh i l a fa t a g i t a t i o n did bus iness in 
B r i t i s h goods. Boycott would ru in them. Gandhi was not 
14 7 prepared t o help the Khi la fa t a g i t a t o r s commit suc ide . 
On 23 November t h e U.P . K h i l a f a t i s t s won Gandhi ' s 
aporoval for pa r t of t h e i r programme. But on 24 November he 
was very cau t ious about the kind of Hindu-Muslim ac t ion he was 
orepared t o suppor t . For a s t a r t he would be a pa r ty t o no 
communal ba rga in . He r e j e c t e d the o f f e r , made by Abdul Ba r i , 
Asaf Ali and o t h e r s , t o s top cow-slauqhter in r e t u r n for Hindu 
support for the K h i l a f a t . The Muslims, he argued, should 
only stop cow-slauqhter of t h e i r own f ree w i l l j u s t as Hindus 
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should only join the Khilafat protes t of t h e i r own free w i l l . 
VJhen they (Khalafat is ts) threatened t o decide the matter by a 
majority vote , Gandhi warned them t h a t , if they did not accept 
his decision, he would have nothing more to do with the 
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ag i t a t ion . As far as jo in t action vjas concerned Gandhi was 
prepared t o support only one item in the Muslim programs resolved 
upon the day before. Boycott of Bri t ish goods he p i l l o r i ed as 
' r i d i c u l o u s ' . Non cooperation he hailed as a 'sublime decis ion ' 
but vjould go no fur ther . Only boycott of the peace celebrat ions 
14 9 gained his un~qualified approval. Resolutions on t h i s ana 
thanking the Hindus were the only ones passed by t h i s jo in t 
conference. Gandhi had his own way. The ' independent' called 
i t 'Gandhi's day , and tne Muslims discovered tha t the Mahatma 
was no easy tool to manipulate. 
So much for the U.P. Khi la fa t i s t s f i r s t attempt to 
capture the Khilafat organisat ion, r a l l y the 'lindus behind 
them and drive the Khilafat protes t in to a higher gear. Hindu 
support for t he i r boycott the oeace ce lebra t ions , vjhich did 
admittedly cause 'a serious curtailment of the programme of 
celebrat ions and gave great prominence to the Khilafat question 
throughout I n d i a ' , was a l l they gained. At the end of 1919, 
the Council reforms became law and the Khi l a fa t i s t s did not» 
have to be very perceptive to see that most Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s 
l ike many Muslim p o l i t i c i a n s , were much more in te res ted in these 
than the Khilafat . In addition the resolut ions of the Delhi 
Conference regarding the boycott of Br i t i sh goods and non-
cooperation came to nought. The Bombay dominated Central 
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Khilafat Committee opposed them and to ld the Chairman of the 
next Al l - India Khilafat conference, t o be held a t Amritsar in 
Congress week, that i t should reach no decision on the matter 
and tha t the non-cooperation, sub-committee should be charged to 
I t ] i nduce representa t ives of Muslim commercial i n t e r e s t s . 
Muslim merchants from Bombay,notably the Central Khilafat 
Committee president Chotani, financed the ag i ta t ion both in 
north India arid in England. "^  The IJ .P. Khilaf a t i s t s , with as 
yet few a l te rna t ive resources, were powerless t o r e s i s t . F.^ ore-
over, they had to stand by s i l en t as the Bombay hold over the 
Khilafat organisation was confirmed. In the const i tu t ion adopted 
in February 1920, Bombay held over one-quarter of the seats on 
the Central Khilafat Committee and every seat on the working 
1*^ 3 committee bar one. 
At the Amritsar Khilafat conference i t was resolved 
to send a deputation to the Viceroy t o place before him t h e i r 
three-fold demand regarding the Khilafat and holy places , and 
to obtain permission for deputations to go t o England and 
America. Permission was granted. But the Khilafat , Chemsford 
told the Muslims, was t he i r own a f f a i r . Moreover, he did not 
encouraged them in t he i r hopes for the Holy p laces . He could 
not . The demands tha t Turkey should preserve the sovereignty 
and dominions which she possessed before the war was one, he 
declared 'we can not reasonably hope wi l l be recognised by the 
Allied power in conference. ^ 
Tied by the f inancial s t r ings of the Central Khilafat 
Committee, given not a spark of hope by the Viceroy, the Muslims 
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of Upper India were not daunted. If the Government would 
not take not ice , i t had to be forced to take no t ice . In 
January and February 1920 they passed forward the ag i ta t ion 
with renewed vigour. In doing so they were ass i s ted by two 
developments. The f i r s t was the creation of the basis of be t te r 
Ulama organisat ion. Two days af ter the Delhi Khilafat conference, 
the Ulama delegates had met t o discuss ways of overcoming t h e i r 
ineffect iveness . They were inef fec t ive , they decided, because 
they were divided. Ulama of different schools, they f e l t , 
should make another attempt t o uni te and so they voted to form 
the Jamait-ul-ulama-i-Hind (the Society of Indian Theologians). 
Abdul Bari was the President of i t s f i r s t conference at 
Amritsar in the l a s t week of 1919. 
The second development was the Release, as a r e su l t the 
amnesty which accompanied the Royal proclamation of the montegeu-
Chelmsford reforms of those Muslims interned during the f i r s t 
World War. The re lease of Abdul Kalam Azad, S h i b l i ' s most prized 
pupi l , brought t o fAuslim p o l i t i c s in alim, who, though less 
i n f l uen t i a l than Abdul Bari , was i n t e l l e c t u a l l y his superior and 
capable to a far greater extent than any other alim of appre-
c ia t ing both the re l ig ious and the p o l i t i c a l sides of a problem. 
The release of the Ali brothers brought those masters of Muslim 
ag i ta t iona l p o l i t i c s to the head of the Khilafat compaign. 
In ear ly 1920, therefore the Khilafat ag i ta t ion reached 
a new level of i n t ens i ty . Leaders went on a se r ies of ag i t a t iona l 
tours throughout northern India , a whole rash of provincial 
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Khilafat conferences were held and the Ali b ro the r s ' purse 
fund was launched - the f i r s t of many appeals for money which 
were to help to reduce the extremists dependence on Bombay 
f inancial support. The U.P. Khi la fa t i s t s methods of making 
the Government take notice remained the same as those they had 
advocated at Delhi in 1919. They wished to force the Khilafat 
organisation into adopting non-cooperation and to persuade, with 
Gandhi's aid if poss ible . Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s to follow them. 
In speeches on tour and at conferences, Shaukat Al i , Abdul Bari , 
Azad and others s t ressed the importance of fos ter ing Hindu 
support. Gandhi joined in and he was no less strong in advocat-
ing Hindu support for the Khilafat , though he maintained his 
l ine of refusing to endorse any bargain over re l ig ious p rac t i ce . 
The main effor t however, was devoted to persuading the 
Khilafat organisation t o adopt measures of non-cooperation. A 
strong at tack was launched during the t h i r d All-India Khilafat 
conference held at Bombay on 15,16 and 17 of February- Twice 
in the month before i t was held, Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari 
toured the backward Muslim province of Sind, and with fanat ica l 
Sindhi p i r s and Mullas at t h e i r backs they descended upon the 
conference. Fourteen resolut ions were passed, among them the 
adoption of the Central Khilafat Committee's cons t i tu t ion , an 
appeal for t h i r t y lakhs of rupees for the committee's fund and 
a manifesto, said to have been drawn up by Gandhi, which s tated 
the Khilafat claim and threatened Government t ha t , if i t was 
not met, ' i t i s f u t i l e t o expect peace in I n d i a . . . . ' But the 
committee s t i l l would not accept a measure of non-cooperation. 
The decisive action came in to the subjects committee where 
the following questions were considered:- The proposed boycott 
of English goods combined with a withdrawal from cooperation 
with Government; whether or not i t was 'Haram' (Forbidden) for 
a ^Auslim to serve in the Indian army; and the evacuation of 
the Ja r i r a t -u l -Arab . The delegates from outside Bombay 
demanded an extreme course of act ion, those from within, 
moderation. When the temper of the conference was tes ted with 
a resolut ion on the th i rd subject , i t was discovered t o lean 
towards the extremists . The resolut ion was passed. The 
moderates t r i e d to wriggle out the s i tua t ion by submitting the 
question of army ser\iiice to the Ulama. This was a bad move. 
The ulama session was chaired by Azad Sobhani, and immediately, 
under the inspi ra t ion of Abdul Bari , i t was decided tha t , as 
there was no ^a r an t ee t ha t the army would not be used against 
Muslim forces, i t was haram for Muslims to belong t o i t . Notices 
were issued to those present asking for the c i rcu la t ion of 
Fatwas among the t roops . When some objected, they were to ld 
that in t h i s matter the Sharia should p reva i l . Nevertheless 
i t was clear to the extremists tha t they were not going t o be 
able to carry the Bombay moderates with them, and, as they 
could not afford t o do without them, they had no a l t e rna t ive 
at the end of the conference but to accept and comoromise With 
moderates tha t the question of the army, boycott and non-
cooperation should be l e f t un t i l i t was seen what success 
Mohamed Al l ' s deputation achieved in England. ^^^ 
A few days l a t e r a speech by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
denouicing Turkey with crusading zeal was reported in India. 
no 
Bombay financers notwithstanding, the U.P. Khi la fa t i s t s were no 
longer prepared to wait for the r e s u l t s of >Aahomed A l l ' s depu-
t a t i o n . At tt\e Bengal Provincial Khilafat conference in 
Calcut ta , Abdul Bari wanted nothing less than an eye for an eye 
from the Anglican primate. He to ld his audience:- "They could 
sacr i f ice every Chr i s t i an ' s l i f e and property; they could burn 
them, and even if they s to le t h e i r property he would give 
them a fatwa in j u s t i f i c a t i o n . . , . He declared t h a t had cannon 
and guns been at h is disposal he would have declared war and 
would have burnt the Chris t ians after sa tura t ing them with 
kerosine o i l ""''^ ^ 
Azad, the conference president , concentrated on more 
prac t ica l means of revenge and in his address raised plain 
non-cooperation in to the Islamic doctrine Tark-i-Malavat, 
surrounding i t with wreaths of quotations from the Koran. Then 
the conference resolved to boycott Br i t i sh piece goods imme-
d ia te ly , to withdraw cooperation from Government if the Khilafat 
dicision was unfavourable, and to observe Friday 19 March as 
a Khilafat day with a Harta l . ""-^ ^ 
The Calcutta resolut ions become the instrument of an 
extremist coup within the Khilafat organisat ion. The Bengal 
Khilafat conference was a mere provincial a f fa i r , and had nb 
r ight to declare for the whole of India a h a r t a l , boycott of 
Bri t ish goods and n on-cooperation. The extremists were offering 
Khi l a fa t i s t s the a l t e rna t ive of other joining them or opposing 
them. Their seizure of the i n i t i a t i v e was very successful . 
Gandhi was forced to follow them. The Mahatma had attended 
the Bengal conference. He had witnessed Abdul 3 a r i ' s fury. He 
had been unable to prevent the boycott resolut ion - indeed he 
had to swallow the fact t h a t , despite h is known disapproval, 
159 i t had been implemented streiqhfcway in Calcut ta . He had 
heard the great chorus of aooroval of the resolu t ions tha t had 
been voiced in north India . He knew tha t if he was t o 
continue to influence the Kh i l a f a t i s t s , he must go with them. 
A week af ter the conference, he issued a manifesto on Khilafat 
ag i t a t i on . He stressed tha t there should be no violence, no 
boycott of Br i t i sh goods and no confusion of the Khilafat with 
other quest ions. He supported the Hartal of 19 March, declared 
tha t if Muslin demands were not granted 'non-cooperation i s . . . 
the only remedy le f t upon t o u s ' , and hazarded a few suggestions 
as to i t s form. All these things he had said before. They 
were unimportant. What mattered was tha t he had shovjn his 
wil l ingness to keep up with the ext remis ts . But there was a 
greater success than t h i s . The Central Khilafat Committee 
a l so , very r e luc tan t ly , f e l l in to l i n e . 
On 7 March 1920, the Central Khilafat Committee, with 
a few d i s sen t i en t s , approved of the 19 March h a r t a l . On 
14 March, the Central Khilafat Committee ac tual ly endorsed non-
cooperation. I t agreed t h a t , when action next became necessary, 
non-cooperation should be begun and t h a t , according to a plan 
drawn up by a committee of which Gandhi was a member, i t should 
take effect in three s tages ; f i r s t , return of t i t l e s and honours; 
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second, resignation of council seats and withdrawal from private 
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and pub l i c s e r v i c e ; t h i r d , non-payment of t a x e s . 
on 22 March a t D e l h i , f i f t e e n Muslim and Gandhi d i scussed 
t h i s non-coopera t ion plan with nine Hindu l e a d e r s , among them 
Lajpat Ra i , Madan Mohan Malviya and Bal Gangadhar T i l a k , with 
the aim of gaining t h e i r suppor t . The Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s were 
not impressed. Malviya doubted t h a t many Muslims would implement 
the p o l i c y ; Lajpat Rai was more i n t e r e s t e d in Swadeshi; T i l ak 
thought i t was a l l nonsense. Even some of t h e Muslims were not 
e n t i r e l y in favour of the Cen t r a l Kh i l a fa t commit tee ' s p l a n . 
Abdul Bari j ibbed at the r e s t r i c t i o n of non -v io l ence ; Hakim 
Ajmal Khan was d i f i d e n t non-cooperat ion but an end t o h i s hopes 
of a Government grant for h i s beloved T ibb ia (medical) c o l l e g e . 
Never the le s s a committee composed of Gandhi, Lajpat Ra i , Ajmal 
Khan, Shaukat Ali and Azad examined the Centra l Kh i l a fa t 
Committee's programme, and two days l a t e r a t a Kh i l a fa t conference 
a t Meerut, Gandhi announced a non-coopera t ion programme t o be 
implemented if t h e Turkish peace terms were not f avourab le , which 
was s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same as t h a t of t h e Cen t ra l Kh i l a f a t 
Committee. 
Once non-cooperat ion was agreed upon, the U .P .Kh i l a f a -
t i s t s se t about p repar ing t o put i t i n t o a c t i o n . They were • 
determined t h a t Government should r e a l i s e t h a t Gandhi ' s Meerut 
announcement was no id le threat . At the Meerut Kh i l a fa t 
Conference i t was proposed t o form committees of Ulama t o 
organise a g i t a t i o n . Ten days l a t er a conference of U.P.Ulama, 
under Abdul B a r i , se t up a Cen t r a l Coordinat ing body for t h e s e 
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committees at Budaun under Abdul Bar i ' s d isc iple Abdul Mazid 
Budauni. Two weeks afterwards, a Khilafat workers conference, 
attended by delegates from a l l over India , was held at Dellii to 
decide upon ways and means of put t ing the non-cooperation 
programme into e f fec t . U.P. leaders helped t o s t i f fen morale 
elsewhere in India . Azad Sobhani and Abdul Mazid attempted to 
s t i r up the Bihar Ulama. Shaukat Ali , with Abdul Bari in 
attendance, presided over the Madras Khilafat conference, and 
ten days l a t e r made the major speech at the Bihar Khilafat 
Conference. ^ But there was a price to pay for a l l t h i s 
ac t iv i ty and preparat ion. Muslim feel ings became increasingly 
strong. The resolut ions of the Ulama conference went beyond 
the content and the s p i r i t of the programme of non-violent 
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non-cooperation, approving of Abdul Bar i ' s Calcutta speech. 
The Khilafat workers conference went fur ther . I t advocated 
' h i j r a t* and many were disappointed. That preparat ions for 
Jihad were not to commence at once, 'with few exceptions, i t 
was noted, ' the delegates were determined not to follow 
172 Mr. Gandhi's peaceful i n s t ruc t i ons . The Bombay moderates 
were attacked mercilessly and even Abdul Bari came in for a 
share of abuse. Matters were get t ing out of hand. By ear ly 
May, Muslims in several U.P. d i s t r i c t had begun to noncooperate 
of t h e i r own accord. 
Jus t as i t was d i f f i cu l t for U.P; leaders t o prevent 
local agi ta t ion from get t ing oot of hand. So they had problems 
in preventing the Central Khilafat Committee from wriggling 
out of i t s commitment to non-cooperation. Understandably, the 
i:u 
moderate men of Bombay were alarmed by the increasing fanaticism 
of the agi ta t ion in northern India. They showed t h e i r d i s -
pleasures bv refusing t o a f f i l i a t e to the Khilafat organisa-
t i on . The Khilafat workers League and the U.P. provincial 
Khilafat Committee. Then, encouraged by declarat ions from the 
Aga Khan and Raja of Mahmudabad, they suggested tha t the non-
cooperation programme ought to be reconsidered. I t seemed 
in l a te April t ha t the U .P . Khilaf a t i s t s ' v ictory of March was 
about to be reversed. They reacted sharply. ' I want Hakim 
Shahab and Maulana Majid to be h e r e ' , Shaukat Ali to ld Asaf Al i , 
175 so ' tha t we could thoroughly work up the Bombay Muslims'. ^ The 
Committee was bombarded with l e t t e r s of objection from Sind, 
Madras, U .P, and Bengal. Ult imately on 12 May the Central 
Khilafat Committee decided t o adhere to i t s non-cooperation 
programme with the change tha t i t should be implemented in four 
stages instead of t h r e e , and appointed a sub-committee consist ing 
of Chotani, Shaukat Al i , A.K. Azad and Hajji Ahmad Khatri t o 
work out in de ta i l a plan for s t a r t i ng i t . Consequently several 
leading Bombay moderates, Badruddin Abdullah Koor, Fazlbhoy 
Currimbhoy and Rahmatulla Chinoy, resigned. Gandhi was e lected 
1 ifi to the committee in Chinoy's place. 
The terms of the proposed t r ea ty between Turkey and 
the All ies were published in India on 14 May 1920. The All ies 
conditions were tough. Apart from the Jaz i ra t -u l -Arab , which 
was le f t in Muslim hands, the demands of the Indian Muslims 
were ignored. The f ron t i e r s of the once great ottoman empire 
were cut back t o Constantinople and predominantly Turkish areas 
i;^ -^  
of Asia minor; the Holy places of Islam were removed from the 
Khal i fa ' s custody; and the power with which he was supposed t o 
depend the fa i th and the fa i thful was reduced to v i s ib le 
proportions - 50,000 policemen, seven sloops and six tarpedo 
177 boats . The Pirangi mahal Ulama condemned these terms straight-
way and demanded tha t non-cooperation should be implemented at 
once. But two days l a t e r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l sense got the be t te r 
of them and they modified t h e i r stand. Abdul Bari and Kidwai 
sent a telegram to the press declar ing, 'Turkish peace terms 
outrageous s i tua t ion desperate Muslims should be pa t ien t t i l l 
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Ulama and Central Khilafat committee decides ac t ions! Gandhi 
described the terms as 'a staggering blow to the Indian Muslims., 
non-cooperation' , he declared, ' i s the only effect ive remedy', 
and hoped tha t the Central Khilafat Committee would ca l l a 
j o i n t conference of Hindus and Muslims t o consider what ought 
179 to be done. Shaukat Ali in a press communique supported 
Gandhi, though he was not prepared to admit tha t non-cooperatdon 
was the only remedy and recommended tha t the next Khilafat 
Committee meeting to consider policy should be held in northern 
1 pn India . When on 24 May t h i s body's working committee 
considered Shaukat A l l ' s suggestion, there was strong opposition 
from the Bombay moderates t o t h i s over attempt to force t h e i r 
• 
hand. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the Central Khilafat 
Committee would meet at Allahabad from 1 to 3 June, which was 
immediately after the All India Congress Committee meeting at 
Benares. Moreover Hindu leaders of all shades of opinion were 
to be invited to join in the deliberations in order to hear the 
Muslim case and to give advice. 
nfi 
At t h e Hindu-Muslim conference in June , Kh i l a fa t 
l e a d e r s were going t o t r y and win Hindu support for the non-
coope'ration programme. They r e a l i s e d t h a t non-coopera t ion was 
l e s s l i k e l y t o be a success without i t . However important i t 
might be t o p re s s forward the Kh i l a fa t p r o t e s t , few were l i k e l y 
t o res ign honours and jobs if they saw t h a t t he se were immediately 
snapped up by Hindus. Equal ly they l e l t t h a t t h e i r ac t ion 
would make l i t t l e impact on the Government i f i t was r e s t r i c t e d 
t o the Muslim n i n o r i t y . So Kh i l a f a t l e a d e r s l a i d heavy s t r e s s 
on the need for Hindu-Muslim u n i t y ; Kidwai ' s p r e s i d e n t i a l 
speech t o the Oudh Khi la fa t conference concent ra ted on t h i s 
p o i n t , and Shaukat Ali did not aopear t o cons ider s t a r t i n g 
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non-coopera t ion without our 'Hindu b r e t h e r n ' . 
Soft words from t h e K h i l a f a t i s t s c a r r i e d l i t t l e weight 
with Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s . Any r e a l hope they had of ga in ing 
Hindu support l ay with Gandhi. By June 1920, t h e Mahatma, who 
had s k i r t e d around the edge of Indian p o l i t i c s for the pas t f ive 
y e a r s , was coming t o be a leading p o l i t i c i a n . In h i s own r i g h t , 
he had developed s t rong a s s o c i a t i o n s with Hindu r ev iva l i sm in 
nor th I n d i a . He had s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with t r a d i n g groups 
such as the marwaris and Bombay Muslims. He had c u l t i v a t e d 
pockets of support in the a reas where he had championed causes . 
Champaran in Bihar , and Khaira and Ahmadabad in Gu j r a t . He 
was beginning t o a s s e r t himself in congress a f f a i r s . 
Gandhi was very w i l l i n g t o play t h e K h i l a f a t i s t ' s game. 
Indeed, he had been p laying i t for some t i m e , though of course 
i t did a l so s u i t h i s own i d e a l i s t i c ends . In Apri l and May 1920, 
w 
he urged closer Hindu co-operation with the khi la fa t movement. 
Soon af ter he joined the All-India Home rule league, he decla-
red tha t he wished to engage every member... in khi lafa t 
work. Three days l a t e r he hinted tha t Hindus should join 
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muslims In non-co-operation. When the Turkish peace terms 
were announced he declared tha t ' the Hindus are bound to join 
in non-co-operation. But when he t r i e d t o bind the nat iona-
l i s t leaders to non-co-operation, he found them unwillln<]. 
The central khi lafa t committee's sessions at Allahabad 
were dominated in s p i r i t though not in number by the extremists 
of upper India and t h e i r folloviiers, Abdul Bari had spent the 
previous days whistl ing up as many of h is Ulama contacts as 
1 ?¥S poss ib le . Two f i f th of those who attended the f i r s t meeting 
187 in Sheikh Zahur Ahmad's house on 1 June were from the U.P. 
Many were very b i t t e r when they heard tha t the congress would 
not support them straightway in non-co-operation: Abdul Bari 
accused the Hindus of 'p laying ' with the muslims and 'exci tedly 
held Gandhi to his pledge of suppor t . ' If the Kh i l a f a t i s t s 
had any doubtf about the congress decission on non-co-operation 
these were removed by the meetings held with the Hindus in the 
Railway t h e a t r e . Only twentyfive Hindus bothered to a t tend, 
and important congress leaders such as Tilak and C.R. Das did 
not come at a l l . I^ost of those tha t did at tend supported 
Motilal Nehru and Madan Mohan Malviya when they made i t qui te 
clear tha t they were not convinced of the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of 
non-co-operation, or of the need for the whole of Gandhi's 
\:\^ 
programme, and tha t they wanted to consider the question much 
more fu l ly . At the second jo in t meeting on 2 June, the e x t r e -
mist muslims jreally ran wild. Hasrat Mohani promised to join 
any Afghan army which might invade India t o drive out the 
Br i t i sh . Then Hindus promptly demanded an explanation, where 
upon Shaukat Ali jumped up and in an aggressive tone said t ha t 
t h e i r holy places had already been snatched away, t h a t attempts 
were being made to ob l i t e ra t e Islam and there was nothing l e f t . 
If any 
moslem invader came for support of the kh i la fa t cause and 
punish the Br i t i sh , the musalmans would join hands with them. 
The Br i t i sh he said, deserved such punishment for t h e i r in jus t i ce 
and high handedness towards Islam. So saying he dropped into 
189 his seat and t e a r s began t o flow, 
Azad Souhani and Zafar Ali Khan strongly supported t h i s 
s tand. But speeches such as these were not l i ke ly to encourage 
the Hindus to a l ly themselves with the muslims. Lajpat Rai 
wanted them t h a t , at the f i r s t sign of the muslims pursuing 
the course se t out by Shaukat Al i , the Hindus would oppose 
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them. The muslims did not win Hindu support^non-co-operation. 
I t was clear to the k h i l a f a t i s t s t h a t , if they were going 
to non-co-operate, they would have to do so by themselves. The 
thought must have detterned many, because, when the cent ra l 
IQl 
khi la fa t committee met on 3 June, only forty attended. After 
the resolut ion to implement non-co-operation had been proposed, 
n^  
Gandhi was asked to explain his programme and the terms on 
which he would a s s i s t . According to an in te l l igence r epor t : 
He said tha t If he were allowed to lead the raohamraadans who 
would then form a small committee of such whole-hearted workers 
who would have to leave themselves at h i s mercy and who would 
have to behave in any manner he directed them to do. He would 
not l imit the number but those who joined him whether few or 
many should be such people who would sac r i f i ce t h e i r very l ives 
i f he asked for them. He would then get through a l l the stages 
in four or five months one by one. He would himself be sor t of 
a d i rec to r . The committee would work in the cause of the 
khi la fa t but wouldnot be dependent t o any other committee. Even 
the centra l khi lafa t committee would not be allowed t o guide 
t h i s committee. 
Shaukat Ali declared tha t the muslims were ready to 
submit to Gandhi's d ic ta to r sh ip , 'There was a dead si lence 
and people did not dare to speak one way or the other as they 
did not approve of placing themselves bl indly under Gandhi. * 
Eventually Riza Ali , supported by Bombay moderates and some up, 
'young pa r ty ' men who together amounted to a majority of those 
present , put forward an ammendment which would have l imited 
non-co-operation to the f i r s t s tage. But Shaukat Ali and Abdul 
Bari with t h e i r customary vigour and re l ig ious fanaticism quashed 
a l l d issent . Consequently, Gandhi was made chairman of a commi-
t t e e composed of A.K. Azad, Ahmad Hasan of Bihar, Mahomad Ali 
of Dharavi, H.S. Khatri , Shaukat Al i , Saifuddin Kitchlew and 
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Hasrat Mohani, which was answerable t o no one, not even the 
cen t ra l khi lafat committee, and was to have complete charge 
of putt ing non-co-operation in to pract ice 'without further 
delay. '^'^^ 
•Take great c a r e ' , the independent of Allahabad warned 
i t s readers on the morning of 3 June, ' t ha t the control of 
kh i la fa t movement does not f a l l en t i r e ly in to hands of theo lo-
gians and divines, without any appreciation of the great n a t i o -
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nal and in te rna t iona l issues involved in i t . "^  Yet t h i s was 
the very thing tha t most of the 'young pa r ty ' muslims and 
the Bombay moderates, by permitting themselves to be bul l ied 
in to questions by Abdul Bari and Shatikat Al l , allowed to happen. 
In get t ing the upper hand the U.P. extremists were helped by 
men from the Punjab, Sindh and Madras. But t h i s had happened 
before, what was important on t h i s occassion was tha t the 
khi la fa t organisation had become less dependent on Bombay 
194 f inanc ia l ly . By June ^920 i t was tapping funds from a l l 
over India , and any way Chotani, the major f inancia l backer, 
though r e luc t an t , s t i l l provided support, probably as a r e s u l t 
of Abdul Bar i ' s s p i r i t u a l guidance. Thus the U.P. extremists 
were able to shake off the leading r a i n s of the Bombay moderates, 
ignore the opposition of the less advanced k h i l a f a t i s t s of* 
t he i r own province, and commit the khi la fa t organisation t o 
put t ing non-co-operation into p r ac t i c e . Their f a i l u r e , as ye t , 
to win subs tan t ia l Hindu support was a great disappointment. 
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But they had done enough t o persuade Gandhi t o commit himself 
to cause and to lead them. 
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The leaders of the khi lafa t movement now submitted them-
selves completly to Gandhi's cont ro l . At his d ic ta t ion they 
appealed to t he i r r u l e r s (Br i t i sh ) once more. On 22 June they 
addressed a memorial to the viceroy asking him e i t h e r t o get 
the Turkish peace terms revised or to res ign . They give him 
t i l l 1 August to take act ion, fa i l ing which they would commence 
progressive non-co-operation. Non-co-operation was launched 
on 1 August. 
The impact of the introduction of non-co-operation was 
not s t a r t l i n g e i the r in the U.P. or in India as a whole. A 
few lawyers resigned the i r pract ice and a few t i t l e holders 
returned the i r honours. The commencement of^.the programme at 
t h i s stage was par t ly a stop to the ext remis ts , but mainly a 
t a c t i c a l expedient. Between June and September, 1920, the 
basic aim of Gandhi and the k h i l a f a t a t i s t was to l ine up 
enough support to persuade the Calcutta special congress to 
support t he i r non-co-operation plans, Gandhi was the a rch i t ec t 
of the compaign. In June he began t o persuade congress men t o 
join the non-co-operation camp. 
Gandhi and the khi lafa t leaders made a d i rec t bid to 
persuade t h e i r supporters to go to Calcut ta and vote for non-co-
operation. 
U ' 
Gandhi courted his Gujrat supporters with a hurr idly 
held Gujrat p o l i t i c a l conference j u s t before the special 
congress. He to ld his audience tha t he vgas 'going to Calcut ta 
196 to get non-co-operation accepted by i t . ' He wooed h i s 
Marwari followers by emphasising the concern of leading 
197 k h i l a f a t i s t s for cow-protection. To make the point Abdul 
Bar i , Hakim Ajmal Khan, Azad and the cent ra l kh i la fa t committee 
a l l issued statements enjoining muslims t o -ebitain from cow-
slaughter on the Bakar-ID, which f e l l a few days before the 
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congress. Their r ea l search for support, however, was 
directed towards the muslims. In July Gandhi and Shaukat Ali 
toured the muslim areas of Punjab and Sindh, in August those 
of Bombay and Madras. They spoke mainly t o the muslims, expla-
ining non-co-operation and emphasising tha t i t was the only 
answer to the khi lafat problem. The persui t of votes also went 
on elsewhere. In Bengal, the kh i la fa t committee asked muslims 
to go to Calcut ta in large numbers and offered free board and 
199 lodging to encourage them. In Bihar, Mazrul Haq and Nurul 
Hasan helped t o push the provincial conference in to approving 
the non-co-operation programme. In the U.P. leading Ulama 
formed a Propaganda subcommittee of the o r o v i t i a l kh i la fa t 
organisation and toured the province. A free t r i p was offered 
t o a l l Ulama who wished to attend the special c o n g r e s s , ^ • 
All these representa t ions bore f r u i t s at Calcut ta . The 
rea l f ight over the centra l khi lafa t committee subcommittee's 
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non-co-opera t ion programme took place in t h e sub j ec t s committee. 
Once the dec i s ion was reached h e r e , v i c t o r y in the f u l l congress 
was a foregone conc lus ion , t h r e e hundred members of the sub jec t 
committee were crammed i n t o the Indian A s s o c i a t i o n ' s rooms in 
Bow Bazar. In the d i s c u s s i o n s t h r e e groups emerged. Gandhi, 
Shaukat A l i , Yakub Hasan, Saifuddin Kitchlew and J i n t e n d r a l a l 
Baner jee , who were out and out suppor t e r s of non -co -ope ra t i on , 
C.R. Das, B.C. Pa l and Madan Mohan Malviya, who were only 
p a r t i a l s u p p o r t e r s , J innah Mrs. Besant and Jamanadas Dwarka Das 
who were s t r ong ly h o s t i l e . The r e a l s t rugg le was between Das 
and Gandhi. The Mahatma presen ted the fo l lowing plan of non-
co-ope ra t ion : (a) Surrender of t i t l e s and honorary p o s t s ; 
(b) Refusal to a t t end levees and du rba r s ; (c ) Withdrawl of 
ch i ld ren from government school ; (d) Boycott of B r i t i s h coKcrts 
by lawyers and l i t i g a n t s ; (e) Refusal t o serve in Mesopotamia 
( I r a n ) ; ( f ) Withdrawl from counci l e l e c t i o n s ; (g) Boycott of 
fore ign goods. Refusal t o p a r t i c i p a t e in government loans and 
i n t e r f e r e n c e in recCAjitment for t he army and p o l i c e , which had 
been inc luded in the programme announced on 7 J u l y , were 
omi t ted . 
Das and pa r ty were prepared to adopt t h e programme with 
the except ion of ( c ) , (d) and ( f ) , which reduced i t t o l i t j : l e 
more than an endorsement of t h e p r i n c i p l e of non -co -ope ra t i on . 
Gandhi s tood firm aga ins t a l l a t t empts t o w h i t t l e down h i s 
programme. For t h r e e days in s t i f f i n g hea t t he argument raged 
ta 
back and f o r t h . A sess ion of t h e congress had t o be pos tpone . 
The only concession t h a t Gandhi was prepared t o make was the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of ' g r adua l • for ' immediate* in sec t ion (c) and 
( d ) . More than once, when the d r i f t of t h e debate seemed t o 
be going aga ins t him, Gandhi stooped h i s opponents in t h e i r 
t r a c k s by dec l a r i ng t h a t , whatever they d id , he would put 
non-co-opera t ion i n t o e f f e c t , Shaukat Ali was Gandhi ' s s t a u n -
ches t suppo r t e r . He b l a s t ed Faz lu l Haq off t he fence i n t o t h e 
non-co-opera t ion camp with a v a l l e y of abuse , and was only 
narrowly prevented from forc ing non-v io len t non-co-opera t ion 
on J innah with h i s f i r s t . V^ lhen on 7 September the vote was 
f i n a l l y t a k e n , Gandhi ' s r e s o l u t i o n passed by the narrow margin 
of 148 to 133. With t h e meeting s t i l l in s e s s i o n , Shaukat Al i 
l e a p t t o a window and announced the r e s u l t t o t h e crov^ds o u t -
s i d e t o a swel l ing cry of 'Gandhi k l j a i . ' That evening the 
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congress voted . The r e s o l u t i o n passed by 1885 t o 883 .vo te s . 
Only one leading congressman, Mot i l a l Nehru, suoported 
Gandhi, i t was an amazing v i c t o r y . I t s exp lana t ion l i e s in 
p a r t in the membership of the s u b j e c t s committee. No l i s t of 
members appears t o e x i s t , but n e v e r t h e l e s s some impor tan t f a c t s 
about i t s composition can be a s c e r t a i n e d . I t was e l e c t e d by 
the de l ega t e s from the var ious provinces and t h e s e conta ined a 
remarkable number of non-co-opera t ion sympa th i se r s . There were 
persona l suppor t e r s of Gandhi: Khaddar Clad Punjabis from 
Ludhiana, Bhat ias from Gujarat and Madras, Marwaris from 
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Calcutta Was upper India, But the major groups were muslims, 
Mazharul Haq led a personal following of fifty muslims from 
u^  
Bihar, Chotani, a similar number from Bombay, while 'kh i la fa t 
s p e c i a l s ' from Bombay and Madras brought hundereds of muslims 
to Calcut ta . .The 'Leader' reckoned t h a t over 2000 of the 5500 
delegates were muslims. Never had so many muslims attended 
a congress. These newcomers did the i r utmost to ensure t ha t 
only supporters of the non-co-operation programme were e lec ted . 
In the Bengal camp, advantage was taken of the claim for special 
representat ion for muslims and Marwaris to introduce a large 
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number of non-co-operation supporters. 
Now the muslims were the core of Gandhi's par ty , but h i s 
victory was narrow enough to make every source of support 
important. Here the council boycott element of the non-co-
operation programme played an important pa r t , V^/hatever the pro-
v inc ia l congress committees may have determined before hand, 
congress po l i t i c i ans at Calcutta decided whether or not to 
support non-co-operation according to t he i r e s t ina te of the 
congress 's chances of wining a majority at the e lec t ions in 
the i r province. Thus congressmen from Maharastra, C.P. and 
Bengal^ Who fancied the i r chances, were most strongly opposed 
to non-co-operation. But these from Madras, where Rajagopala-
c h a r i a r ' s Brahmin faction feared defeat , from Bihar, where 
they knew they would be squashed by the landed i n t e r e s t s , aod 
from U.P. , where a similar r e su l t was an t ic ipa ted , supported i t . 
Crucial probably, in swinging the U.P. delegation behind the 
programme was the defection during the discussions of Motilal 
Nehru. Das thought so, Gandhi cer ta in ly thought so; i t was for 
him he made h i s one concession, ^^ 
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This Was a great victory for Gandhi. By persuading the 
congress to join the central khi lafa t committee in non-co-
operation he tiad gone some way towards achieving h is ambitions 
of Hindu-Muslim unity and proving the efficacy of Satyagraha as 
a means of obtaining j u s t i c e . But Gandhi, for a l l his p o l i t i c a l 
s t reudness , was an i d e a l i s t . In crude p o l i t i c a l terms, t h i s was 
a much greater victory for the k h i l a f a t i s t s . For months they 
had been t rying to win Hindu support. For months the congress 
chiefs had res i s ted them. No they had with Gandhi's aid tossed 
them to one s ide , and as Lajpat Rai put i t ' tacked ' the congress 
on to the khi lafa t commit tee .^ 
This kh i l a f a t i s t v ic tory was primari ly the work of the 
'young pa r ty ' men and ulama of the U.P. They had led the move-
ment and led i t into ever more rad ica l pa ths . But not a l l had 
worked equal enthusiasm. Many 'young p a r t y ' p o l i t i c i a n s were 
wary of association in p o l i t i c s with fana t ica l ulama. Moreover, 
the i r wariness grew as non-co-operation became increasingly the 
favoured t a c t i c of the khi la fa t l eaders : they l ike many of t h e i r 
congress contemporaries, did not want to rel inquish t h e i r legal 
p rac t i ce s , however small they might be, t he i r chances of wininq 
a council seat or the i r hopes of government patronage. So, as 
the steady revelat ion of the reform assured them tha t the tfluslim 
claims of separate representat ion and ' p o l i t i c a l importance' 
were not in danger and as the influence of the ulama in p o l i t i c s 
increased and non-co-operation seemed a l ike ly form of p r o t e s t . 
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many 'young party* men became more circuspect in t he i r agi ta t ion 
for the kh i l a fa t . Ajmal Khan and Ansari who had launched the 
agi ta t ion at Qelhi in 1918, refused to a s s i s t e i the r the Delhi 
khi lafa t conference of November, 1919 or the extreme khi la fa t 
workers conference of April 1920. "^^  After the draft ru les 
of the new up council were published in May 1920, several 
'young pa r ty ' men fancied t h e i r chances of ge t t ing a sea t , among 
them Ansari, Kamaluddin Ahmad J a f r i , Riza Al i , Ali Nabi, 3a j i 
Musa Khan, Hyder Mehdi, Sheikh Zahur Ahmad and Syed Zahur Ahmad. 
Att i tudes to the khi la fa t ag i ta t ion became influenced by 
the council entry question. For e l ec to ra l reasons 'young p a r t y ' 
p o l i t i c i a n s had to appear to support the khi la fa t agi ta t ion 
whole-heartedly but , when at the Allahabad conference Riza Ali 
gave them a chance t o l imit non-co-operation to harmless i tems, 
several of them seized i t . Right up t o the Calcutta congress 
they kept t he i r options open. When they were forced t o choose, 
those who know they could win council s e a t s , l ike Riza Ali and 
Ali Nabi, abandoned the khi la fa t ag i t a t ion ; most of those who 
knev,» they couldnot made the best of a bad job and support non-
co-operation. These were not the men to force t o non-co-
operation programme through the Calcutta congress. 
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The only 'young p a r t y ' men wholly behind the k h i l a f a t i s t 
drive to implement non-co-operation were the Pan-Islamist rump 
of Mahomed A l l ' s pre-war following. They were few in number; 
Hasrat Mohani, Mushir Husain Kidwai, plus one or two new rec ru i t s 
such as Syed Mahomad Hosain and Ismail Khan who helped to run 
the U.P. khi lafa t committee, and they joined hands in other 
provinces with Kitchlew, Zafal Ali Khan, Mzharul Haq and Yakub 
Hasan, Their doyen was Shaukat Al i , t i r e l e s s ag i t a t iona l tou-
r e r , bombastic orator and committee l ion , with the useful 
Knack of being able to bludgeon opponents in to submission. 
The muslims, however, who made the k h i l a f a t i s t victory 
were the ulama. They t r i e d to push the movement in a rad ica l 
d i rec t ion fas te r than the 'you^g pa r ty ' p o l i t i c i a n s wished t o 
go. They for instance, founded the Delhi khi lafa t workers 
associat ion in order to force the hands of Ansari and Ajmal 
Khan. They originated the idea of non-co-operation and put 
constant pressure on the centra l khi lafa t committee to adopt 
i t and put i t into p rac t i ce . The extent of t h e i r involvement 
i s indicated by the closeness with which the non-co-operation 
programme had by 7 Ju ly , been t a i lo red to f i t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s ; 
they hoped to replace l eg i s l a t i ve councils with committees of 
ulama, courts of in f ide l law with bodies tha t would in te rpre te 
the Sharia and government schools with muslim Madarassas. What 
could have appealed more to a band of pr ivate school-masters, 
who were fas t losing business t o s ta te schools, than smashing 
the r i va l system, wining back the i r pupils and reviving t h e i r 
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t r a d e . The ulama had most to gain from driving the kh i la fa t 
ag i ta t ion more extreme. I t was not surpr is ing tha t they lay 
at the heart of i t s organisat ion. They dominated the U.P. 
provincia l khi lafa t committee: Azad Sobhani was president and 
t/l^» 
Abdul Majid and Nazir Ahmad ran i t s propaganda. They presided 
over d i s t r i c t , provincial and a l l - Ind i a conferences and the i r 
follcA'jers were usually a large part of the audience. Nor were 
they any l e s s prominent in other provinces. Maulvis Akram 
Khan and Ghiasuddin ran the Bengal khi la fa t committee, Mahomed 
Sajjad Was the leading worker in Bihar and Abdul Majid Sharar 
209 the organiser in Madras. 
These ulama who dominated the early stages of the khi la fa t 
ag i ta t ion both in the U.P. and in India as a whole, were mainly 
210 followes of Abdul Bari , The Lucknow Maulana's inf luence, 
not only as head of the school which most ulama p o l i t i c i a n s 
followed but also as the p i r of most leading lay k h i l a f a t i s t s , 
was immense. He organised the f i r s t great fatwa on the khi lafa t 
question as well as those which reinforced the various develop-
ments in the ag i ta t ion . These fatwa moved muslims a l l over 
India , and the i r p rac t i ca l power was considerable. Abdul Bari 
led most of theulama who attended such important occasions as 
the Delhi khi lafa t conference of November 1919 or the Allahabad 
meetings of June 1920. His followers were mainly responsible 
for the large muslim attendance at the Calcutta congress in 
September, which transformed non-co-operation from a dream into 
a p r ac t i c a l p o l i t i c a l proposi t ion. 
But Af te ra l l , the publication of the government despatch 
on the Turkish question in March 1922 was a watershed for the 
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k h i l a f a t i s t s . The movement had derived much of i t s impetus 
from the fact the Brit ish government was opposing the Turks 
at the peace conference and once i t became clear t h a t the 
government of India was representing the Indian muslim opposit ion, 
non-co-operation seemed less j u s t i f i a b l e . At the t ime, t h e r e -
fore , two of the main groups involved in the movement, the 
Bombay moderate and the ulama of North India , showed signs of 
a change of pol icy. 
The moderate had been eclipsed p o l i t i c a l l y as ea r ly as 
May 1920, and from that time forward, though they continued t o 
render the movement invaluable f inancia l ass i s tance , p o l i t i c a l 
control had rested in the hands of the North Indian p o l i t i c i a n s 
and ulama. After March 1922, however, the dissocia t ion of the 
congress working committee at Ahmadabad on 17 and 18 March, 1922, 
Mohammad Chotani, the president of the central khi lafa t commi-
t t e e and the leader of the Bombay group, borke with the p o l i t i -
cians over the a t t i tude to be adopted to montegue resignat ion 
211 
and drew upon himself the enmity of the north India fac t ion , 
Chotani however, was not alone. Many of the most inf luencia l 
ulama were s imi lar ly affected by the same development. After 
the government's dispatch was published, Abdul Bari and Hasarat 
Mohani and many leading U,P, k h i l a f a t i s t s issued a manifesto 
urging muslims t o cease h o s t i l i t i e s against the government," 
and Abdul Bari , in a l e t t e r intended for the v iceroy 's eye, 
declared tha t h is opposition to the government had been solely 
ir.i 
with a view to preserving the khi lafa t and t h a t the government's 
changed a t t i tude towards a similar change on the par t of the 
213 
muslims. Most spectacular of a l l , however, was Hasarat 
Mohani's react ion. He had been the most v i ru len t protagonist 
of independence for India and h i s a c t i v i t i e s had been curbed 
with d i f f icu l ty by Gandhi at Ahmadabad in December 1821," 
but by rAarch 1922 he showed himself prepared to drop non-co-
operation a l together , ^ By March 1922, the re fore , those ulama 
who did remain p o l i t i c a l l y active were not those who had led 
the movement from the beginning but the secondary leaders , men 
l ike Abdul Badauni, whose ant ipar ty tow/ards the Raj went deeper 
than t h e i r aversion to pa r t i cu la r p o l i t i c s . 
After N/larch 1922, the movement began a rapid decl ine. 
Most of the leading p o l i t i c i a n s were in gaol, subscript ions 
216 began to f a l l off, and though the government continued to 
be wary of any developments in Europe which might spark off a 
resumption of c iv i l diobedience, i t was g ra t i f i ed by the enhanced 
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esteem in which i t was held. The major revival of muslim 
feeling took place in September and October when the Bri t i sh 
opposed the retaking of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. At the 
t ime, a clash between Br i t i sh and Turkish forces seemed imminent 
and the Khi la fa t i s t s organised a body of semi-mili tary volun-
t e e r s called the Angoralegion.^ ° But t h i s organisation also 
could not bring any posi t ive r e s u l t . 
By the beginning of 1923, khi la fa t a c t i v i t y had v i r t u a l l y 
com© to an end, ^ The masses had los t i n t e r e s t , with few 
Ifl^ 
exceptions the ulama had dissociated themselves from the work 
of the khi la fa t committee, and the p o l i t i c i a n s , finding them-
selves to be"leaders without a following, sharpend t h e i r knives 
for internecine war. The north Indian faction made public 
Chotani'6r embezzelment of 18 lakhs of kh i la fa t funds and 
preoccupied themselves with r e t r iv ing the money by the l i q u i -
dation of h is a s se t s , ^ while Chotani 's colleague, Khat r i , 
the t reasurer of the khi la fa t committee, gave p len t i fu l evidence 
to the kh i la fa t Accounts Enquiry Committee of the parasi t iocil 
221 a c t i v i t i e s of the Ali Brothers and Dr. Mahmud, Neither 
of these disclosures improved the public image of the leader-
ship , and future e f for t s to ra i se funds were t r ea t ed with 
j u s t i f i a b l e cynicism. Yet though the k h i l a f a t i s t s were leaders 
without a following, they found themselves in an iden t i ca l 
dillemma t o t h a t faced by t h e i r congress counterpar ts . Were 
they to follow Gandhi and his l ieu tenants in the continued 
pursui t of non-co-operation outside the l eg i s l a tu re s or were 
they to join the congress-Swaraj khi la fa t par ty , under the 
leadership of C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, in order to contest 
with e lec t ion and made the reforms unworkable ? l ike the 
congress, the khi lafat committee was deeply divided over t h i s 
issue andl th ls added to i t s ineffec t iveness . 
The main protagonists of the 'no-change' party were the 
Ali b ro thers . Dr. Kitchlew of Amritsar and Dr. Mahmud of Patna. 
tr>5 
For the Ali brothers , the obstacles t o a policy of council 
entry were the same as the obstacles to t h e i r pa r t i c ipa t ion in 
cons t i tu t iona l . po l i t i c s in the years before 1920. As ind iv id-
u a l s , they might have secured e lect ion to e i t h e r the U.P. 
council or the central assembly yet they were too committed 
t o non cons t i tu t ional a c t i v i t y to change t h e i r policy over-
night , and t o accustmed to straddling the sub-continent t o 
confine themselves to being small in a cons t i tu t iona l machine. 
For Dr. Kitchlew, the existence of a Zamindari party in the 
Punjab which despised his Kasmiri or igins as much as he despised 
i t s consistent loyalism l e f t him no a l t e rna t ive but to continue 
as a p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t , and for Dr. Mahmud, habi tual v a c i l l a -
t ion and an emotional attachment to Jawaharlal Nehru, himself 
a fervent no changer, provided on t h i s occasion, as on many 
o thers , a stumbling block to ra t iona l ac t ion. Las t ly , in ear ly 
1923, when the Swaraj party was found, a l l these men were in 
gaol and incapable for tha t reason of pa r t i c ipa t ing in the 
new p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e which were being taken. 
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CHAPTER -• I I I 
MUSLIM POLITICS AW LEADERSHIP IN U . P . DURING 
SWARAJIST ERA 
The main protagonists of the Swarajist policy were the 
young men l ike Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Abdur Rahman 
Siddiqui , Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman, Abdul Aziz Ansari, Khwaja 
Abdul Majid and Shuaib Qureshi. They supported a policy of 
council ent ry . Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman both served as 
sec re ta r i e s of the Swaraj party from i t s inception in January 
1923, and as they freed themselves from t h e i r panislamic entan-
glements the others threw the i r weight behind these two men. 
I t has been already explained in chapter I I tha t the 
muslim leaders were divided on the question of the council 
en t ry , in to two groups. Some where between these two groups 
but progressively incl ining to the second were Hakim Ajmal Khan, 
Dr. Ansari and Abdul Kalam Azad. The role of Ajmal Khan and 
Ansari in the khi lafa t movement had been s t r i c t l y l imi ted . 
They were men of caution, opposed to violence, re luc tan t t o 
pa r t i c ipa t e in mass p o l i t i c s and wary of the extremism of the 
Ali brothers and the ulama. At the hight of the khi lafa t move-
ment they remained in the background and when they did emerge 
again af ter the imprisonment of the Ali b ro thers , i t was largely 
as a moderating influence, working hand-in-hand with Gandhi in 
an endeavour to co-ordinatethe two movements under h is 
leadership .^ After the government's dispatch of Feb. 1922; 
they continued to follow the same pol icy, urging both the ulama 
and the moderates, in the name of Hindu-Muslim uni ty , not t o 
tfi=^ 
make any gesture of conci l ia t ion to the government. Over the 
question of council entery, however, they di f fered. Both 
considered a return to c i v i l disobodience the resor t of des-
perate men, but Ansari was more anxious than Ajmal Khan t o 
keep both wings of the movement together . Ajmal Khan came 
out in favour of council entry in October 1922 but Ansari 
continued t o favoure the no-change party and worked to prevent 
2 party divisions from becoming deeper. 
After the defeat of council entry at Gaya, these d i f f e r -
ences increased. AnSari continued t o support the no-changers; 
Ajmal Khan joined the Swarajist party and endeavoured to 
persuade the ulama, though with l i t t l e success, t o amend the 
fatwa passed in 1920 on t h i s question. In t h i s he was aided 
by Kalam Azad, who had resigned from the khi la fa t committee in 
January 1923 when he saw that the Swarajist s t a r was in the 
acendant. He had been obliged t o admit by t h i s stage t h a t h i s 
hopes to become Sheikh-ul-Hind would not be fu l f i e ld and he 
chose a broker ' s role instead these differences pe rs i s t ed u n t i l 
September, 1923, when the special congress gave the green l igh t 
to the Swaraj is ts , After tha t t ime, Ansari ceased t o support 
the no changers and applied himself instead to the task of 
healing Hindu-Muslim d iv i s ions . 
These differences over council entry did not en t i r e ly 
dominate the proceedings of the khi la fa t committee. Indeed, 
even af ter Nov. 1922, i t pursued Pan-Islamist po l ic ies which 
were unanimously supported by a l l fac t ions . Reactions t o the 
abol i t ion of the temporal and s p i r i t u a l powers of the khi lafat 
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and to Shafi Hussain's bid for e lec t ion to tha t off ice , a l l 
f a l l into th i s category. Not a l l Pan-Islamist i s sue , however 
can be disintafigled from Indian i s sues , because pa r t i cu l a r ly 
for the Ali brothers , the pursuit of Pan-Islamist po l i c i e s was 
largely dictated by the i r need t o maintain themselves as 
credible muslim leaders af ter the decline of non-co-operation. 
Their advocacy of Pan-Islamist a c t i v i t i e s , there fore , did not 
always meet with widespread support. Indeed i t often brought 
them into confl ict with those k h i l a f a t i s t s who wished to use the 
khi lafa t organization for jjurely Indian porposes. 
In 1923, the main opposition within the khi lafa t committee 
t o i t s continuing preoccupations with Pan-Islamic Ventures came 
from the Muslim Swarajists who had joined Nehru and Das in 
January. These men had involved themselves in the U.P. Munici-
pal e lec t ions in March, and Khaliquzzaman and Khwaza Abdul 
Mazid had emerged as the Chairman of the Lucknow and Aligarh 
municipal Boards. This involvement in Swarajist p o l i t i c s made 
them less sympathetic to Pan-Islamic a c t i v i t i e s . Their feel ing 
was that the khi lafa t organisation should be used to strengthen 
the pro-change par ty , and t h i s fee l ing grew stronger as the 
ba t t l e between the no-changers and pro-changers became more 
acute , one small indicat ion of the emergence of t h i s feel ing 
was provided at the khi lafa t committee meeting at Muzaffarabad 
in April 1923, when Khaliquzzaman and Sherwani fought with 
Ansari over the al locat ion of 12,000 rupees to Kalam Azad for 
propaganda in persian and Arabic in the khi la fa t cause. 
Matters got worse, however, af ter the Ali brothers were released 
from goal , fo^ .they proceeded to na i l t he i r colours firmly t o 
the khi lafa t mast and to plan three deputations t o the middle 
e a s t . This escapis t p o l i t i c a l thinking won them few f r iends . 
ATiong the Swaraj is ts , and at Coconada in December the differences 
between the two groups came to a head. Khalizuzzaman led the 
Swarajists in an attack on the Ali b ro the r ' s proposals for 
three deputations, holding tha t one would be quite su f f i c i en t , 
and when t h i s at tack f a i l ed , he, Shuib Qureshi and Abdul Aziz 
Ansari refused to stand for e lec t ion as sec re ta r i e s of the 
organizat ion. By t h i s s tage , the p o l i t i c a l r i f t between the Ali 
brothers and t h e i r former chelas was v i r t u a l l y complete. But 
the Ali brothers were not only faced with opposition from t h e i r 
former followers. They also had t o face a muslim community 
throughout north India which was becoming less in te res ted in 
the problems of Turkey and mo^e preoccupied with the growth of 
communal tension in i t s own back-yeard. By June 1923, communal 
feeling in U.P. was already in tense , and on the eve of Mahommed 
A l l ' s re lease from prison, rumours were r i f e t ha t he would r e s -
pond to t h i s s i tua t ion by breaking with the congress and by 
leading an-anti-Shuddhi campaign. Consequently, when he turned 
a blind eye to these developments and plunged himself in to middle 
eas t a f f a i r s , there was much disappointment and opinion hardened 
against him. The Moradabad municipal Board decided in July by 
the casting vote of the chairman not t o present him with an 
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address ,^ and though the Aligarh and Lucknovi Boards did so in 
September and October t o met with a very poor reception in both 
p laces . At Lucknow, where he campaigned for the freedom of 
the 3azirat-ul-Arab, he only col lected f i f ty rupees for h i s 
projected deputations, and at Jhans i , whither he proceeded 
the following day, he was so chagrined by h is reception at the 
Railway Station ' that friends had some d i f f i cu l ty in persuading 
g 
him to proceed t o the c i ty to receive the address. ' By the 
end of 1923, therefore , i t had became clear tha t the fortunes 
of the Ali brothers were in decl ine . The Pan-Islamic question 
with which they were concerning themselves were only of p e r i -
pheral appeal to the masses, and i t was not to be long before 
the r i se of communal antagonism in the provinces began to 
erode t h e i r control of the khi lafat organizat ion. 
In 1924 af ter the i r success in the e l ec t i ons , the Swara-
j i s t s took less i n t e r e s t in the a f fa i r s of the khi lafa t committee 
and the main opposition to the Ali brothers came from the Punjabi 
k h i l a f a t i s t s under the leadership of Dr. Kitchlew. His Amritsar 
khi lafat party had sided with no-changers in debate over council 
ent ry , but as communal tension increased, Kitchlew was obliged 
to become more communal himself. Even in 1923 there had been 
a s p l i t in the Punjab khi lafa t committee over the 'Suddhi '* 
movement, but at the stage Kitchlew had worked hard to reduce 
communal tension, and to revive non-co~operation by forming a 
united front with the Akalis. ^ What he los t by these endevours, 
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however, was considerably greater than what he gained. The 
muslims of Amritsar were offended by the introduction of Akalis 
into the i r Mosques and in the ear ly months of 1924 in the face 
12 of waning support for his p o l i c i e s , Ketchlew was obliged to 
give up his hopes of an a l l iance with the Akalis and t o 
concentrate on constructive work amongst h is own community. 
The plans which he i n i t i a l l y put forward were not ef a 
communal character but his ambitions were c lear ly p o l i t i c a l 
and he met with opposition from both the Swarajist and the 
Pan-Islamists on t h i s score. The Swarajists did not' r e l i sh 
the idea of mass mobilization. They were involved in cons t i tu -
t i o n a l opposition to the Raj and given the nature of the 
franchise, they were obliged to take in to account the prejudices 
of the more es tabl ished sect ions of the community. When 
Kitchlew's programme was debated by the centra l khi lafat 
committee at Delhi in June 1924, Khaliquzzaman emphasized the 
fac t t h a t 'most of the r ich men, the landholders and the Shia 
community wil l not l ike to work in any organization founded 
under the khi lafa t committee and he suggested tha t the best plan 
would be ' the capturing of the muslim league by the k h i l a f a t i s t s . 
The muslim league had a his tory behind i t and any work done 
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through i t would carry moie weight. He pointed out, fur ther-
more, t ha t the muslim league had appointed a committee to confer 
with other na t i ona l i s t organisations and he said tha t i t would 
be inadvisable to pre-empt the work of the league before i t 
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had been given a chance to prove i t s e l f . This advice was in 
l ine with Sviarajist pol icy, and Kitchlew did not take t o i t . 
His difference's with Ali bro thers , however were more fundamental. 
They were less opposed than the Swarajists to t h i s plan for 
p o l i t i c a l mobilization but they reacted strongly against two of 
h i s proposals which struck at t h e i r chances of p o l i t i c a l survival , 
of the two, the proposal to convert the Jamia Mil l ia into a 
school for propagandists was the less serious because the Delhi 
and U.P. Swarajists were as opposed to t h i s as the Ali bro thers . 
But his proposal for the t r ans fe r of the Khilafat office 
from Bombay to Delhi met with the support of both these groups 
and placed the Ali brothers in a very threatend jsosition. I t 
amounted to a vote of censure on Pan-Islamic p o l i t i c s and a 
demand for a khi lafa t organization geared to the North Indian 
Si tua t ion . The Ali brothers res i s t ed i t to the h i l t , tempers 
rose on both s ides , and they only escaped defeat by much b l i s t -
ering rhe tor ic and a th in ly veiled at tack on Ajmal Khan and 
Ansari which produced a cha rac t e r i s t i c plea for compromise from 
14 these two men. 
After this Kitchlew became progressively more conmunal. 
By Sept. 1924 he had offended not only Malviya but also Das and 
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Nehru by h i s advocacy of muslim economic independence, "^  and 
thcugh he s t i l l remained a member of the congress he concen-
t r a t e d more on attacking Hindu communalists than on s e t t l i n g 
Hindu-Muslim differences. By February 1925 he had begun a 
•tanzim' tour of Northern Punjab and was reported to be 'on the 
po in t of breaking with the congress and joining the ordinary 
muslim progressive party in the Punjab.16 
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The p l ight of the Ali brothers was scarcely enviable . As 
ear ly as August 1924, in the hope of a f inancia l return from 
journalism, Mahommed Ali had considered reviving the 'comrade'. 
But though he received an i n i t i a l offer of help from Shuaib 
Qureshi, he was ul t imately disappointed and i t was not u n t i l 
November, following a donation of 10,000 rupees from Haji 
Abdullah Haroon, tha t the project got off the ground. By 
October 1924, such was the f inancia l pl ight of the Ali brothers 
tha t they were obliged to espouse sect ional i n t e r e s t s in order 
to survive: They began supporting Ibn Saud, the Wahabi king of 
18 Saudi Arabia, in his ambitions to take over the Hedjar, This 
provoked a Sunni backlash and ul t imate ly al ienated t he i r old 
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colleagues,Hasarat Mohani, Abdul Bari and Mushir Hussain Ki^wai, 
but so long as Ibn Saud and h is Indian followers provided them 
with cash the Ali brothers refused to throw him over. Like 
Zafar Al i , however, who was also in Ibn Saud's pay, the Ali 
brothers were placed in a d i f f i cu l t posi t ion when h i s t roops 
desecri ted the Prophet ' s tomb at lAadina in August, 1925. Shaukat 
did h i s best to play down Wahabi excesses but he met with consi-
derable opposition, not l eas t in Bombay, where Chotani took the 
opportunity to wreak his revenge on 28 September, on leaving 
the Juma Musjid, Shaukat was met by Chotani at the head of a 
hos t i l e mob and was only saved from serious i ju ry by the i n t e r -
vention of the Afghan consul. 
This pa r t i cu la r reversal of fortune was perhaps the most 
dramatic from which the Ali brothers suffered, but i t was not 
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untypica l , and if they remained Pan-Islamist p o l i t i c i a n s i t 
was largely because they had nowhare e l se to go. By May 1925» 
the comrade had proved a fa i lu re and Mahommed Ali had taken t o 
the pr in t ing of sedi t ious a r t i c l e s in the hope of a cheap 
Martyrdom. The chief commissioner of Delhi informed the 
government of India tha t Mahommed Ali was 'thoroughly d i sc re -
di ted and almost penn i l e s s ' and refused to prosecute him 
inorder to watch him flounder s t i l l fu r ther . And flounder 
he did. He went cap in hand to his former associa tes and 
21 colleagues, and having fa i led in almost a l l quar ters he 
f i na l l y secured a grant of 6,000 rupees from the deposed Maharaja 
of Nabha to do propaganda for his r e s t o r a t i o n . By the end of 
1925, the growth of communalism in the provinces had made the Ali 
brothers look l ike p reh is to r ic animals unable to adopt to a new 
environment. 
In the f ie ld of cons t i tu t iona l p o l i t i c s , the most notable 
po l i t i c i an to share the predicament of the Ali brothers was 
Mahommed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had been a leading member of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement before 1920 but he had been disappointed 
by the reforms. Unilike h i s U.P. Colleague in the Muslim League, 
he had been ambitious for pov^er at the cen t re , and when dyarchy 
was only introduced in the provinces he was obliged t o recqpcile 
himself to f ight ing the same old b a t t l e s a l l over again in the 
new l eg i s l a t i ve assembly. 
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Jinnah only re-emerged as a s igni f icant p o l i t i c a l force 
af ter the 1923 e l ec t ions . He was returned to the assembly by 
the muslims of Bombay ci ty and he became the leader of the 
independent par ty . In tha t capacity he co-operated with Nehru's 
Swarajist party and together the two p a r t i e s were known as the 
Nat ional is t par ty . None-the-less Jinnah held the upper hand. 
There were 101 seats in the assemble and the Swarajists had won 
only fortyone of them, Jinnah with a party of some seventeen 
members, held the balance between the Swarajists and the 
government. 
From the beginning the two pa r t i e s were separated by 
p o l i t i c a l idealogy. Nehru's party was recrui ted chiefly out-
side the pres idencies , from thoseareas which had e i the r co-
operated wholeheartedly with Gandhi or seen the wisdom of compro-
mising with him. Of i t s forty-one members, ten came from the 
united provinces (U.P.) and Delhi seven from Bihar and o r i s s a , 
five from the Punjab and the cent ra l provinces, and two from 
Assam. Only twelve came from the pres idencies , five from Bengal, 
where Das had bowed to Gandhi, four from Bombay, and three from 
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Madras, J innha ' s par ty , on the other hand, was recru i ted 
almost e n t i r e l y from the pres idencies , six of i t s seventeen 
members coming from Bombay, six from Madras, th ree from Bengal, 
and only two from the united provinces, (Madan Mohan Malviya 
and Mahommed Yakub were from U.P . ) , Unlike the Swaraj is ts , the 
independents had mostly opposed non-co-operation and several had 
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contes ted t h e e l e c t i o n s 1920, If they could be i d e n t i f i e d with 
any p o l i t i c a l group a t a l l , i t was with the school of 'modera te ' 
na t i ona l i sm which had broken with the congress over the a c c e p t a -
b i l i t y of the Reforms. Though J innah was the p r e s i d e n t of t h e 
muslim league , t h e r e f o r e , the d i f f e r ences between the two 
p a r t i e s were p o l i t i c a l , not communal. M o t i l a l Nehru had more 
muslim suppor t e r s than J i n n a h . Of the for tyone S w a r a j i s t s 
e i g h t were muslims, whereas of the seventeen independents only 
t h r e e muslims. The outcome of t h e i r c o - o p e r a t i o n , however, vMas 
of g r e a t importance for communal r e l a t i o n s in North I n d i a . If 
J innah enabled Nehru to ca r ry the day aga ins t t h e government 
and t o ob ta in p o l i t i c a l concess ions with which t o pay off h i s 
s u p p o r t e r s , the S w a r a j i s t - k h i l a f a t a l l i a n c e would be s t r e n g t h e d , 
but i f Nehru through J i n n a h ' s r e c a l c i t a r e n c e , f a i l e d to car ry 
t h e day, h i s opponents were poised and ready t o e x p l o i t communal 
d i f f e r e n c e s t o des t roy him. I t was an awesome r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
but J innah was not e n t i r e l y aware of t h e burden which he c a r r i e d . 
He had h i s eyes f irmly f ixed on the c e n t r a l government and he 
had h i s own no t ions of the bes t nnethods t o achieve the p o l i t i -
ca l r e v i s i o n which he sought . 
The i n i t i a l per iod of co-opera t ion was c o r d i a l enough. 
The ground was prepared by Das, Jayakar M.R. and J innah a t Bombay 
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a f t e r t h e Coconada Congress , A Nat iona l Demand c a l l i n g for 
p r o v i n c i a l autonomy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in the c e n t r a l government, 
was subsequent ly approved by t h e Swara j i s t execu t ive a t Lucknow, 
and the two p a r t i e s agreed t o make t h i s t he b a s i s of a j o i n t 
p o l i t i c a l programme at Delhi on 3 February, On 18 Feb. Mot i l a l 
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Nehru moved t h i s Demand as an amendment t o Diwan Bahadur Ranga-
c h a r i ' s resolut ion cal l ing for the ear ly appointment of the 
s ta tu tory commission. I t was supported by v i r t ua l l y a l l the 
e lected Indian members of the assembly and i t was passed by a 
handsome majority. Even before Nehru moved h i s amendment, how-
ever, the Home Member's reply to Rangachariar 's resolut ion had 
made i t clear tha t the government of India was in no mood to 
make concessions. All manner of obstacles to advance were 
erected, not l e a s t . The problem presented by the posi t ion of 
minori t ies and a l l tha t was offered u l t imate ly was a departmental 
enquiry to remedy ju s t i f i ab l e complaints within the terms of the 
Act i t s e l f . The main hopes of the Swaraj is ts , however, res ted 
not with the government of India , but with the new labour 
government in England, They had fr iends in the labour party 
and they continued throughout the summer to expect a summons 
to a conference. 
The f i r s t response to the nat ional demand by the new 
secretary of s t a t e , Lord Oliver, however, was d i s t i n c t l y d i s -
appointing. In a speech to the house of Lords on 26 February, 
he made i t plain tha t he was not prepared to go any further 
than the government of India , and as Nehru was l a t e r t o remark, 
t h i s response was 'not only insuf f i c i en t , but highly unsa t i s fa -
ctory and d isappoin t ing . ' When i t cameto pressing home t h i s 
disappointment, however, the Swarajists and independants were 
at Loggerheads. Many Swarajists wished t o r e j ec t the Budget in 
i t s e n t i r e l y , but the independant were not prepared t o r e s o r t 
t o such t a c t i c s and because t h e i r agreement was necessa ry for 
any p o l i c y t o be success fu l they u l t i m a t e l y won the day. I t 
was agreed t h a t t h e f i r s t four heads should be r e j e c t e d and 
t h a t the r e s t of t h e Budget should be t r e a t e d on i t s m e r i t s . 
T h i s was the f i r s t i n s t ance of J innah using h i s advantage t o 
modify Swara j i s t p o l i c y , but i t was very c l e a r from t h e s t a t e -
ment which he made t o the Assembly on 11 March t h a t i t was not 
t o be t h e l a s t . The whole tone of the speech sugges t s not only 
a de s i r e t o r eas su re the government as t o t h e r easonab leness 
of the N a t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i o n but a l s o in ambition t o b r ing t h e 
S w a r a j i s t s under h i s own more c o n s t i t u t i o n a l umbre l l a . 
He sa id " . . . The n a t i o n a l i s t pa r ty i s a p a r t y which i s 
formed to work in t h i s assembly and nothing more; and in t h i s 
assembly we s tand to pursue a po l i cy and a programme of a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . We s h a l l pursue t h a t po l i cy and t h a t 
programme u n t i l the l a s t s tage of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e 
are exhausted . There i s no idea in the mind of t h e n a t i o n a l i s t 
p a r t y t o r e s o r t t o c i v i l d i sobed ience . The no idea in the 
mind of t h e n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y t h a t we want r e v o l u t i o n . There 
i s no idea in the mind of t h e n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y t h a t we are 
27 going to car ry on the campaign of non-payment of t a x e s . 
In read ings view, J innah was making a bid fo r l e a d e r s h i p 
and h i s a c t i v i t i e s over the next t h r ee months do not b e l i e t h a t 
2ft impress ion . 
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He f i r s t attempted to achieve t h i s ambition by d i rec t 
methods. After the assembly session ended, he returned to 
Bombay and held almost dai ly conferences with Nehru, Jayakar, 
Purushotamdas Thakurdas and V. J . Pa te l with a view to produc-
ing a new, inc lus ive , cons t i tu t iona l par ty . Gandhi also p a r t i -
cipated in a number of these discussions , as did Das on hi5 
a r r i va l from Bengal. Ult imately, however, Jinnah»s e f fo r t s 
foundered on the rock of in t e rna l congress dif ferences . Nrhru 
and Das were under pressure from Gandhi and, though they did 
not bow before him, they were too wary of h i s an t ies to a l ly 
openly with men wno repudiated h i s creed. I t was only a f te r 
the promulgation of the Bengal ordinance in October 1924, vjhen 
Gandhi agreed to suspend non-co-operation and to place the 
Swarajists in charge of the congress organizat ion, t h a t J innha ' s 
ambition stood any chance of being fu l f i l l ed and by then new 
obstacles had been thrown into h i s path. 
J innah ' s other plan, the revival of the rauslim league, 
had more ominous consequences, When Jinnah called the council 
of the league at Delhi on 16 March and persuaded h is colleagues 
to agree to a session at Lahore, he was undoubtedly motivated by 
a desire to strengthen the chances of a government response to 
the National Demand. The choice of Lalfjore was not for tui tous* 
The Punjab was the only province where the muslims were working 
the reforms for t h e i r own advantage, Fazli Hussain was keen on 
provincial autonomy, but he was wary of se l l ing his support too 
cheaply and he made sure t h a t he was in a posi t ion of overwhel-
ming strength at the League meeting. This preparation paid 
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dividends; and when the main resolution defining the muslim 
position emerged from the subjects committee it was an almost 
entirely Punjabi affair. It looked forward to a Federal 
government at the centre, 'The functions of the central govern-
ment being confined to such matters as are of general or common 
concern. ' It demanded that very small minorities should be 
given representation in excess of their numerical proportion 
in those cases in which they would remain entirely unrepresented 
in the absence of such exceptional treatment, subject, however, 
to the essential provison that no majority should be reduced to 
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a minority or even to an equa l i t y . " 
This demand was a d i rec t product of the Punjabi s i t u a t i o n , 
the s t r e s s on 'very small mino r i t i e s ' being calculated t o 
exclude the Hindus and the Sikhs, and the province i t s e l f to 
improve the posit ion of the muslims at t h e i r expense. As such 
i t was resented by the minority-province muslims, and p a r t i c u l a -
r ly by those working the reforms, and an amendment eliminating 
the reference to 'very small mino r i t i e s ' and replacing i t with a 
demand for 'adequate and effect ive representat ion for minori t ies 
in every province ' was moved by Dr. Ziauddtn Ahmad and carr ied 
by one hundred and twenty-six votes to eighty t h r e e . This amend-
ment was supported by the Punjab a g r i c u l t u r i s t s , suggesting t h a t 
t he i r or iginal resolut ion had re f lec ted parochiailism but not 
pre judice , but i t was vociferiously opposed by the k h i l a f a t i s t s 
and notably by Ghazi Abdur Rahman of Lyalpur, Chaudhuri 
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Khaliquzzaman and Mahotnmad Ali . These were the men who had 
worked closest with the congress and they saw tha t these terms 
would not be accepted by tha t body. I t had become clear when 
Dr. Ansari and Lala Lajpat Rai t r i e d t o formulate t h e i r nat ional 
pact t ha t even separate e lec to ra tes had ceased t o be universal ly 
accepted, and a communal majority by separate e l ec to ra te s had 
already been rejected by the congress at Coconada. If the 
league were to demand t h i s concession again without giving any 
compensation in the minority provinces, the r e s u l t would be a 
foregone conclusion. Nonetheless by the passage of the amend-
ment, the league did demand jus t t h a t , and Jinnah emerged from 
the Lahore session, not only armed with a declarat ion infavour 
of a complete overhaul of the government of India Act, but 
commited to securing an improvement on the Lucknow pact as a 
precondition for united act ion. He did not shirk t h i s responsi-
b i l i t y proved insuf f i c ien t . 
Within a week of Lahore session, Nehru and Jinnah were 
invi ted to s i t as non-official members on the reform Enquiry 
Committee, an extended version of the departmental enquiry proved 
promised by Hailey in February. Nehru would have l iked t o accept 
t h i s inv i ta t ion but opposition from the Swarajist executive 
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obliged him to turn i t down. Jinnah being l e s s subject t o 
external pressure, accepted with a l a c r i t y . I t gave him an ideal 
opportunity to pursue h i s ambitions for reform, to explore the 
views of o thers , and where necessary to convert them to h is 
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point of view. His q u e s t i o n s t o w i tnes ses suggest t h r e e main 
p r e - o c c u p a t i o n s . He seeks f i r s t l y to show t h a t Dyarchy has 
f a i l e d and t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n needs ove rhau l ing , sedondly t o 
encounter the argument t h a t communal t e n s i o n in an obs t ac l e t o 
advances, and t h i r d l y , t o d iscover terms on which a new Lucknow 
pac t might be dev ised . His path was not smooth, however, for 
he met with cons iderab le oppos i t ion from the chairman. S i r 
Alexander Wuddiman, who was a l s o the Home member, and from S i r 
Mahommed S a f i , the law member, who had been put on the committee 
t o r ep re sen t the communal po in t of v iew." 
As a t Lahore, Jinnah obta ined the g r e a t e r co-opera t ion 
from the Punjabi Muslims, They were anxious for reforms and 
w i l l i n g t o minimize the s i gn i f i c ance of communal t ens ion in 
order to achieve i t . Furthermore they had a l ready come t o an 
unders tanding with J innah and based t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the 
r e s o l u t i o n passed by t h e League." 
J i n n a h , a l so rece ived suoport from t h r e e IJ.P. Muslims, 
Maulvi Mahommed Yakub, a member of h i s own p a r t y , Syed Raza A l i , 
a member of t h e counci l of s t a t e , and professor Shafaat Ahmad, 
a member of the U.P. L e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l . Mahommed Yakub was 
the most outspoken. He held i t 'a mol ic ious subvers ion of f ac t s 
t o say t h a t t he musalmans are not in favour of r e s p o n s i b l e 
government' and he opposed t h e argument t h a t comnunal d i scord 
was an obs t ac l e to p o l i t i c a l advance. He admit ted , however, t h a t 
ts i 
he was 'more keen for an extension of democratic powers in 
35 the centra l government than in the provinces. ' As an 
All-India po l i t i c i an he wished for r e spons ib i l i t y at the 
cent re , but as a muslim from a minority province he had his 
scruples about provincial autonomy. The same dichotomy was 
also not ic iable in the evidence of Raza Ali . He was less bold 
than Mahommad Yakub with regard to the centra l government, 
holing tha t Dyarchy, though unpopular, would be a more sensible 
beginning than complete r e spons ib i l i t y , but more special about 
provincial autonomy, declaring quite openly tha t communal t en-
sion was an obstacle t o further devolution. Shaafat Ahmad's 
were less prec ise . On the one hand, he held tha t fu l l advantage 
had not been taken of the opportuni t ies afforded by the act ; 
on the o ther , tha t i t would be possible even within terms of 
the Act to abolish dyarchy and to introduce respons ib i l i ty at 
the centre . Did he wish for the overhaul of the Act ? i t i s 
not c lea r . He did demand, however, tha t muslim representat ion 
should be increased both in the provinces and at the cent re , 
and as t h i s appeared to be an escala t ion of the league demand 
made at Lahore, Jinnah was anxious to c lar i fy the pos i t ion . 
Shafaat agreed almost immediately, however, tha t the minority 
province muslims were sa t i s f i ed with the Lucknow pact , and 
Jinnah proceeded fur ther . 
When the work of the reforms enquiry conmittee was comp-
l e t ed , J innah, Sapru, Sivaswamy Iyer and Paranjpye refused to 
sign the majority report and produced a minority report ins tead. 
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In t h a t r e p o r t , they condemned Dyarchy unequivoca l ly and they 
demanded the i n t roduc t i on of p r o v i n c i a l autonomy and r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y in the "central government they used the evidence of 
Barakat Ali t o show t h a t communal t e n s i o n was a phenomenon of 
r e s t r i c t e d impo^^tance; they quoted the muslim league r e s o l u t i o n 
t o prove t h a t the muslims were not opposed t o advance. They 
invo lved the spec t re of cen t r i fuga l i sm as an argument for 
s imultaneous advance. 
" . . . with p r o v i s i o n a l governments f u l l y r e spons ib l e t o 
t h e i r l e g i s l a t u r e s and the c e n t r a l government i r r e s p o n s i b l e in 
the l a s t r e s o r t , the c o n t r o l of var ious kinds which i t i s 
de s i r ed t o be continued in the c e n t r a l government w i l l be more 
d i f f i c u l t t o enforce and the c e n t r i f u g a l tendency observed in 
many f ede ra l s t a t e s and e s p e c i a l l y marked in the h i s t o r y of 
Ind ia w i l l manifest i t s e l f more and more making s t a b l e govern-
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ment unworkable ." 
This was perhaps the f i r s t time t h a t p a r t i t i o n had been 
foreshawed in c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms and i t p rov ides a very 
s i g n i f i c a n t marker on t h e road t o t h a t d e s t i n a t i o n . 
On 3 D e c , 1924, when the reforms enqui ry committee r e p o r t 
was s igned , J i n n a h ' s ambition looked of f u l f i l m e n t . Gandhi» 
by h i s suspension of non-co -ope ra t ion , had paved t h e way for 
a new access ion of s t r e n g t h to the congress ; and a l r e a d y , on 
21 Nov., an a l l - p a r t i e s conference had met a t Bombay and s e t 
up a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e committee t o devise a u n i t e d f r o n t a g a i n s t 
the government. 
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None-the-less, Jinnah vgas wary of taking part in unity 
discussions on other people 's terms. S t r i c t l y speaking, the 
suspension of, non-co-operation enabled him to re join the 
congress. But when he considered attending the Belgaum session 
he found himself in two minds, "He i s apparently of the view, ' 
Venkatapatttaju wrote to Purushotamdas Thakurdas, ' tha t we need 
not bother ourselves outside the Assembly. My point i s tha t 
t o carry any influence in the asembly we should have public 
38 support. ' This was a crucial difference not only between 
Venkatpatiraju and Jinnah but more importantly between Jinnah 
and Swaraj is ts . Jinnah wanted the Swarajists to adopt purely 
cons t i tu t iona l methods but he had no desire to fight t h e i r 
ba t t l e s for them. His own pos i t ion , both as leader of the 
independents and as president of the Muslim League, was already 
secure, and he did not wish to compromise his chances of negotiat-
ing with the congress as an equal by becoming a party to i t s 
decis ions. The same considerations a lso affected h i s p a r t i c i -
pation in the a l l - p a r t i e s conference. He only agreed to s i t on 
Gandhi's unity committee providing i t s decisions were not taken 
39 by vote. Decisions by majority implied differences of opinion 
and he was only prepared to subscribe to an agreement which was 
voluntar i ly adopted by a l l p a r t i e s , 
Jinnah saving himself for negot ia t ions with the congress. 
But Mahommad Ali, as congress pres ident , had already put a number 
of spoker in h i s wheel, J innah ' s self-importance, h i s fine 
18* 
c lo thes and h i s p rec i se manner of speech had long been a 
sub jec t for Mahommad A l l ' s s a t i r e , but by the middle of 1924, 
with P a n - I s l a m i s t enthusiasmat low ebb, J innah was no longer 
40 j u s t good ma te r i a l for the goss ip column of the 'Comrade. ' 
If Mahommad Ali had any chance of r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g himself as a 
p o l i t i c a l l eade r i t was a purveyor of Hindu-Muslim u n i t y , and 
J i n n a h ' s e f f o r t s t o rev ive the League and t o r e n e g o t i a t e t h e 
Lucknow pact provoked a j e a l o u s response for t h a t r e a s o n . 
Mahommad Ali opposed the r e v i v a l of the League; he a t tended i t 
only t o objec t t o the r e s o l u t i o n on communal sa feguards ; and 
when the sess ion was over , he tu rned with a new zea l t o the 
41 promotion of communal harmony. J innah was not unduly p e r t u r -
bed so long as Mahommed Ali confined himself t o pour ing Oi l on 
t roub led w a t e r s . Within the League h i s oppos i t ion was managea-
ble and the reduc t ion of communal t ens ion was a d e s i r a b l e and in 
i t s e l f . But he was cons iderab ly inconvenienced when Mahommed 
Ali stopped p laying peacemaker and s t a r t e d p laying p o l i t i c i a n . 
During the Lahore League, a committee had been appointed 
t o formulate a c o n s t i t u t i o n in c o n s u l t a t i o n with o ther organiza t -
i o n s . This was J i n n a h ' s b r a i n c h i l e d and he had g rea t hopes of 
42 i t . When i t made ove r tu res t o the congress , however i t was 
unceremoniously snubbed. This was the f i r s t ins tance of Maho.-
mmed A l l ' s a c t i v i t i e s in f luenc ing the r e l a t i o n s between the two 
o rgan iza t ions and i t prevented the holding of a j o i n t se s s ion a t 
Belgaum. 
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Though re la t ions between the League and the congress had 
become t e s t y , both Jinnah and the Swarajists remained anxious 
for a settlemen^t. When Motilal learned tha t the League had 
decided to hold i t s session at Bombay, he urged Jinnah to 
change the venue to Belgaum, and Jinnah though he claimed i t 
was too l a t e to do so, did postpone the meeting for several days 
to allow for congress attendance. At the League i t s e l f , the 
pres ident , Syed Raza Al i , warned h i s audience against a Merger 
with the congress. But Jinnah, whilst acknowledging the 
differences which had emerged over separate e l e c t o r a t e s , renewed 
h i s plea for an attempt at a set t lement . Nor was he success-
f u l . The const i tu t ion committee appointed at Lahore was refash-
ioned t o accomodate a s igni f icant ly larger congress muslim 
element, and presumably as a r e su l t of Gandhi's in te rvent ion , 
t h i s new committee was subsequently co-opted bodily on t o the 
unity committee of the a l l - p a r t i e s conference. All t h i s shows 
tha t hope was not yet dead. The main obstacles came from U.P. 
and Punjab. Malviya and Chintamani, who had already began t o 
break Nehru's a l l iance with U.P, Muslims in the munic ipa l i t i es , 
were the main leader who protes ted. Hindu ^Aahashabha's a c t i v i -
t i e s took a d i s t i nc t ly p o l i t i c a l tu rn , A committee was 
appointed to formulate Hindu opinion on the communal question, 
and i t s composition was ominous for the future . Amongst 
o thers , i t consisted of Lajpat Rai, Raja Narendra Nath, Chintamani, 
Raja Sir Rampal Singh, Jairamdas Daulat Ram of Sindh and, most 
I K H 
ominously of a l l , Nehru ' s Swara j i s t a l l i e s from the c e n t r a l 
p r o v i n c e s , B.S. Moonji and N.C. Kelkar , '^ ' 
I t was these mahasabhites who f r u s t e r a t e d the chances 
of a new LucknovJ pac t when the a l l - p a r t i e s conference reconve-
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ned a t Delhi on 23 January 1925. During the p r e l i m i n a r y 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s , when J innah urged t h e committee t o a t t e n d f i r s t 
t o Hindu Muslim d i f f e r e n c e s , the Mahashabhaites did not a c t u a l l y 
oppose a new s e t t l e m e n t . They feigned ignorance of Muslim 
demands and having f i r s t preempted J i n n a h ' s p o s i t i o n by condem-
ning both communal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , J i n n a h ' s speech demanding 
r e c o g n i t i o n for Muslim m a j o r i t i e s in Bengal and the Punjab was 
followed by an uncompromising harangue from Lajpat Rai and 
t h e r e was some danger of t h e committee being d i s r u p t e d . Th is 
danger was aver ted by the acceptance of Mrs. Besan t ' s p roposa l 
for the e s t ab l i shmen t of two committees, oneto formulate a 
scheme for Swaraj and other t o solve the communal q u e s t i o n , but 
no sooner had the second committee s t a r t e d work than Chintamani 
announced t h a t i t s dec i s ions would not be acceptable t o t h e 
49 Hindu u n t i l they had been endorsed by the Mahashabha. Both 
J innah and Nehru objected t o t h i s condi t ion and i t was e v e n t -
u a l l y withdrawn at Gandhi*s i n s i s t e n c e , but t he r e l a t i o n s between 
Hindus and Muslims wi th in the committee became s t e a d i l y worse 
and on 26 January Hakim Ajmal Khan had t o propose an adjournment 
t o allow for t h e removal of misunders tanding . These misunder-
s t a n d i n g s , however, were too s u b s t a n t i a l t o be removed and a f t e r 
w 
a further five miniite session on 28 January the committee 
was adjourned for a month tha t in effect marked the end of i t . 
After the fa i lure of the a l l - p a r t i e s conference, the 
division between Nehru and Jinnah def in i te ly widened. In the 
spring of 1925 the two men began to disagree pub l ica l ly , and 
the united front against the government collapsed. 
On 7 July 1925, in the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead 
put paid to hopes of immediate reform. He did not en t i r e ly 
rule out the poss ib i l i t y of an ear ly s ta tu tory commission but 
he made i t plain that no concession could be expected u n t i l 
Indian leaders had co-operated in the working of the reforms. 
This speech was a turning point for the p o l i t i c s of confronta-
t i on . Unt i l t ha t t ime, Nehru's leadership and Swarajists 
t a c t i c s had been unchallenged and a victory at the a l l - I nd i a 
level seemed poss ib le . Afterwards both were re jec ted , and 
many provincial ba t ta l ions withdrew from the ba t t l e and made 
overtures to the enemy. Conseguently, Nehru was obliged t o 
wase front l ine operations and to take up the task of quel l ing 
rebel l ion amongst his own forces. To do tha t successful ly, 
however, he eventually had to quit the l eg i s l a tu re and to resume 
non-co-operation. 
After Birkenhead's announcement, the confrontation with 
the Raj ceased to hold the centre of the stage and i t s plade 
was taken by a confl ict between Nehru and h is opponents. 
Opposition to Nehru came from the main sources; f i r s t l y from h i s 
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own a l l i e s in the cent ra l provinces and Bombay, and T l l ak i t e 
congress organization in Maharastra and Berar, And secondaly 
from the Hindus of Punjab and U.P. the main point at issue was 
office acceptance Nehru had b u i l t his a l l - Ind ia organization 
on the re ject ion of the reforms and a Demand tha t the cons t i tu -
t ion be Completely overhauled. Yet having fa i l ed to budge 
the Br i t i sh , he had to face a demand tha t the reforms be worked 
iot what they were worth. 
At the same time, in north India, Malaviya's a t t i t ude had 
become more overt ly p o l i t i c a l . In August, the working committee 
of the Mahashabha decided to set up candidates for the for th-
coming e lec t ions if other candidates were i n i t i a l to Hindu 
i n t e r e s t s , and in September, Malviya began to give a l l - I n d i a 
importance to the issue of music before Masques, On 5 Sept. 
h i s r e l a t ive Pandit Rama Kant Malaviya, to ld a jo in t Hindu-
Muslim meeting at the c o l l e c t o r ' s house at Allahabad tha t local 
Hindu could not agree to stop music before Masques u n t i l there 
was an a l l - Ind ia set t lement ." 
Both, Malviya group and Maharastrian group clashed j o i n t -
ly with Nehru at the Kanpur Congress. Nehru proposed a resolu-
t ion reafirming the fa i th of the congress in c i v i l disobedience, 
i n s i s t ing on non-acceptance of office as the party progranpe 
for the 1926 e l ec t ions , and ca l l ing for a withdrawl of Swaraji-
s t s from the l eg i s l a tu re if the National Demand had not been met 
by Feb. 1926. Malviya proposed an amendment urging the congress 
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to work the reforms to the best possible advantage, replacing 
the National Demand of February 1924 with the less extreme 
demand of Sept. 1925, and declaring all reference to civil 
disobedience and resignation. hAalviya was supported by 
Jayker, Kalkar Aney (Party leader in Berar) and Moonji, but 
Nehru ultimately carried the day.^^ Nonetheless the scene was 
set for a substantial political battle in the crucial months 
before the 1926 elections. 
In U.P. Malviya was supporting office acceptance, maximi-
zing his contancts with Hindu landlords and using a communal 
platCorm as a means of rallying support. He had already defea-
ted Nehru's Swarajists allience in the 1925 municipal elections, 
and from the Spring of 1926. He began to use the same methods 
for provincial ends, Nehru did not want an outright battle 
with Malviya. Nonetheless, though he wanted a compromise, he 
was not prepared to compromise on Malviya's terms, and afterall 
outright battle took place. In the battle, Malviya used every 
communal device available. Nehru was accused of being a beefea-
ter; the congress was stigmatized as a prostitute of muslim 
India; and such was the communal hatred aroused that Nehru 
afterwards considered retiring from public life in disgust. 
• 
An indication of the depth of communal tension and its 
political implications is provided by a letter from the secre-
tary of the Delhi pec to the congress president Sarojini Naidu. 
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i t 
You know tha t Delhi the one place in the whole of India 
where v/e have get joint e l e c t o r a t e s , and during coming e lec t ions 
the question of, having jo in t e l ec to ra te allround in future wi l l 
be put to the t e s t here. The muslim and hindu votes are in r a t i o 
of 1 to 2 and the pec Delhi has put up Mr. Asaf Ali , bar at law, 
as their candidate for the Assembly.. . . i t i s a matter of shame 
tha t the Hindus of Delhi do not r ea l i s e the importance of De lh i . . 
Though Nehru made considerable concessions to communal 
fee l ing , the e lec t ion r e s u l t were d i sa r t rous for h i s par ty . 
the U.P. from t h i r t y one members in 1923, they were reduced to 
sixteen members in 1926, 
In U.P. where eleven muslims had been nominated and four 
returned in 1923, only six were nominated and only one returned 
in 1926. Of the or ig inal eleven only one was renominated, 
Maulvi Zahuruddin, the member for Barei l ly and Shahjahanpur 
cum Moradabad, and he was the only one returned. Not only had 
muslim vote decreased. There has been a v i r tua l ly complete 
change of personnel. Indeed the indicat ions are t h a t Nehru 
concentrated on supporting independent candidates in the hope 
they Would join the party one e lec ted . 
• 
Ultimately fourteen Swarajist muslims stood for eighteen 
seats and six were returned. These were almost the only muslims 
returned to provincial councils on the congress ticket through-
out North India. 
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In the centra l assembly, of the eight Swarajist muslims 
returned in 1923, only three were teturned in 1926. 
The only new blood came from Bihar and U.P. from U.P, were 
Tassaduq Sherwani and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai. Khaliguzzaman who 
stood for the U.P. council from the Lucknow, Unao, and Hardoi 
constituency, was soundly defeated by the Raja of Salempur. ^ 
When Nehru contemplated these r e s u l t s he was profoundly 
discouraged. He wrote t o Jawahar Lai :- "The Malviya - Lala 
gang aided by B i r l a ' s money are making f ront ic e f fo r t s to 
capture the congress. They wi l l probably succeed as no counter 
ef for t i s possible from our s ide . I sha l l probably make a public 
declarat ion af ter the Guahati congress and with i t resign my 
seat in the assembly though I am s t i l l acclained as the leader 
of the strongest party in the country. We can do no possible 
good in the Assembly or the councils with our present numbers 
and the kind of men we have, 
Nehru Report and fAjslim Leadership : 
The Nehru report was f i r s t published on 21 August 1928, 
I t immediately aroused tremendous i n t e r e s t . The cons t i tu t ion 
which the report put forward was the most coherent and radica l 
ever framed by group of Indian p o l i t i c i a n s , and though i t s * 
communal provisions have since received most a t t en t i on , i t s 
p o l i t i c a l provisions were equally controversial and undoubtedly 
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contributed to were of communal dlssention in which I t 
was Soon submerqed."' All Departments of the cent ra l government, 
including defence,, finance and r e l a t i o n s with the s t a t e s , were 
t o be t ransferred t o the control of a responsible Indian l e g i s -
l a t u r e , and though Dominion s ta tus was the goa l , i t Was deman-
ded at the next immediate step in Ind ia ' s p o l i t i c a l evolut ion. 
The central government was to consist of a governor general 
appointed by the king, a prime minister appointed by the governor 
general , and six minis te rs , appointed by the governer general on 
the advice of prime minis ter . The appointment of a provincia l 
government was to follow a s imi lar p a t t e r n . In both cases, 
cabinets were t o be jo in t ly responsible to t he i r respect ive 
l e g i s l a t u r e , and the power of both governor-general and governor 
reduced to o bare minimum. The lower house of the centra l 
l e g i s l a t u r e and a l l provincial l eg i s l a tu re were to be e lec ted 
on f\n adult Franchise. There wns also to be a supreme cour t , a 
coTmittee for Defence, -?nd a public service commission. Relations 
between the central qcvernment ar^ the provincial governments 
were not discussed in d e t a i l . But i t i s clear from the schedules 
of subjects under the i r charge tha t the nat ional government was 
t o be of a uni tary ra ther than a federal type, with reiJiduary 
power in the hands of the centra l government. This was subsequ-
ent ly to bo a bone of contention with many opponents of the 
congress point of view. In the communal sphere, the repor t 
recommended the abol i t ion of separate e l ec to ra t e s and of woightage 
for minor i t i e s , and i t also rejected the muslim demand for r e s e r -
vation for major i t ies and for t h i r t y three per cent a t the centre . 
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The a l l party conference to consider the report was 
convened at Lucknow on 28 August. The Raja of Mahmudabad, 
Saroj ini Naidu'and Dr. Ansari, a l l urged the Nehrus t o postpone 
i t So that Jinnah could at tend, but though they secured a token 
postponement of one day, the indica t ions are tha t the Nehrus 
were not anxious to be conci l ia tory . All r e l ig ious bodies, 
including two inf luencia l Sikh organisat ion, the Akali Dal and 
the Siromani Gurdwara prabandhak committee were excluded, and 
the attendence was kept down to about a hundred people. The 
meeting produced a happy r e s u l t . On 30 August i t was unani-
mously agreed. 
But, as the various agreements were reached, the only 
murmur of dissent came from Shaukat Al i , who feel out with the 
Punjabi k h i l a f a t i s t s over the aboli t ion of reservat ion for 
minor i t i es , s ta t ing tha t the centra l khi la fa t committee s t i l l 
stood by i t s or ig inal resolut ion on t h i s question. The 
secession of the Punjabi and Bengali k h i l a f a t i s t was a b i t t e r 
blow for Ali brothers (Saukat Ali) and Mahommad Al i ) , Even by 
1925, t he i r standing with the i r own community had been very 
much in decline and if congress now struck bargains independently 
with different khi lafa t fac t ions , t h e i r only remaining p o l i t i c a l 
a s se t s , controls of the All-India organisat ion, would also ba in 
juopardy. Following the Lucknow conference, therefore , Shaukat 
girded up his l ions for act ion. He broke with Motilal Nehru, 
denouncing him for making concessions to the Mahashabha (Hindu), 
and he also broke with the muslims who supported Moti la l , Chief 
among whom was Ansari, denouncing them as congress stooges. 
H'l 
Shaukat A l l ' s repudiation of the Nehru report was a 
considerable embarassment to congress. But a more ser ious 
challenge to the report came from those provincial forces on 
whom the government had re l i ed from the beginning. Those 
(provinces) who found themselves in the sepa ra t i s t lobby could 
look to leadership chiefly from two sources, the Punjab and 
the U.P. In the Punjab, i t was Fazl i Husain's unionist party 
which gave the lead, and in the U.P. a group of Muslim members 
of the l e g i s l a t i v e council , chiefly from the western division 
of the province, who were co-ordinated by Professor Shafaat 
Ahmad Khan of Allahabad University and financed by Sir Mahommed 
Yusuf, the minister of local self-government the views of the 
f i r s t group are most succinctly expressed in the majority report 
of the Punjab l eg i s l a t i ve council co-operating committee set up 
in May 1928 under the chairmanship of Sikunder Hayat Khan, and 
those of the second in 'Representation of the Muslims of the 
united provinces to the Indian s ta tu tory commission. 
In many respec ts , the vievjs of these tw© groups were 
diametrical ly opposed to each other. The unionist party in 
Punjab was confident that any further devolution of power at 
the provincial level would be to i t s advantage, the U.P, Muslims 
on the other hand, fearing tha t in the prevai l ing communal 
atmosphere of t h e i r province a further devolution of power would 
mere usher in 'a Brahmin oX a Kayastha domination, declared 
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t he i r opposition to a l l forms of provincial advance if t h e i r 
posi t ion was not safeguarded. They favoured a continuation 
of Dyarchy, with law and order and revenue remaining reserved 
subjec ts . They were opposed t o the abol i t ion of the nominated 
element and special cons t i tuencies . They demanded a second 
chamber and they required tha t t h i r t y three percent of a l l 
cabinet posts should be al located to t h e i r community. These 
U.P. Muslims demands were, in fac t , the most far-reaching 
ever put forward by a minority community. They also demanded 
separate e l ec to ra te s with weightage at every level of govern-
ment, effect ive representation on a l l autonomous i n s t i t u t i o n s 
created by the l e g i s l a t u r e s , safeguards for Urdu, adequate 
Safeguards for the excercise of muslim re l ig ious r i g h t s , due 
a l locat ion of grants in aid by government and local bodies, 
and a share of the services according to t h e i r representa t ive 
proportion in any given body. 
Outside the sphere of provincial devolution, however, the 
U.P. Muslims were agree with Punjab group. Not only did they 
both support the separation of Sind, reforms for the f ron t ie r 
and Baluchistan, a t h i r t y three percent muslim share in the 
central l eg i s l a tu re and the continuation of separate e l e c t o -
rates; they also showed a common opposition to control of the 
cent ra l government by the majority community, though for 
different reasons in each case. The unionis t of Punjab were not 
opposed in pr inciple to fu l l responsible government at the cent re . 
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The U.P. Muslims adopted a very dif ferent a t t i t u d e . 
They were not in favour of a ful l responsible government at 
the centre . In t h e i r vievg, the existence of communal 
mistrust was a suff icient reason for the maintenance of the 
s ta tus quo: 
"We are of the opinion tha t the re la t ionsh ip between 
the governor general and his executive council which now 
subsis ts be maintained. . . We feel tha t a strong cent ra l govern-
ment, which is able and wil l ing to pursue a policy tha t i s not 
coloured by communal, r a c i a l , l o ca l , provincial o^ economic 
prejudices i s necessary at the present juncture , and i s essen-
t i a l in a country where confl ic t of i n t e r e s t necess ic ia tes 
absolute impar t ia l i ty and prompt act ion. 
The U.P. fAuslims wanted a strong centra l government - and 
t h i s involved vesting residuary powers at the centre - because 
they envisaged the continuance of Br i t i sh control . In the words 
of Masud-ul-Hassan, they wanted 'Fundamental safeguards which 
nobody in India can t ouch , ' and t h i s was only possible if the 
Bri t ish parliament retained the r ight to in te r fe re in the 
provinces on behalf of the minor i t ies . We are strongly opposed: 
wrote Shafaat Ahmad, to vesting the centra l government with 
the power of amending any const i tu t ion that i s granted to i t by 
the Br i t i sh parliament. In t h e i r different ways, t he re fo re , 
both the unionis ts and the U.P. Muslims were opposed to what 
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J innah and the congress were campaigning f o r . Ne i the r wanted 
t o be sub jec ted t o a n a t i o n a l government a t the c e n t r e . 
Among the muslims of these two groups , the p u b l i c a t i o n 
of the Nehru r e p o r t did not produce any major changes of p o l i -
t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . Most of them had always be l i eved t h a t 
they Would get a b e t t e r hear ing from the government than from 
congress , and before the r e p o r t was pub l i shed , most of them 
had a l ready decided t o co-opera te with the Simon commission. 
For both the U.P . and Punjab Muslims» the r e p o r t posed 
the q u e s t i o n : 'what i s your a t t i t u d e t o the p rospec t of an 
e f f e c t i v e B r i t i s h withdrawl from t h e c e n t r a l government. 
In the U.P . where muslim demands for a l l manner of sepa-
r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n had met with a hammer blow from Nehru and 
h i s c o l l e a g u e s , those who had been r e s p o n s i b l e for the s t a t u t o r y 
commission. Memorandum convened an a l l - p a r t i e s muslim confe re -
nce a t Kanpur on 4 November. Hafiz Hidayat Hussa in , Masud-ul-
Hassan and Saikh Zahur Ahmad, a l l t h r e e of them important c o n t r i -
bu tors t o the memorandum, now f igured prominently on the p l a t -
form and r e i t e r a t e d the demands which they had e a r l i e r submit ted 
t o the commission. By November 1928, however, one a d d i t i o n a l 
and more extreme demand had emerged for a f i f t y percen t " sha^e 
in t h e p r o v i n c i a l government. This demand, which appears i n i t i -
a l l y to be j u s t another i n d i c a t i o n of muslim nervousness , may 
wel l have been the r e s u l t of a change of a t t i t u d e towards the 
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prospect of a nat ional government at the centre , Hafiz Hidayat 
Hussain, the chairman of the reception committee, t o ld h i s 
audience tha t the Nehru r e p o r t ' s g rea tes t drawback was tha t i t 
concentrated power in the cent ra l government where muslims 
would always remain in a minority. The solution he said, was 
a federal system of government which would provide for provinces 
where the muslims majority could r e t a l i a t e the treatment method 
out to t he i r community in the Hindu provinces. This statement 
r e f l ec t s a considerable change in perspective since the submi-
ssion of U.P. tnuslim memorandum to simon, and i t suggests 
tha t Nehru's recommendations had forced Hidayat Hussain and h is 
friends to face the question: How are we t o pro tes t ourselves 
if we cannot rely on the Raj ? I t suggests, moreover, tha t 
t h e i r answer to t h i s question was to put t he i r fa i th in a 
system of ' r e t a l i a t i o n , ' which depended for i t s effect iveness 
on a maximum degree of provincial autonomy for the majority 
province muslims. By November, therefore , the p o l i t i c a l future 
of the U.P. Muslims was seen to be far more interlocked with 
t h a t of t h e i r Punjabi c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s . 
The Kanpur conference was also s ignif icant because i t 
witnessed an important accession of strength to the minority-
province sepa ra t i s t s from those na t i ona l i s t muslims who had begn 
al ienated by the Nehru repor t . The president of the session was 
no less a person than Shaukat Al i , who now es tabl ished himself 
in the separa t i s t camp. In the future he was to make occasio-
nal forays in to ' n a t i o n a l i s t ' p o l i t i c s , drawn by his personal 
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indicat ions and his lengthy acquaintance with congress l eaders . 
Yet - jus t as the const ra in ts of the system had forced him in to 
the separatist"camp, so they continued to keep him t h e r e . The 
same was also t rue for his brother, Mahommed, who following h is 
return from Europe in October, took up an iden t i ca l pos i t ion . 
Not only did he support the demands of the U.P, muslims for 
safeguards: he also campaigned for a loose federation with 
maximum provincial autonomy. At the Bihar a l l - p a r t i e s muslim 
conference early in December, he condemned the Nehru report 
for favouring the Hindu Mahashabha. Even in the provinces where 
muslims had a majority, he sa id , ' the Nehru report was so 
planned as to counter the influence of tha t muslim majority by 
having too dominate a cent ra l government a t Delhi . 
The most important personal i ty in Mot i l a l ' s ca lcu la t ion , 
however, was Mohammad Ali J innah, who returned t o India some 
months l a t e r than expected as a resu l t of his wi fe ' s i l l n e s s 
in P e r i s . If Jinnah could be won over, the Nehru report would 
aquir added p res t ige , and Motilal therefore deputed Purushotam-
das Thakurdas t o 'rope in J innah ' before Shaukat Ali got to 
him. He wrote "so much depends on Jinnah tha t I have a mind 
to go to Bombay to receive him. If I have the necessary funds 
within the next few days I hope to create a strong opinion 
amongst the Mussalmans to great Jinnah on his a r r i v a l . Therefore 
please lose no time to ra ise as much money as you can for t h i s 
great e n t e r p r i s e . ^ 
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When Jinnah arrived however, he did not immediately 
proclaim his support for Nehru's recommendations but cha rac te r i -
s t i c a l l y chose to Sound out Muslim opinion f i r s t . Nehru who 
wrote to him from Ahmedabad the day af ter he a r r ived , urged 
him to attend the a l l pa r t i e s committee meeting at Delhi on 
5 November, assuring him that members of the committee were 
not representat ives of the organisations to which they belonged 
and tha t his presence would not commit the muslim league t o any 
decision reached. All such decis ions , he sa id , would be open 
to a l t e ra t ion at the a l l - p a r t i e s convention at Calcutta on 17 
December, But Jinnah was too experienced a po l i t i c i an to put 
h is head in such a noose. He was not prepared to attend any 
a l l pa r t i e s conference u n t i l he knew his brief , and though sent 
Nehru a l e t t e r to be read out at the Delhi meeting, he wailed 
to see what would happen at the muslim league council meeting 
which he had called at Lucknow on 11 November, 
The Lucknow muslim league council meeting was less concl-
usive than Jinnah would have l iked. Three different schools were 
present (The Independents, the congress muslims and the U.P, 
s epa ra t i s t s ) and no decision was reached by a subs tant ia l majo-
r i t y . A resolut ion thanking the Nehru committee for i t s report 
(but not committing the league t o accepting i t s provisions) was 
carr ied by only four votes , and the Raja of Mahmudabad was e l e c -
ted president of the annual session by a majority of two, ^ 
From J innah ' s point of view, t h i s absence of unanimity made i t 
impol i t ic for him t o open negotiat ions with the congress. He 
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ensured tha t the two organizations net in the same c i ty but 
he was not prepared to attend the a l l - p a r t i e s convention u n t i l 
a full session of the league had met. This a t t i t ude forced 
him into disagreement with Motilal who wished the league to 
meet after the convention so tha t i t could r a t i fy i t s decis ions . 
Jinnah was adament, however, t ha t authorization to attend the 
convention could not come from the council alone; and he also 
held t ha t subsequent Rat i f icat ion by the league, would not be 
necessary if adequate authorization was forthcoming in the f i r s t 
place. This difference of opinion caused some i l l - f e e l i n g 
between the two men and the a i r was only cleared when Sir Ali 
Imam helped them to coine to a compromise. The a l l pa r t i e s 
convention was t o begin on 22 December, as Nehru had planned, 
but i t s open session was to be held on 27 and 28 December, t o 
allow the league to send accredited represen ta t ives . The open 
session of the congress was to s t a r t on the 29th. 
Before the league met at Calcut ta , a powerful section of 
support had seded from i t . This was the khi lafa t section which 
had repudiated the N'ehru report - Shaukat Ali, Mahommad Ali , 
Shafi Daudi, Hasarat Wohani, Azad Shobhani and a section of the 
Jumait-ul-Ulama-i-hind under the leadership of Mufti Kifayat-
ul loh. The confrontation between these men and the ' n a t i o n a l i s t ' 
k h i l a f a t i s t s , which had been on the cards since the Lucknow 
sesr.ion of the a l l - p a r t i e s conference, came to a head during 
the chrismas week. By that s tage, Punjabi and Bengali opposition 
had convinced the Ali brothers tha t bold t a c t i c s were necessary 
21)^ 
to re ta in control of the organization. Mahommad Ali and H.S, 
Suhrrawardy, the Calcutta khi lafa t leader , broke up the Bengal 
provincial khi lafa t committee meeting and overruled the e lec t ion 
of delegates from the d i s t r i c t s to the annual session. Instead, 
quite uncons t i tu t iona l ly , they enrolled t h e i r own delegates from 
Calcut ta i t s e l f . The Ali brothers also succeded in banning 
the attendance of North West f ront ie r delegates elected by the 
Punjab khi la fa t committee, and they outraized the Bihar de le -
gation, Thesetac t ics gave them a majority in the annaul session 
but only at the cost of a s p l i t in the par ty . Dr. Ansari and 
his followers broke with the Ali brothers and cal led t h e i r 
bluf by e lect ing thei r own delegation to the a l l p a r t i e s 
convention. The Ali brothers responded by withdrawing from the 
convention e n t i r e l y . 
The muslim league meeting at Calcut ta was attended by 
Jinnah, the Raja of Mahmudabad and Sir Ali Imam, the old indepen-
dent t r i o , and by Ansari ' s t. khilaf a t i s t s . The session began 
with a note of warning from the chairman of the reception 
committee, Maulvi Abdul Karim, who argued tha t some form of 
special representat ion was essen t i a l for the protect ion of Muslim 
i n t e r e s t s , and i t continued with a plea for 'sweet reasonable-
ness* by the Raja, who made a strong case for Dominion s t a tus • 
ra ther than independence and urged his audience to e l ec t a 
delegation t o the a l l - p a r t i e s convention t o . s e t t l e outstanding 
communal issues on tha t b a s i s ' in the s p i r i t of broad minded 
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n e s s . ' On the second day, following a meeting of the subjects 
committee on the previous afternoon, Mr. M.C. Chagla, J innah ' s 
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disciple an fr iend, proposed a delegation to the a l l - p a r t i e s 
convention consisting of twenty persons, ten of whom had 
seceded from t^e khi lafat committee with Dr. Ansari, Haji 
Abdullah Haroon, the Karachi businessman, objected tha t the 
delegation only consisted of members of one party but he was 
cal led ' today' by Zafar Ali and no major changes were made. 
Two addi t ional delegates were added, however to give represen-
6Q t a t i on t o the f ron t ie r and Assam, 
The same afternoon, these Muslim League and khi la fa t 
delegates met a. sub-committee of the a l l - p a r t i e s convention. 
The demands which they put forward had not been discussed at 
the open session of e i the r organization. They were put forward 
jo in t ly by Jinnah and T.A.K. Sherwani. The demands were as 
follows. "^ ^ 
(1) That one-third of the e lected representa t ives of both the 
House of the Central Legislature should be Mussalmans, 
(2) That in the Punjab and Bengal, in the event of adult 
suffraze not being es tabl i shed , there should be reserva-
t ion of seats for the Musalmans on the population basis 
for ten years subject to a re-examination af ter tha t period, 
but they shal l have no r ight t o contest addi t ional s e a t s . 
(3)a. That residuary powers should be l e f t t o the provinces and 
should not res t with the centra l l e g i s l a t u r e . 
b. That clause 13A embodid in the supplementary report be 
deleted. 
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c. That the division of subjects in the schedule I and I I be 
revised. 
{A) That the const i tu t ion shal l not be amended or a l te red 
unless the amendment or a l t e ra t ion is passed f i r s t by 
both the houses of parliament separately by a majority 
of four- f i f ths of those present and then by both the 
houses in a jo in t s i t t i n g by a majority of f ou r - f i f t h s . 
(5) Art ic le V-communal representat ion . . . delete the words 
•simultaneously with the establishment of government 
under t h i s cons t i tu t ion . 
(6) Embody the pact regarding communal representat ion in 
Punjab in fu l l in the Nehru repor t . 
In a l l p robabi l i ty , Jinnah was responsible for the demand 
for t h i r t y three percent at the cent re . This had been one of 
h i s four proposals in March 1927 and he had every reason to 
s t ick to i t regorously, because h is muslim followers in the 
centra l assembly, and pa r t i cu l a r ly those from the minority 
provinces, had been very c r i t i c a l of the Nehru report on p re -
c ise ly t h i s point . J innah ' s i n s i s t ance , in defence of t h i s 
demand, tha t the ext ra seats should be d i s t r ibu ted to give 
weightage to the minority provinces, i s probably a r e f l ec t ion 
of his awareness of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
At l eas t three of the demands, however, appear to have 
come from the Punjab k h i l a f a t i s t s . This group had c lear ly been 
put out when the Nehru committee supplementary report made no 
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reference t o adult suffrage as a precondition for the introdu~ 
ction of jo in t e l ec to ra tes in t he i r province. This had been 
agreed at Lucknow and they wanted tha t agreement to be incorpo-
ra ted into the Nehru report in f u l l . The demand tha t the 
reservat ion of seats should be on a population basis if adult 
suffrage was not introduced also seems l ike ly to have come from 
them, though Jinnah may have prompted them to be r e a l i s t i c . 
F ina l ly , the demand tha t residuary powers should r e s t in the 
provinces cer ta in ly did come from them, as i t was put forward 
f i r s t in a l e t t e r from Ansari ' s khi lafa t faction to the a l l 
p a r t i e s convention, Jinnah for his pa r t , supported t h i s demand, 
but more out of necessity than of choice. Being in ten t on 
min i s t e r i a l power at the cent re , he did not wish the cen t r e ' s 
powers t o be eroded before he could enjoy them, and he only 
bowed to the Punjabi k h i l a f a t i s t s , as they had bowed before 
public opinion in t he i r own province, because he had no a l t e r -
na t ive . 
The reception given to these demands by the a l l - p a r t i e s 
convention sub-committee could have been safely predicted af ter 
a perusal of i t s personal of i t s th i r ty-seven members, eleven 
were Hindus, Sikhs and Christ ians of the Punjab, one was a 
leading opponent of the separation of Sind, and Six were lea^Jing 
l i gh t s of the Hindu Mahashabha. The demand for t h i r t y - t h r e e 
percent at the centre was supported by Gandhi and Sapru, but 
opposed by the Hindu Mahashabha and the Sikhs. The demand tha t 
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residuary powers should r e s t with the provinces was opposed 
by both the Mahasabha and the l i b e r a l federat ion, though both 
Sapru and Chintamani were prepared to re-examine the schedules 
of subjec ts . Neither Gandhi nor Motilal intervened during the 
discussion of t h i s most important poin t . The demand for r e s e r -
vation on a population basis in Bengal and Punjab if adult 
suffrage was not adopted was ski r ted by means of the formula, 
"We do not contemplate any such contigency. ' The demand regar -
ding Sind Was re jected on the grounds tha t i t involved a l t e r i ng 
the agreement reached at Lucknow, In the open session, Jinnah 
t r i e d to change the verdict of the committee. He to ld h i s 
audience tha t the modifications required were fair and reaso-
nable; tha t no country had succeeded in es tab l i sh ing i t s inde-
pendence without making provision for i t s minor i t i es ; and tha t 
a Hindu-Muslim settlement was e s s e n t i a l for the p o l i t i c a l 
71 progress of the country. Yet though he was supported by 
Dr. Sapru, he met with a highly reasoned opposition from 
Jayakar, who to ld the convention that Jinnah only represented a 
small minority of muslims and that i t was not worth-while making 
concessions because i t would make no difference t o the muslim 
community as a whole. Besides he sa id , Jinnah was on t h e i r side 
anyway, and would do h is best to bring the Muslim League with 
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him, J innah ' s reply shows how clear ly he rea l ized the i s o l a -
t ion of h is pos i t ion: 
" I t i s e s sen t i a l tha t you myst get not only the muslim 
league but the musalmans of India and here I am not speaking 
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as a musalman but as an Indian. And i t i s my desire t o see 
t h a t we get seven crores of musalmans to March along with us 
in the struggle 'for freedom. Would you be content i t I were 
t o say, I am with you ? Do you want or do you not want muslim 
73 India to go along with you ? 
I t was a good question. But Jayakar had already answered 
i t . The convention re jected J innah ' s offer and brought him to 
' the part ing of the ways, ' 
The circumstances responsible for forcing Jinnah in to the 
wilderness were extremely complex. They went for beyond the 
individual a t t i t udes of Mahasabha p o l i t i c i a n s . They re f lec ted 
the working of t h e p o l i t i c a l system i t s e l f . In the ear ly 1920s, 
though the forces of provincialism did occasionally impinge on 
the a l l - Ind ia scene, the r ea l confl ic t of i n t e r e s t between the 
' n a t i o n a l i s t ' po l i t i c i an and the provincial po l i t i c i an working 
the reforms was obscured by the absense of points of f r i c t i o n . 
Only vjhen the Montegu-Chemsfo^d reforms come under the hammer 
does t h i s confl ict of i n t e r e s t become e x p l i c i t . 
J innah ' s main d i f f icu l ty was that he had no sol id p o l i t i c a l 
base. He was a consultative po l i t i c i an in an age of p o l i t i c a l 
r e spons ib i l i ty . Consequently, however sincere h i s ' na t iona l i sm ' , 
he could only survive by acting as a broker between muslim 
p o l i t i c i a n s in the provinces and his congress coleagues at the 
cent re . He was not himself engaged in provincial p o l i t i c s . He 
merely attempted to fashion the provincial clay at h is disposal 
into a shape sui ted to h is a l l - I n d i a , purpose. His t a sk , however, 
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was like t ha t of a sculptor required to work in materials which 
constantly change the i r t ex tu re . As the provinces threw up 
new provincial demands, so, inc luc tab ly , Jinnahwas obliged to 
change his p o l i t i c a l objec t ives . In 1927, he put forward four 
proposals; in 1928, they became s ix , and in 1929, fourteen. 
Ult imately, negociation between Jinnah and the congress 
was no longer productive. Jinnah was looking over h i s shoulder 
at the provinces so much tha t he was no longer ac t ively engaged 
in the same ba t t l e as the congress. He was not prepared to 
accede to the congress programme merely as an individeial. He 
wanted to take a large body of muslims with him, yet those 
muslims whose a c t i v i t i e s forced Jinnah to a l t e r h is a l l - I n d i a 
negot ia t ing posit ion were the provincial opponents of the 
very men who swelled the ranks of the congress. Here was the 
heart of J innah ' s dillema. I t had ceased to be possible to 
occupy a centra l posit ion in Indian p o l i t i c s . One e i t he r had 
to be in the congress camp or the muslim camp. I t was t h i s logic 
which ul t imately turned Jinnah in to the Quaid-i-Azam of Pakis tan, 
But J innah ' s discomfiture at Calcutta was not the end of the 
s to ry . Jus t as the r i se of provincial muslim separatism had 
cut the ground from under the feet of the ' a l l - I n d i a p o l i t i c i a n . 
So was the Calcutta convention followed by the emergence of the 
All-India Muslim conference. Jus t as those congressmen favouTcing 
'independence • and non-co-operation were beginning t o replace 
the Nehru's and Saprus so the muslims of t he various l e g i s l a t -
ures gathered at Delhi to declare t h e i r al legiance to the 
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king emperor and the i r respect for cons t i tu t iona l norms. The 
Indian body p o l i t i c was being divided, government and muslims 
on one s ide , Hindus on the other. 
The idea of a conference of muslim l e g i s l a t o r s was f i r s t 
mooted by the Aga Khan in December 1927. But i t was not taken 
en thus ias t i ca l ly un t i l af ter the publicat ion of the Nehru repor t , 
at which stage cer tain of J innah ' s coleagues in the cent ra l 
assembly, notably Sir Mahommed Yakub and iVlr. Fazl Rahimtoolah, 
brought the scheme to f ru i t i on . They invi ted members of the 
l eg i s l a tu r e s and other prominent men to a conference at Delhi on 
31 December and they persuaded the Aga Khan to del iver the 
pres idencia l address. The Nehru report had made i t clear tha t 
muslims in the central assembly could no longer maintain an 
^independent' pos i t ion . By advocating jo in t e l ec to ra te s and 
abolishing weightage i t had reduced muslim representat ion in 
the minority provinces and made i t almost cer ta in tha t minority 
province muslim representat ion in the centra l assembly would 
also be reduced. These were suff ic ient reasons for such men 
t o want to make common cause with t h e i r provincial colleagues. 
Those who respond most readily to the i r i nv i t a t i on , however, 
were e i the r those who were highly organised already, the Punjab 
unionis ts under the leadership of Firoz Khan Noon and the U.P,, 
Muslims under Shafaat Ahmad Khan and Hafiz Hidayat Hussain, or 
those who had become d is i l lus ioned with the p o l i t i c s of confron-
t a t ion once i t became clear tha t J innah ' s negociations with the 
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congress would be f r u i t l e s s the frontiersmen, the Punjabi and 
Bengali urban c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s , the minority province kh i l a -
f a t i s t s and S indh i ' s . The appearance of a l l these different 
schools on the same platform was the most remarkable feature 
of the f i r s t meeting of the conference. That Mahommed Ali 
should s i t beside Sir Mahommed Shafi, whom he had so often 
derided as a government stooge, and t h a t the Aga Khan should 
be cheered by Azad Shobhani, whose v i t r i o l i c speeches at Kanpur 
in L913 had forced him to wash h is hands of the muslim league, 
were amongst the most del icious i ron ies of the Montegu-chemsford 
reforms. 
The terms put forward by the All-India muslim conference 
were a combination of unionist and U.P. Muslims demands: 
(1) Federal system with complete autonomy and residuary 
powers vested in the consti tuent s t a t e s . 
(2) No b i l l to be passed if 3/4 of the affected community 
i s against i t , 
(3) Separate e lec tora tes t o be retained u n t i l muslims decide 
to give them up. 
(4) Fair muslim share in the cabinets of provinces and the 
centre , 
(5) Where muslims const i tu te a majority of the population, 
t h e i r ascendancy may not be undermined by e l ec to ra l 
reorganisat ion. 
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(6) Where inuslims were in a minority, they shal l have no less 
representat ion than they do at present . 
(7) 339^  (Thir ly- three percent) representat ion in the cen t ra l 
l e g i s l a t u r e . 
(8) Separation of Sind. 
(9) Reforms in the North-West Frontier province and Baluchi-
s tan . 
(10) Same safeguards for Hindu minori t ies in rauslim provinces 
as for muslim minori t ies in Hindu majority ones. 
(11) Adequate share for muslims in the se rv ices . 
(12) Safeguards for the protect ion of muslim cul ture and 
education, language, re l ig ion and personal law. 
(13) No change in the const i tu t ion except with the assent of 
the federal l e g i s l a t u r e s . 
Of these demands 1 and 5 c lear ly came from the un ion i s t s , 
whereas 2 , 4 , 6, 11, 12 & 13 came from the U.P. muslims. 3 ,7 ,8 
and 9 were commonly demanded by both groups, 7 gaining added 
urgency as a r e su l t of the presence of several •a l l - Ind ia groups. 
I t i s s ignif icant that the U.P. muslim demands, though covering 
the same ground as those put forward at Kanpur, were shorn of 
the . hys te r ica l percentages which were a feature of t h a t 
occasion and given a more balanced and del ibera te look. 
in 
Atti tude of Muslim Leadership in U.P. to Simon Corrmission : 
After 1925 biglns the new phase - The phaseof confron-
t a t i o n . The muslim league, though ridden with fac t ional 
p o l i t i c s u n t i l Jinnah assumed i t s leadership in 1937, preffered 
t o s t ick t o the course of open and unabashed c r i t i c i sm of the 
congress po l ic ies and programmes for no other reason than to 
r e g i s t e r i t s opposition for the sake of opposit ion. What the 
congress did, the league did i t s opposite. When the congress 
decided t o boycott the Simon commission, a powerful section 
of the league welcomed i t . Morethan t h i s , the league now 
came forward with cer ta in fan tas t i c demands of i t s own so as 
t o beat the forces of nationalism with i t s s t i ck of communalism. 
The most agonising feature of the league p o l i t i c s now was tha t 
i t went to the extent of f ighting for i t s dommunal demands in 
the g a l l e r i e s of the Br i t i sh parliament without paying head t o 
the old maximum tha t mutual problems should not be discussed in 
the enemy's home. 
The Indian s ta tutory commission presided over by Sir Jon 
•7c 
A Simon -^  was constituted under a Royal warrant dated 26 Nov, 
1927, It was composed of seven trusted, well placed and expe-
rienced Englishmen - The chairman himself, Harry Lawson Webster, 
Oonald Sterling Palmer, Edward Cecil George Cadagon, Stephen 
Walsh, George Richard Lane Fox, and Clemant Richard Attlee.*^ ^ 
Its basis of appointment lay in section B4A of the government 
of India act, 1919, which provided that 'within' ten years after 
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i t s passage , 'The Sec re t a ry of s t a t e with the concurrence of 
both house of par l iament s h a l l submit for the approval of h i s 
majesty the nanfes of persons t o act as a commission' which 
a f t e r approval would i nqu i r e i n t o ' t he working of the system 
of government, the growth of educat ion and the development of 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s in B r i t i s h India and ma t t e r s conn-
ec t ed t h e r e w i t h , and t h e commission, s h a l l r e p o r t as t o 
whether and to what ex ten t i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e spons ib l e government . . . t hen e x i s t i n g t h e r e i n 
inc lud ing the ques t ion whether t h e e s t ab l i shmen t of second 
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chambers of the l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s i s or i s not d e s i r a b l e , ' 
The Indian s t a t u t o r y commission paid two v i s i t s t o I n d i a , 
the f i r s t one l a s t i n g from 3 February, 1928 t o 31 March, 1928 
and the second one from 11 October , 1928 to 13 A p r i l , 1929. 
The f i r s t ac t t h a t the chairman of the commission performed 
on a r r i v a l in India was to wr i t e a l e t t e r on Feb. 6 , 1928 t o 
h i s exelency the v iceroy and t h e r e in he unfold t h e scheme of 
a ' j o i n t f ree conference . ' This proposal was based on the s t a t e -
ment of h i s ma jes ty ' s Government th?jt the t a s k of the commission 
in t ak ing evidence would be g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d , if i t were t o 
i n v i t e t h e c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t u r e to appoint a j o i n t s e l e c t 
committee chosen from i t s e l e c t e d and nominated u n o f f i c i a l 
members. 
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This committee was merely to be a consultat ive body. The 
plan chalked out in the Chairman's l e t t e r to the viceroy was 
tha t the two houses of the cent ra l l eg i s l a tu re of India should 
const i tu te a jo in t committee consis t ing conveniently of seven 
members and each local l eg i s l a t i ve council should be asked to 
cons t i tu te a similar body, These committees of the Indian 
Legis la ture were to provide assistance to the Indian s ta tu tory 
commission. This step was represented to have been taken in 
the true i n t e r e s t s of India and great Bri tain a l ike . I t was 
spec i f ica l ly mentioned tha t the jo in t conferences were t o 
commence the i r work only on the second v i s i t of the Simon 
Commission. 
By the time the commission arrived again, committees, on 
the l ines indicated, had already been formed in a l l provinces 
except Burma and C.P. The co-operation of the centra l l e g i s l a -
ture was, however, not unreserved, the l eg i s l a t i ve assembly 
deciding to withhold support. But the viceroy short ly before 
the return of the commission had formed an Indian centra l commi-
t t e e Composed of the three elected members of the council of 
s t a t e , one more member of the same body and five members of the 
l eg i s l a t i ve assembly. The procedure adopted in each governor's 
province was one of reg is te r ing evidence and hearing witnesses 
by the jo in t conference, comprising the s ta tu tory commission, 
the Indian centra l committee, and the provincial committee. 
Witnesses were examined and evidence was taken in the presence 
of the p ress . The members and the minis ters of provincial govern-
ments were also associated with the jo in t conference. 
21^^ 
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Since evidence taken at Delhi concerned only the cent ra l 
matters , the jo in t conference was composed of the s ta tu tory 
commission and tl^e Indian Central Committee. The work performed 
was themendous and a number of places were v i s i t e d , "Evidence 
as taken," wrote the commissioner, "on 75 days in a l l , at the 
following p laces- Poena, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Delhi , 
Lucknow, Patna, Shil long, Calcut ta , Rangoon, Madalay, Madras 
and Nagpur, We have also v i s i t ed many other areas besides 
these pr incipal towns and have done our utmost t o make ouxsel-
81 ves more famiar with various par t s of Bri t ish India ." 
Shortly before the i r f ina l departure, the commissioners 
held a three days conference at Delhi and on t h i s occassion a l l 
the eight committees of provinces, the Indian cent ra l committee 
and the s ta tu tory commission sat together . Even when the 
commission returned home, i t s work was not suspended and the 
Indian cent ra l committee was cal led to England where o f f i c i a l s 
of the India office members of the secretary of s t a t e ' s council , 
the high commissioner for India and a representat ive of the war 
office consulted. The Chairman of the Indian s ta tuary commission 
shought permission of the prime minister for inves t igat ing and 
reporting on Indian s t a t e s because the cons t i tu t iona l develop-
ment o£ India presupposed considerations of r e l a t ions subs is t ing 
between Brit ish India and Indian s t a t e s and j . Ramsay Macdonald 
accorded t h i s permission on October 25, 1929. 
Above description should give an erroneous impression 
tha t the commission had a plain s a i l l i n g throughout i t s course 
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of invest igat ion of conditions and examination of evidence. 
So great was the agi ta t ion over t h e i r a r r i va l tha t even the 
commissioners were constrained to accept tha t "the purely 
Bri t ish composition of our own body roused resentment in many 
quar ters in I n d i a , . . . Regarding the arrangement of t h e i r 
report and the data they examined, the commissioners observed: 
"we have examined many schemes and suggestions. The material 
i s abundant, while i t i s true tha t we were denied the d i rec t 
testimony of some important bodies of Indian opinion, we have 
had the fu l les t opportunity of studying the repo^^t of the 
84 committee appointed by the Al l -pa r t i e s conference, 1928, and 
have not fai led to give due a t tent ion to i t s contents , and t o 
other s t i l l more recent exposit ions of contemporary Indian 
85 opinion." The lack of contact with representat ive bodies, 
including the Indian National Congress, not only handicapped 
the s ta tu tory commission in i t s grasp of p o l i t i c a l feel ings in 
India, but also demonstrated the degree of boycott the commissio-
ners experienced in t h i s country. 
Delivering his p res iden t ia l address at the Madras congress 
of 1927, M.A, Ansari voiced the feel ings of the people when he 
reffered to the s ta tutory commission in these words: "Keen 
disappointment and surprise have been expressed at the exclusion 
of India from i t s pe rsonne l , , . No same or self respect ing Indian 
can ever admit the claim of great Bri ta in to be the sole judge 
of the measure and timeof I n d i a ' s p o l i t i c a l advance. We alone 
know our needs and requirements best and ou r ' s must be the 
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86 decisive voice in the determination of our fu tu re , " Motilal 
Nehru the president of the Calcutta congress of 1928, observed^ 
"The Solemn promise of responsible government have found f u l f i l -
ment in that colosal fraud, the s ta tu tory commission which i s 
now careering along our s t r e e t s leaving bleeding heads and 
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broken bones behind," Answsring the v iceroy 's cha rac te r i -
sation of demonstrations af ter the return of the s ta tory 
commission to India as 'unmannerly and offensive, • he said t ha t 
such demonstrations "must in t h e i r very nature be offensive t o 
those against whom they are made, and i t i s hardly reasonable 
aa 
t o expect drawing room manners from a hos t i le crowd. 
This nat ional view point gives suf f ic ient indicat ion of 
the nature and degree of ag i ta t ion tha t resul ted from the v i s i t s 
of the s ta tu tory commission. In persuance of the resolut ion of 
boycott , non-co-operation and demonstrations passed in the 
forty second session of the Indian National Congress held at 
8Q Madras on 26 December 1927, an a l l - Ind i a ha r t a l was observed 
on February 3 , 1928. As a mark of protest against the Simon 
commission Bombay were a deserted appearance when the commission 
landed. Commission was greated with black f lags and the slogan 
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of "Simon go back." Wherever the commission went i t was acc-
orded a woi reception by the publ ic . 'A moster meeting of 
50,000 in Bombay attended by the moderate leaders solemnly 
resolved to boycott the commission in any shape or at any stage ' 
and in Madras the demonstration was marked by disorderly scenes 
in different par t s of the ci ty forcing the police t o open f i r e . 
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Now the a t t i tude of the muslim league towards Simon 
commission and emergence of J innah ' s leadership : - The Muslim 
league was at thfis time seriously threatend with a r i f t . 
Muhammad Shafi , a very inf luencia l muslim leader of Punjab, 
who had also acted as a member of the v iceroy ' s executive 
council , was chosen to preside over the ninteenth session of 
the All-India-Muslim League scheduled to be held in December, 
1927, Muhammad Shafi desired the session to take place at 
Lahore as decided by the executive of the league, but Jinnah 
and his friends were determind to hold i t any where except a t 
Lahore, A small majority in a special meeting of the council 
of the All-India muslim league at Delhi decided tha t i t should 
take place at Calcutta and, in the upshot, two separate sessions 
were held, one at Lahore under the presidentship of Muhammad 
Shafi , and the other at Calcutta under the presidentship of 
Muhammad Yakoob, Deputy president of the l eg i s l a t i ve assembly. 
The points of difference between Safi and Jinnah were, 
however, far-reaching. The former was in favour of supporting 
the Simon commission, whereas the l a t t e r had declared i t s 
boycott . But even t h i s does not explain the whole s i t ua t i on . 
The crux of the matter lay in the fact tha t i t was Jinnah who 
received the league in December, L924 after a period of quies-« 
cence and he continued to be one of i t s dominating p e r s o n a l i t i e s . 
I t was inev i t ab le , the re fore , tha t there should be a clash of 
CO 
some Sort between him and Shafi, 
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Under the c i rcumstances , the a t t i t u d e of the two l eaguer s 
was pre-deter tnined and could e a s i l y be p r e d i c t e d . At the 
C a l c u t t a s e s s i o n ' o f the league on the motion of Ali Imam and 
a f t e r t he speeches of Yakub Hasan, Mrs. Besant and Muhammad 
A l i , the following r e s o l u t i o n was unanimously c a r r i e d : "The 
Al l - India-Musl im League emphat ica l ly d e c l a r e s t h a t the s t a t u t o r y 
commission and the procedure as announced are unacceptab le t o 
the people of Ind i a , I t t h e r e f o r e , r e s o l v e s t h a t the Musalmans 
throughout the country should have nothing t o do with the commi-
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ss ion at any s tage and in any form. 
The Lahore sess ion of the League r epud ia t ed the dec i s ion 
of non-co-opera t ion with t h e commission taken by the Madras 
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congress and a d e f i n i t e r e s o l u t i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t was c a r r i e d . 
Th i s dual po l i cy adopted by the muslim community a t t he e a r l y 
s tage of t h e Simon commission, however, be t rayed a lack of 
concer ted a c t i o n . I t was t r u e t h a t one s e c t i o n of t h e d iv ided 
muslim l eague , Jamia t -u l -Ulema, A l l - I n d i a k h i l a f a t committee, 
and most of the muslim l e a d e r s ( l i k e M.A. J i n n a h , Sir Ali Imam, 
Sayyid HaSan Imam, the Hon'ble Maharaja of Mahmudabad, Shaheb-
jada Afatab Ahmad Khan, Maulana Mohammad A l i , Shaukat A l i , Abul 
Kalam Azad and o t h e r s ) a r rayed themselved in t h e oppos i t ion t o 
the commission. 
But the view of Maulvi Muhammad Yakub t h a t i t "appears t h a t 
propaganda for co-opera t ion with t h e Simon commission in i t s 
p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n i s ga in ing moiQ favour with t h e musalmans 
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than with t h e Hindus" can hard ly be d i spu ted . ' The p a r t i a l 
boycot t of the commission by the muslims did not involve s u r r -
ender of t h e i r ' b a s i c demand and even the J innah f a c t i o n of the 
League a t C a l c u t t a on January 1, 1928 worded i t s r e s o l u t i o n 
t h u s : "That in the p re sen t c i rcumstances the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
muslims in the d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t u r e s of t h e country through 
sepr^rate muslim e l e c t o r a t e s i s i n e v i t a b l e and t h a t the muslims 
w i l l not accept any scheme involv ing the su r render of t h i s 
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valued r i g h t un less and u n t i l Sind i s a c t u a l l y s e p a r a t e d , e t c . 
With t h i s ou t look , the muslim support t o n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s 
Could not but be s t i n t e d , though i t cannot be denied t h a t the 
boycot t of t he s t a t u t o r y commission by a s e c t i o n of the f a c t i o n -
r idden muslim was suppor ted . 
Now the a n a l y s i s by C.F. Andrews about the causes of 
boycott by the I n d i a n s : He po in ted out t h a t l o rd Birkenhead, 
t he Secre ta ry of S t a t e , " i n s t e a d of appoint ing a mixed commiss-
ione on which Indian and B r i t i s h should serve j o i n t l y under a 
B r i t i s h member of par l iament as chairman, nominated a commission 
of seven members drawn so le ly from t h e B r i t i s h r a c e , " Apart 
from t h e p o l i t i c a l annoyance of t h i s cour se , i t was regarded 
as a r a c i a l i n s u l t t o have ignored Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on a 
commission t h a t was t o decide t h e fu tu re c o n s t i t u t i o n of Indi 'a . 
I t happened t h a t j u s t a t the time of the appointment of the 
Simon commission race f ee l ing was running very high in the E a s t . " 
To r ide - rough-shod over n a t i o n a l sent iment and appoint a pure ly 
B r i t i s h commission on a sub j ec t s so V i t a l l y and i n t i m a t l y a f f e c -
t i n g India was sure ly asking for t r o u b l e . " ^ ^ 
^^^ 
I t was, however, on the side of recommendations tha t the 
report was most disappointing. I t feel far short of the count-
r y ' s needs and* expectat ions. I t betrayed lack of understanding 
the young India which was r i s ing up in a nat ional upheaval. 
Inspi te of the fa i lure of non-co-operation movement, i t s effect 
was a very powerful p o l i t i c a l awakening leading t o a longing 
iov Swaraj. 
Though the commissioners professed t o have come in contact 
with the na t iona l i s t point of view and though the Indian centra l 
committee also la id special claims of get t ing "ample opportuni-
100 t i e s of acguainting themselves with the sentiments of the group, 
the fact remains tha t the real India was le f t unrevealed to them 
and, hence t he i r recommendations f e l l considerably short of the 
rea l aspira t ion of the publ ic . To choose only one example, the 
proposal of federal s t ructure for India was not in consonance 
with the national desire of the t ime. The language of the report 
could be interpreted as calculated towards the vivisect ion of 
the country. For example, i t was la id down in the repor t : " I t 
might be possible to v isua l i se the future of federation in India 
as the bringing into re la t ionship of two separate federa t ions , 
one compose'd of the elements which make up Bri t ish India , the 
other of the Indian s t a t e s , "^  However, the chief flaw of tl^e 
s ta tutory commission report was best represented by Prof. Herald 
Laski. He s t a t ed : "As a piece of ana lys i s , i t s f ina l ly meshed 
s t ruc ture could hardly be b e t t e r e d . , , Everything i s there save an 
understanding of the Indian mind.. . Gandhi, who has set half India 
a flame with new dreams, i s dismissed as an administrat ive i n c i -
dent of which the significance is never seen. You cannot deal 
with the hopes of a people as though they were studies in l o g i c . ^ ^ 
m 
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CHAPTER - IV 
A^USLI^ AS ATTITUDE AND LEADERSHIP IN U .P . 
BETWEEN 1930 - 1937 
Muslim P o l i t i c s in U.P. During Civi l Disobedience and Round 
Table Conferences : 
The his tory of the three round table conferences may 
conveniently be taken from the date of the decision t o form the 
Simon commission. Ramsay Macdonald, the then prime minister 
(Br i ta in) delivering h is speech at the f ina l plenary session of 
the conference, made t h i s point absolutely c lear . He said: 
"When tha t commission was appointed, we a l l leaders of the three 
p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s were agreed tha t when the Bri t i sh government 
came to consider the r epor t , i t came to give i t a legal and 
cons t i tu t iona l value at some time or other , and somehow a consu-
l t a t i o n would have to take place between the representat ive of 
the Bri t i sh parliament and the representat ives of Indian opinion; 
and tha t i s why you are here ." I t had been announced tha t 
af ter the examination of the Simon repor t , his majesty's govern-
ment Would be duty bound to present proposals to parliament. 
But i t i s not the in tent ion of his majesty's government to ask 
parliament to adopt these proposals without f i r s t giving a ful l 
opportunity for Indian opinion of different schools t o con t r i -
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bute its view upon them," 
It was, indeed, the British anxiety to placate all shades 
of political opinions in India that the round table conference 
were called and, with that end in view, nothing was more reaso-
nable than to contemplate the possibility of a thorough discu-
ssion with the representatives of Indian opinion. On this basis 
alone, any constitutional structure could have the possibility 
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of endurance for some time. But the announcement of the v ice -
roy (Lord Irwin) made on 31 October, 1929 giving Bri t ish in ten-
t ion a de f in i t e shape, was more precise and exact . I t s main 
promise was tha t "the Bri t ish Government would invi te represen-
t a t i v e s of different pa r t i e s and i n t e r e s t s in Bri t ish India an9" 
Indian s t a t e s t o meet in a round tab le conference for discussion 
of the Indian problem,^ 
Behind a l l these promises, however, there was the national 
movement in the country. The s i tua t ion became menacing for the 
government of India. The non-co-operation movement had ended 
in fa i lure for a l l outward purposes, but i t had l e f t a permanent 
impress. I t had developed national courage and provided t ra in ing 
in organising agi ta t ion through out the country. I t kept alive 
the f i re of nat ional enthusiasm which found expression in the 
boycott of the Simon commission and the preparation of a Swaraj 
cons t i tu t ion . All t h i s must have served as an eye-opener t o 
Br i t i sh diplomats and the aforesaid announcement of the viceroy 
was in the nature of th ings , "The Calcutta congress in December, 
1928, had resolved tha t in case the Br i t i sh government did not 
accept the Nehru repor t , which provided that the India should 
have the s ta tus of a Dominion within a year by 31 December, 1929, 
the congress would give up the report and i n s i s t on complete 
independence. 
The period of t h i s ultimetum was fast approaching comple-
t i o n . In view of the past experience of agi ta t ion in Ind ia , 
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nothing was more diplomatic than to avert the catastrophe by a 
bold pronouncement of a conference in London, The viceroy 
reffered to Sir John Simon's l e t t e r t o the Premier in which the 
proposal for such a conference was embodied. The expected 
happend at f i r s t and within twenty four hours of the announce-
ment leading person.qlities ( l ike Madan Mohan ^Aalviya, T.R, 
Sapru and Mrs. Besant) assembled at Delhi and af ter deep consi-
dera t ion, the mixed gathering came to conclusions which were 
embodied in a manifesto in which the s ignator ies "expressed the i r 
appreciation of the s incer i ty underlying the declaration as also 
the desire of the Bri t ish government t o placate Indian opinion." 
This move on the part of Bri t ish statesmanship was cer ta inly a 
ba i t thrown to na t iona l i s t aspi ra t ions and the subsequent his tory 
of the Indian cons t i tu t ional developments bears testimony of the 
i l lusory character of the pronouncement. 
In the December session of 1929 held at Lahore, the most 
important problem for the congress was to arrive at a decision 
for p o l i t i c a l act ion. It was r igh t ly observed tha t "the one 
top ic on which the const i tu t ion laboured for over two ful l days 
was Mr, Gandhi's resolut ion recommending the re jec t ion of the 
offer of the Round table conference, the def ini t ion of Swaraj 
as complete independence, the boycott of councils , and the . 
launching of a c i v i l disobedience campaign," The opposition 
t o t h i s was rea l ly very vehement and disruption of the congress 
as expected at every moment. But the subjects committee, after 
a prolonged discussion and heated debate, passed (by 187 votes 
77) Gandhi's main resolut ion on independence and council boycott. 
w 
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Jawaharlal Nehru's p res iden t ia l address at the Lahore 
congress of L929 was an intense plea for complete independence. 
He r ight ly argoed that in view of the non-fulfilment of the 
condition of the Calcutta reso lu t ion , the Nehru report (which 
aimed only at Dominion s ta tus and not complete independence) 
should be scrapped. I t was true tha t Mahatma Gandhi's resolu-
t ion of boytott of the Round table conference and the asser t ion 
t o complete independence did not have an immediate r e s u l t . But 
i t s f ina l adoption indicated a healthy a t t i tude of the nat ional 
mind. The congress therefore , not only did not have to do any-
thing with the round table conference, but also busied i t s e l f 
with the c iv i l disobedience movement. The independence reso lu-
t ion of the working committee vjas read over in public meetings 
a l l over the country on 26 January, 1930, the 'Purna Swaraj day ' . 
The Mahatama Gandhi s ta r ted his famous March for manufactu-
ring sa l t inviolat ion of s a l t laws, reaching Dandi for the purpose 
on 5 Apr i l , 1930. Salt was actual ly prepared on 6th April and 
i t was tha t then the c iv i l disobedience movement began in fu l l 
swing. Under the circumstance?, the congress a t t i tude t o the 
round table conference can bet ter be imagined. The congress 
delegates t o t h i s conference were conspicuous by t h e i r absence 
in plenary session. The Bri t ish Premier Said : "I regret 
profoundly that important sect ions of the Indian p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y are not here too . " 
The muslim a t t i tude to the round tab le conference may at 
once be described as one of co-operation. The muslim s p l i t of 
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L927 was not bridged even by 1929. I t i s true tha t twelve 
months l a t e r , a special gathering of Indian Mohammedans, known 
as the All-Musiim pa r t i e s conference, assembled in Delhi and 
passed ser ies of very important r e so lu t ions . But at the same 
t ime, i t must also be accepted that " i t le f t no permanent orga-
n i sa t ion behind i t and by the winter of 1929, the two winqs of 
the or iginal muslim league had not recombined. The resu l t was 
t h a t "no rea l ly representat ive muslim gathering took place. 
But for t h i s reason, i t would be wrong to asser t tha t the 
muslim outlook on the proposed, conference cannot be gauged. 
Jinnah, for example, welcomed the viceregal announcement and 
suggested that the inv i ta t ion t o the round table conference 
g 
"should be responded to without any condition." The Delhi 
conference of prominent politicians, held immediately after the 
viceregal statement, desired amnesty to political prisioners and 
a truely representative and national character of the personnel 
of the round table conference along with its appreciation of 
the proposal. But Jinnah's was an unqualified support to it, 
irrespective of the fulfilment of any conditions whatsoever, 
Saiyid Matlub Hasan, the biographer QF Jinnah, observes; 
"Mohammad Ali Jinnah had seen the abrudity of such an attitude 
from the very beginning and wrote to Motilal Nehru that the . 
principle of the Round Table Conference should be accepted and 
details outlined in the Delhi manifesto could be adjusted 
later, particularly in view of the bitter criticism by the House 
of Lords of the progressive policy of Labour government regarding 
India."^ 
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Nor was Jinnah alone in the f ie ld to support the round 
table conference, the All India Khilafat conference which 
commenced i t s - s i t t i n g on 31 December, 1929 under the Pres ident -
ship of Nawab Ismail Khan also welcomed i t . ' The president was 
happy tha t the announcement regarding the round tab le conference 
and t rus ted that the Musalmans would avai l themselves of the 
opportunity of s t ress ing t h e i r view point . I t i s s igni f icant 
t h a t , besides the Ali brothers and Abdul Qadir among the promi-
nent presentees , there was also Muhammad Shafi (The Punjab 
Muslim Leaguer) who had set up an independent league in his 
province in protes t against J innah ' s d i c t a t o r i a l conduct. The 
Uiiama meeting ici conference at Kanpur on 23 December, 1929 under 
the presidentship of Maulana Muhammad Ali condemned the Nehru 
report and gave adherence t o the proposal of the Round Table 
Conference. But a condition was attached to the i r support. The 
conference of the Ulama expressed i t s fa i th in the proposed round 
tab le conference only if such muslims were selected to represent 
t h e i r community as were rea l ly worshippers of the Shariat and 
in t e rp re t e r s of the i r own community's r ight and i n t e r e s t s . 
The a l l - Ind i a Muslim conference meeting at Lahore on December 
30, and 31 , 1929 also welcomed the viceregal announcement of the 
Round table conference. But i t was made plain tha t the muslim 
representat ion should be by men "who t r u l y represent the commu-
n i t y , respect the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the Islamic law, possess the 
confidence of the i r co - re l ig ion i s t s and give t rue expression to 
t h e i r views and sentiments. 
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Thus i t i s clear that whereas the Lahore session of cong-
ress (December 1929) was marked by the decision t o obstain from 
pa r t i c ipa t ion in the round table conference, a l l important 
muslim leaders and organisat ions declared themselves in favour 
of complete co-operation with the pro jec t . In consequence, a l l 
important muslim leaders composed the muslim personel of 
delegates to the round table conference as H.H. the Aqa Khan, 
Maulana Muhammad Ali , M.A. Jinnah and Muhammad Shafi being 
special ly noteworthy as representa t ives of the view point of 
important muslim organisat ion. 
There were three sessions of the Indian round t ab le confe-
rence held in London, F i r s t , from 12 Nov. 1930 t o 19 Jan. L931. 
Second, from 7 Sept. 1931 to 1 Dec. 1931. Third, L7 Nov. 1932 
to 24 Dec. 1932. To discuss the problems nine sub committees had 
been se t up under these heads:- Federal s t r uc tu r e , provincial 
cons t i tu t ion , minor i t ies , Burma, North-West f ron t ie r provinces. 
Franchise, Defence services and Sind, 
The proposals of communal safeguards was the main point 
from the muslim leaders , insp i te of the fact that a committee 
was specia l ly entrusted with the work of examining the minority 
question were communal vi tuperat ions could best be expressed, 
Muhammad Shaft observed, "unfortunately t ha t hope, has not been 
rea l i sed and therefore i t has become absolutely e s sen t i a l for 
me to make declaration tha t in the words of the resolut ion 
adopted by the All-India-Muslim conference held at Delhi on 31 
December, L927 and 1 January, 192R, 'no cons t i tu t ion by whomso-
ever devised, shal l be accepted by the Indian musalmans unless 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t are adequately safeguarded in the cons1i.tution."-'L-l-
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Jinnah was no less emphatic when he sa id : "I maintain 
tha t the Hindu-Muhammedan settlement i s a condition precedent 
. . . before any Constitution can be completed for the government 
of India , and I maintain tha t unless you orovide safeguards for 
the musalmans tha t wi l l give them a complete sense of secur i ty 
and a feeling of confidence in the future cons t i tu t ion of the 
government of India and unless you secure t h e i r co-operation and 
wil l consent, no const i tu t ion tha t you frame for India wi l l work 
12 for 24 hours ." As a sequel to muslim a c t i v i t i e s and u t t e rances , 
the Round table conference at the f ina l pl inary session held on 
19 J a n . , 1931 unanimously adopted a resolut ion admitting, i t e r 
a l i a , muslim claims of 'adequate safeguards' to be incorporated 
in to the future const i tu t ion of India. 
Even the second session (Sept. 7 - Dec. 1, 1931) of the 
round t ab l e conference attended by Mahatma Qandhi in counsequence 
of a t rue (between Lord Irwin for the government of India and 
Mahatma Gandhi on behalf of the congress) did not improve the 
Communal or federal posit ion in any way. The chief vjork was 
t ransacted by two sub committees - i^ederal s t ructure and mino-
r i t i e s which scrut inised and 'amplified the repor ts presented 
by the corresponding sub-committees at the f i r s t session, ' 
Mahatma Gandhi was a members of both these sub-committees and, 
much was expected towards easing the s i t u a t i o n . But the expected 
did not mater ia l ise and the communal question remained as puzzl-
ing as before, Ramsay MacDonald, the chairman of the minor i t ies 
(second session) remarked in his opening speech in the committee: 
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"when we met l a s t , the oroblem of minor i t i e s , I candidly -
confess, and I am sure those of you who were with me then must 
a lso candidly confess, baffled us . We could not come to a 
solution of the diff icul t ies ."^-^ A week adjournment was asked 
for v/ith a view to arr ive at an amicable settlement of the 
communal problem by a process of free and hearty consultat ion 
between the leaders of the various committees. 
At the end of the week (8 Oct. 1931), Mahatma Gandhi 
announced his fa i lu re in the matter . He sa id : "Prime Minister 
and f r i ends , i t i s with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation tha t 
I have t o announce u t t e r fa i lu re on my par t to secure an agreed 
solution of the communal question through informal conversations 
among and with the representa t ives of different groups. I 
appoloqise t o you, Mr. Prime Minister , and the other coleagues 
for the waste of a precious week." Mahatma Gandhi, however, 
presented before the sub-committee the congress solution of the 
communal problem and emphasised the congress claim ' to represent 
the whole nat ion. ' According to the congress scheme, safeguards 
for minori t ies would be incorporated in to the fundamental r igh t s 
of the future const i tu t ion of India. There would be proviaion 
for the protect ion of the i r cu l tu re , languages, sc r ip t s educat-
ion, profession and pract ice of r e l ig ion and r e l i g ious endowne-
nts e t c . , and franchise would also be extended t o a l l adult men 
and women. 
While speaking in the minorities committee, Gandhi assured 
the reservat ion of the seats for the Hindus in Sind, for the 
muslims in Assam and for the Sikhs in the Punjab and northrwest 
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f ront ier provinces, and for Hindus and Muslims in any province 
where they were less than 25 percent of the population. I t 
would be done on the basis of population vdth the r ight to 
contest 'addi t ional s e a t s . ' The condition of the untouchables, 
he promised, would be bet tered by the most d ras t i c l e g i s l a t i o n . 
He openly sa id: "Thank God, the conscience of Hindu has been 
s t i r r e d , and untouchabil i ty wi l l soon be a r e l i c of our s inful 
pas t . "^^ 
He also examined the causes of fa i lure of communal s e t t l e -
ment and r ight ly ascribed i t to ' the cotnposition of the Indian 
delegation, ' He observed: "We are almost a l l not e lec ted 
representa t ives of the pa r t i e s or groups whom we are presumed 
t o represent . We are here by nomination of the government, 
Wuharamad Shafi attempted t o refute Mahatma Gandhi's 
contention of the non-representative character of the delegates 
at the second Round Table conference. Regarding the congress 
scheme of the future const i tu t ion of India , he observed tha t i t 
had met i t s fate along with the Nehru report and i t was 'no 
use reffering to tha t resolut ion here. 
Speaking in the tenth maeting of the minori t ies committee 
held on 13 November, 1931, Gandhi reminded the prime minister of 
the assurance given to the Indians before the round tab le confe-
rence and sa id : "I am quite cer ta in t h a t you did not convene 
t h i s Round Table Conference and bring us a l l six thousand miles 
away from our homes and occupations to s e t t l e the communal 
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question, but you convened os , you made del ibera te declara-
t ions t na t we were invi ted to come here, to share the process 
of const i tut ion bu i ld ing . . . Now at the present moment, we are 
face to face with a wholly different s i t ua t i on , namely, t ha t 
because there i s no communal settlement agreed to by us , there 
1 f\ i s no building of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . " The second report of 
the minori t ies committee, however, reffered t o the various 
suggestions that the Bri t ish government should s e t t l e the 
dispute on i t s own author i ty . Afterall Br i t i sh Government 
assumed t h i s authori ty and made provision for minori t ies safe-
guards in the const i tut ion of 1935 vMhich was super imposed on 
us by an imper ia l is t power. 
The Government of India Act L935 and Muslim Leadership in U.P. ; 
The government of India act 1935 was the resu l t of brisk 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s expanded over a long span of t ime. I t vjas 
the product of long discussion and ul t imately of compromise bet-
ween contending ideologies of Br i t i sh imperialism on the one 
hand and Indian nationalism on the other "The Simon Commission 
report of 1930, the Indian round table conferences held in 
London between 1930-1932, the white paper on proposals for 
Indian cons t i tu t iona l reforms, 1933, the j o in t se lec t committee 
report on the white paper proposals , 1934 - these served as the 
basis for determining the new const i tu t ion of India ."^^ 
Three important pr inc ip les in the act of 1935 comprised 
'All India federat ion, provinciBl Autonomy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
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with safeguards. ' Now our main point i s communal safeguards. 
The Act of 1935 represented the most in t e res t ing features in 
so far as i t was influenced by the muslim league p o l i t i c s . In 
order fully to understand t h i s contention, i t i s desirable t o 
go l i t t l e back in h i s to ry . The communal policy of aloofness 
from the Hindus had been marring Hindu-Muslim r e l a t i ons from 
1857 onward. The period of the khi la fa t movement ce r ta in ly 
const i tuted an exceptional stage of Hindu-Muslim unity and, 
when i t ended in a f a i l u r e , there was once again reversion to 
the old policy of i so la t ion and even antagonism. A basic reso-
lut ion was, therefore , carr ied on January 1 1929, in the 
inaugural meeting of the All - India I4jislim Conference under the 
leadership of His Highness the Aga Khan, which contended that 
the muslim community would not accept any cons t i tu t iona l frame 
v<ork, if i t s demands were l e f t unconceded, 
A peep into demands of the muslim community bears t e s t i -
mony to the intense feeling of separatism and i t i s e s s en t i a l to 
reproduce them here in the words of Shafat Ahmad Khan. "These 
demands included a majority for the muslim ccmmunity in the 
Punjab and Bengal, separation of sind from Bombay the in t roduc-
t ion of genuine provincial autonomy, int toduct ion of equal i ty 
of s ta tus for the north-west f ront ie r province, weightage fo» 
muslims in the l eg i s l a tu res of a l l provinces where they are in 
a minority, fundamental safeguards for the protection of the i r 
r e l i g ion , culture and c i v i l r i g h t s , representat ion of the 
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community by separate e l e c t o r a t e s , adequate representat ion in 
the public services , and residuary powers to be vested in the 
provinces."^® The Delhi resolut ion of the All-Indian muslim 
conference brought about unity in a l l sect ions of the Indian 
muslims and put them on a single platform. 
The re su l t of the muslim demands was tha t the minor i t ies 
problem proved insoluble . In consequence the communal award 
was issued by His Majesty's government on August 4 , 1932. The 
basis of t h i s award was l a id down in these words: "I wil l be 
recal led tha t owing to the fa i lu re of various communities to 
reach any agreement on the subject , p r inc ipa l ly because of a 
rad ica l divergence of opinion on the v i t a l question of separate 
e l ec to ra t e s and the d i s t r ibu t ion of communal s e a t s . His maje-
s t y ' s government themselves re luc tan t ly undertook the task of 
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devising a scheme for the composition of the new l e g i s l a t u r e s . " 
The Communal award was highly detested in India, Rabind-
ranath Tagore, the great poet, could not r e s t r a in h i s feeling 
and sent a telegram to Madan Mohan Malviya. "You all. know tha t 
I have always disapproved of the corrmunal award, I hope our 
leaders wil l join the i r forces to save from i t s paralysing 
grip the p o l i t i c a l in tegr i ty of the n a t i o n . " ^ 
I t i s in te res t ing to note tha t the communal award was 
said to be the r e su l t of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Aga Khan. The 
ed i to r of a leading monthly paper commented: "From pr ivate 
advices received from London, we are in a posi t ion to s t a t e 
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that H.H. The Aga Khan has a great deal to do with it." The 
Aga Khan kept M.A. Ansari informed of all developments and 
this accounts for the latter's changed attitude of neutrality 
from one of complete opposition to the Award. It was further 
stated: "The London correspondent of the 'Daily Sun' wired to 
that paper on 6 August 16, that frequent references between 
the Aga Khan and Mr. Jinnah, who is in Europe, were taking 
place. "-^ ^ 
Under the circumstances, i t does not require any special 
logic to conclude tha t the government of India Act 1935 was 
considerably influenced by the muslim community and i t s a c t i v i -
t i e s . The All-India Muslim League and the All-India-Muslim 
conference supported the white paper and the communal award. 
I t i s f u t i l e to argue, as the edi tor of the 'modern review' 
did in h i s emthusiasm, tha t these two muslim organisat ions 
commanded ins igni f icant influence because the muslim masses, 
eas i ly influenced by catchwords, followed t h e i r lead. The 
subsequent his tory of the league i t s e l f c lear ly indicated i t s 
l ight grip over the community. I t was in response to the 
muslim demands expressed on many occassions tha t the separate 
e lec to ra te system was not only re ta ined but also made firm. 
Safeguards of a similar nature were introduced for other mino-
r i t y communities. The language of the act leaves no doubt as 
t o the provision for communal disharmony. For example, i t was 
la id down: "No person shal l be included in the e l ec to ra l role 
for a Sikh constituency, a Muhammadan consti tuency, an Anglo-
Indian constituency, a European Constituency, or an Indian 
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chr is t ian constituency unless he is a Sikh, a Muslim, an Anglo-
23 Ind ian , a European or an Indian c h r i s t i a n , as t h e case may b e . " 
Weightage and r e s e r v a t i o n of s e a t s provided in the Act 
a l so r e f l e c t on the B r i t i s h po l i cy of winning good w i l l of t h e 
muslim community in Ind ia . In accordance with the government 
of India Act, ( r e s o l u t i o n of 4 J u l y 1934) 25 percent of the 
vacanc ies were reserved for muslims and 8.5 pe rcen t for o ther 
m i n o r i t i e s . In the absence of s u i t a b l e cand ida tes from the 
l a t e r , a l l r e s idua ry vacancies of t h i s category would a l s o be 
rese rved for the muslims. A comment on t h i s arrangement . "In 
a l l c i v i l i s e d c o u n t r i e s t h e ru l e i s r e c r u i t the a b l e s t men fo r 
the pub l i c c e r v i c e s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of c reed . In I n d i a , govern-
ment has encouraged the not ion t h a t i t i s not a b i l i t y t h a t 
counts but t he government jobs must be given by prefe rence t o 
European?, Anqlo Indians and muslims Indians according t o 
c e r t a i n f ixed minimum percentage in add i t ion t o what they can 
get by complet ion. For t h e muslims a minimum of 25 percen t has 
24 been f ixed . But they now want 33.5 p e r c e n t . . . " 
\'Vith these p r o v i s i o n s , the B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n t o appease 
the m i n o r i t i e s in genera l and muslims in p a r t i c u l a r was c a l c u l a -
t e d , i n t e r a l i a i t o widen the breach between the two communitieG. 
Small wonder t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1935 f a i l e d to 
win the approbat ion of n a t i o n a l i s t I nd i a , I t was observed. "To 
c a l l the new c o n s t i t u t i o n ' aned i f i ce of popular self governrrent ' 
25 i s a f l a g r a n t misuse of words ," Reffer ing t o an American view 
on t h e s u b j e c t , i t was commented: " I t has been admit ted even in 
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Britain by members of the Tory government also t h a t the new 
cons t i tu t ion , vmich is going to be imposed on India , has been 
generally dis l iked and condemned by the Indians and that even 
the Muhammadans, who among Indian cofnmunities have been favoured 
most, have not bestowed unmixed praise upon i t . " 
The connress-league confl ict of ideas at t h i s stage was 
best ref lec ted in the league 's a t t i tude towards the Act of 193'.. 
The basic demands of the muslim community were well high s a t i s -
fied through i t . Separate e l ec to r a t e , reservation of sea t s and 
weightage were admitted as powerful safeguards for the muslims 
and they vjere provided in the Act. In the acceptance of the 
communal avjard lay the germs of narrow communalism. In the 
centra l l eg i s l a t i ve assembly. 'A'nich s ta r ted i t s session on 
January 21 , 1935, J innah ' s resolution was carr ied to the effect 
tha t the communal Award should be accepted ' u n t i l a subs t i tu te 
i s agreed upon by toe various co:nmunities concerned. ' Inspi te 
of t h i s , the league also vigorously condemned the Act of 1935. 
But i t was in other d i rec t ions that i t did so. An important 
difference between the ideas of tnese organisat ions league i s 
thus represented: "The congress had re jected the whole of the 
Act. The league, which denouncinn the 'safeguards ' as making 
responsible government 'nugatory ' , recommended tha t having 
regarded to the conditions prevail ing at present in the country, 
the provincial scheme of the const i tu t ion be u t i l i s e d for what 
i t i s worth. 
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This difference i s well expressed in the proceedings of 
the Lucknow congress held on April 12, 1936 and those of the 
All-India-Muslim League vMhich met at Bombay for i t s 24th 
session on April 11, 1936. In his p res iden t ia l address Jawahar 
Lai said : "Our a t t i tude towards ttie new India Act can only be 
one of uncompromising h o s t i l i t y and a constant endeavour to end 
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i t . " ^ ^ 
The league 's session presided over by Sayyid V^azir Hasan 
was characterised by a s p i r i t of opposition to cer ta in pa r t s of 
the Act. The president remarked: "A const i tu t ion i s l i t e r a l l y 
being forced on us by the Bri t i sh parliament which nobody l iken, 
which no one aoproves of. After several years of commissions, 
r epor t s , conferences and committees, a monstrosity has been 
invented and i s being presented to India in the garb of t h i s 
28 const i tu t ion Act." In h is resolution on the cons t i tu t ion , 
Jinnah condemned the All-India -ederal scheme of the cent ra l 
government as most react ionary, re t rograde, injurious and fa t a l 
to the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of Bri t ish India. Vi/hile moving h i s 
resolu t ion , he made i t also plain tha t the new const i tu t ion 
embodied only 2 percent respons ib i l i ty and 98 percent safeguards, • 
But with a l l h is c r i t i c i sm, he spec i f ica l ly said in h i s r e so lu t -
ion; "The league considers t h a t , having regard to the conciitions 
prevai l ing in the country, the provincial scheme of the cons-
t i t u t i o n be u t i l i s e d for what i t is worth insp i te of the most 
objectionable features contained there in which render rea l 
controlf r espons ib i l i ty of the ministry and the l eg i s l a tu re over 
oo the en t i r e f ie ld of government and administrat ive nugatory." 
Apart from these cleavage of thought and a t t i tude towards 
the act of 1935, a reference to the ever-recurr ing malady of 
communal r i o t s should also be made, as i t c lear ly indicates the 
nature of the re la t ionsh ip between the two communities. Karan-
chi witnessed a serious incident on '.'arch 19, 1935, when d i s t u r -
bances occured over the procession taking dead body of Abdul 
Qaiyum, who was sentenced to death for murdering a Hindu alleged 
to have insul ted Islam. And serious t rouble arose in Lahore on 
29 June as a r e s u l t of a dispute between muslims and Sikhs about 
a Mosque s i tua ted within the precincts of a Sikh temple known 
aS Shahidganj Gurdwara. 
Hut whatever the degree of antagonism between the two 
major communities, the provincial part of the scheme under the 
government of India Act 1935, v^ jas soon to be brought in to force . 
The year 1936 was the year of preparation for e lec t ions to 
provincial l e g i s l a t u r e s . The Lucknow session of the congress 
(12 April 1936) decided in favour of contesting e l ec t i ons , though 
the question of office acceptance was, af ter heated discussion, 
postponed through a resolut ion moved t o that effect by Dr. 
Rejendra Prasad. I t was also resolved tha t the functions of 
the parliamentary Board be discharged in future by the working 
committee of the All-India-Congress committee which was en t rus -
ted with the work of placing the e lect ion menifesto before the 
country. 
Though several other pa r t i e s also contested the e lec t ion , 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the league deserve special a t ten t ion in context 
2ifi 
with our subject point . fVluhaiTi'Tiad Mi Jinneh was authorised 
t o const i tu te a central e lect ion board of 35 nembers with 
power to form snd a f f i l i a t e provincial boards for the purpose 
of fighting e l ec t ions , A resolut ion to tha t effect was moved 
by Hpja Ghazanfar M i Khan in the Bombay session of the League 
(April 11, 1936) and i t vvas car r ied . The muslim league then 
met at Lahore on 10 June, 1936 and expressed confidence in the 
muslim parliamentary Board and the muslim league e lec t ion 
menifesto was issued on June 12, 1936. The task before the 
league was how to organise the muslims of India with a view to 
ensure the success in the elect ion and t h i s war, indeed a 
d i f f i cu l t job. 
The muslims of the country followed different paths and 
i t was s t a t ed : "In the Punjab Mian Sir Fazli ilusain had bu i l t 
up a unionist par ty , in Bengal o Krishak Pooja party functioned 
under Maulvi Fazlul Maq. In U.P. the Nat ional is t Agr icu l tur i s t 
party was a creation of the leadership of Nawab of Chhatari , In 
Sind Sir Abdullah Haroon refused to join hands with the league. 
In Bihar Sayyid Abdul Aziz followed s u i t . In the North-vjest 
f ront ie r province the congress forces under Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
30 Khan and h i s celebrated brother were l e t loose ," But Jinnha, 
in his extraordinary determination and devotion to the task , 
"proceeded to supervise the work of the board and const i tu te 
the provincial branches and he accomplished a great deal more 
than could be expected from him under the circumstances." 
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Addressing a meeting of U .P . f^uslims on August 15 , 1936 
J innah s t r e s s e d ' the need of corrmunal and inter-communal u n i t y . 
He exp la ined , in the course of an address t o the muslim s t u d e n t s 
of C a l c u t t a , t h a t the aim of the muslims was t o a t t a i n s o l i d a -
r i t y . Speaking at Nagpur on January 2 , 1937, he again voiced 
the same f e e l i n g s . 
Muslim League menifesto (for e l e c t i o n ) had been adopted 
on 11 J u n e , 1936 under the p r e s i d e n t s h i p of J i n n a h . I t was 
s t r e s s e d in i t . : "To a l l appearance the s o c i a l po l i cy i t 
advocated vNas much the same as the congress p o l i c y . I n d u s t r i a l 
development, the upl i f tment of the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n , the r e l i e f 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l indebtedness a l l t h i s was common ground. Nor 
32 
was t h e r e much d i f fe rence on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e . " 
In f a c t , the window-dressing of the league manifes to was 
complete . I t skeched, in b r i e f , the h i s t o r y of the muslim 
league with s p e c i a l s t r e s s on i t s f e e l i n g of Hindu-Muslim u n i t y . 
I t s t a t e d t h a t the league had always been vjorking in co-opera t ion 
with a l l n a t i o n a l i s t i c views and t h a t i t s ob j ec t i ve was the a t t a i n -
ment of fu l l r e spons ib l e government. For example i t was empha-
s i sed in the meni fes to ; "In the var ious s t e p s t h a t followed t h e 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s and c o l l a b o r a t i o n s t h a t took p l a c e , the league has 
always stood for f u l l r e spons ib l e government for India and 
u n f l i n c h i n g l l y s tands for the same i d e a l . " 
Behind a l l t h i s g l i t t e r i n g e x t e r i o r , the manifesto was 
not an at tempt a t r e p r e s e n t i n g the n a t i o n a l view p o i n t . The 
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communal poison prevailing for so long was surfacing in the 
country and the menifesto was a powerful addition to the already 
surcharged atmosphere. Even in this document meant for wide 
circulation among the public, the propaganda for muslim safe-
guards could not be kept concealed and it was openly stated 
that, as minority, their position was required to be protected 
•in any future political structure, ' The problem, it was said, 
was not merely to educate the middle class muslim, but was also 
to bring about 'the entire social regeneration of the seventy 
millions of muslims.' The muslims were asked to unite as 
musalmans and there was clear insinuation of their exploitation 
by others. It was stated without reservation: "The League 
appeal to musalmans that they should not permit themselves to be 
exploited on economic or any other grounds which will break up 
the solidarity of the community." 
Infact the propaganda was that the muslims should unite 
under the league for all eventualities and for the attainment 
of their communal demands. The programme part of the menifesto 
embodied the claim to protect and promote the Urdu language and 
script. It was, for all intents and purposes, a communal meni-
festo which promised general improvement of the country and 
special attention to the uplift of muslims and promotion of 
• 
t h e i r r e l ig ion , language and cu l tura l i n t e r e s t s . The burden 
of the league 's propaganda was to prove tha t i t had been, and 
was at the t ime, a p a t r i o t i c organisation and tha t the need for 
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muslim so l ida r i ty was necessary for furthering the special 
i n t e r e s t s of the community. The s ta tus of the muslims could 
only be raised by a recognition of t he i r claims and t h e i r 
r e l i g ious , economic, socia l and cu l tu ra l i n t e r e s t s could be 
safeguarded only by a continued attempt at common uni ty . 
In addition to t h i s , Jinnah in h is e lec t ion speeches 
charged the congress and the Hindus with attempts to divide 
muslim forces . Speaking at a meeting in Calcutta on 3 January, 
35 he warned congress "not to in te r fe re in muslim a f f a i r s . " He 
regarded the muslim community as an exclusive sphere for h is and 
the league 's propaganda and was jealous of other organisat ions 
making an appeal, however reasoned, t o i t . 
This propaganda had i t s effect and the clue was taken up 
by other muslim leader and organisat ions . Even a man of h i s -
highness the Aga Khan's cal ibre and i n t e l l e c t u a l grasp seized 
the opportunity of extending a concealed th rea t of muslims 
renouncing the ideal of independence in India when in his p r e s i -
dent ia l speech at the All-India muslim conference he claimed 
communal credi t in these words; "Though the a t t i t ude of t h e i r 
powerful s i s t e r community has been cold and d i s t an t , t he i r pa t r i -
otism and t h e i r sense of self respect and honour did not permit 
t h e i r going back on the i r ideal of self-government for theix. 
country," In the course of h is p res iden t i a l address delivered 
on 4 January, 1936, Khawaja Habib Ullah (Nawab Bahadur of Dacca) 
sa id : "The fundamental p o l i t i c a l objective of the Indian musal-
mans i s a self-governing India in the p o l i t i c a l po l i ty of which 
Islam must have a place as a flSee community of culture."^^^ 
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This was an outspoken expression of what was to follow 
in the demand for Pakistan, shorn of a l l i t s diplomatic po l i sh . 
The best cr i t ic ism of t h i s type of muslim propaganda sponsored 
and generated by the muslim league was embodied in these words: 
"When Jinnah speaks of measure for the protect ion of ' the 
in teg r i ty of Islam' in India and another leading muslim of 'a 
self-governing India in the p o l i t i c a l po l i ty of v^hich Islam 
must have a place as a free community of cu l tu re , ' a confl ic t 
ensues between medieval and modern developments that can be 
resolved only by muslim thought-leaders themselves: any help 
offered by outsiders cannot have any chance of acceptance, and 
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wi l l be rejected as impertinence." 
The muslim league now released ideas tha t l a id the 
foundation of Pakistan and made division of the country an 
e v i l necessity of paramount important. Under the circumstances, 
an attempt t o draw a p a r a l l e l , as R. Coupland does, between the 
congress manifesto and tha t of the league would not only be 
f u t i l e but would also be missing the rea l issues and betraying 
ignorance, r ea l or pretended, of the s i tua t ion as i t exis ted in 
India of the t ime. The r e su l t s of e lec t ions ful ly conformed 
t o the p o l i t i c a l s i tua t ion in India. The congress was highly 
popular and i t achieved unprecedented success in the electiojns. 
The league succeded in appealing to the sentiments of the muslims 
and, to tha t ex tent , i t s victory was only l imi ted . The elect ion 
were almost over by the end of February, 1937, and the r e s u l t s 
were soon announced. They indicated the r e l a t i ve strength of 
p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s in different provinces. 
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The resul ts of the elect ions indicated tha t whereas the 
congress gained a pos i t ion of super io r i t y i n Madras, Bombay, 
U.P., Sihar, C.P. and Orr issa and whereas i t gained a commanding 
pos i t ion as a single p o l i t i c a l party in Bengal, Assam and N.Vii.F. 
P., the League's condit ion betrayed lack of hold over the muslim 
masses every where. Jinnah's claim of muslim being the sphere 
only of the muslim a c t i v i t i e s was bel ieved. Under the circums-
tances, R. Coupland's observation that the resu l ts in Punjab 
and Sind alone "were enough to show tha t the congress could not 
t r u l y claim to be the only va l i d champion of Indian p o l i t i c a l 
asp i ra t ion , " can only be received with a su f f i c i en t allowance 
fo r h is imper ia l i s t bias and pro-muslim i nd i i na t i ons . Such a 
view wholly ignores congress inf luence in a larger part of India 
and makes absolutely no margin for exceptions and unusual 
circumstances. The t o t a l muslim seats fo r a l l the eleven l e g i s -
l a t i ve assemblies were 482, "Out of t h i s number the congress 
contested only 58 and won 26, that i s 45% of the seats contested.* 
This was by a l l means a b r i l l i a n t record and i t was only 
perverted log ic to argue that most of these 26 seats were won i n 
the N.W.F.P. where the congress held a 'p®c^li®^ pos i t ion. ' "^^ 
The 'pecul ier p o s i t i o n ' could not be se l f -begot ten, i t was the 
resu l t of the congress ideology of independence which appeale'd 
t o the people of that province. The league s t r i c t l y speaking, 
could gain 108 seats in a l l the provinces and t h i s was cons t i t u -
ted only 22 percent of the t o t a l muslim seats i n the country as' 
a whole. This resu l t was a fa i r comaient on the league's i n a b i l i t y 
to win the support of the muslim masses and i t s la te r strength 
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was surely the product of a vigorous pEopaganda carr ied on by 
i t s p ro tagonis t s . Even the l imited success of the league in 
these provincial e lec t ions was due to i t s propaganda of p ro tec-
t ing the exclusive i n t e r e s t s of the muslim community though, at 
t h i s s tage, i t did not assume a dreadful character . But, a l l , 
the Same, t h i s meagre success vjas a stepping-stone for i t s 
future glory. Moreover, considering the league 's age of 30 
years , fu l l of a c t i v i t i e s of a diverse nature , the success 
achieved in these e lec t ions was not unencouraging. 
VJith the completion of e lec t ions and the Marvellous 
success of the congress, the question of accepting office could 
not long be differed. There was a growing desire for the cong-
ress to accept min is te r ia l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As early as 21 Feb. 
41 1937, the Lucknow d i s t r i c t congress committee voted in favour 
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of t h i s course. On Feb,27, 1937, the a l l - I nd i a congress 
committee met at wardha to s e t t l e t h i s question, but i t was 
reserved for i t s meeting at Delhi (March 18, 1937) to pass a 
resolut ion tha t in pursuance of the basic congress policy 
towards the new const i tut ion of India 'permission should be 
given for congressmen to accept office in the provinces where 
the congress party was sa t i s f i ed and could s t a te publ ica l ly 
t h a t the government would not use his special powers of inter^. 
ference or set aside the advice of ministers in regard t o the i r 
cons t i tu t iona l a c t i v i t i e s , "^  
2r.5 
The Governors of Madras, Bombay, U.P . , Bihar, C.P, and 
Orissa Invited congress parliamentary leaders in these provinces 
t o const i tu te min i s t r i e s , but they expressed t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to 
promise not to use t h e i r special powers provided in the cons t i -
t u t i on . Under the circumstances, the leaders declined to form 
min i s te r i es . This cons t i tu t iona l deadlock made Sardar P a t e l , 
president of the congress parliamentary sub-committee, remark: 
"The repeated professions of ttie Br i t i sh statesmen have been put 
to t e s t by the congress and once again they have been as usual 
found to be f a l se . The Mockery of the newly created democracy 
stands thoroughly exposed," 
AC. 
The statement of lord Zetland ^ (the Secretary of s t a te 
for India) and of R.A, Butler, (under secretary of s t a te for 
India) about the cons t i tu t ional deadlock were deemed inadequate 
t o meet the requirements of the congress according to a congress 
working committee resolution adopted at Allahabad on April 30, 
1937, But in view of the subsequently modified o f f i c i a l pro-
nouncements, including the statement of the viceroy and the 
premier on the subject , the congress working committee which met 
at Wardha under the guidance of Wah-jtma Gandhi f e l t " that the 
s i tua t ion created as a r e s u l t of tae circumstances and events , 
t ha t have since occured, warrants the belief tha t i t w i l l npt be 
easy for the Governors to use t h e i r special powers." 
Then on July 7, 1937, the GVC unanimously adopted the 
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resolut ion of office acceptance. I t was done with the 
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important stipulation that the congress election menifesto 
would be Worked out and the congress policy of combating the 
new Act on the one hand and of prosecuting the constructive 
49 programme on the other would be furthered. The conditions 
binding on the congress legislators had already been broadly 
impressed in the Oath of allegiance to congress ideology 
administered by Jawaharlal Nehru after his presidential address 
in the national convention which opened its session at Delhi on 
(March 19, 1937.^" 
Immediately after the V\/ardha decision of 7 Ju ly , 1937, 
brisk a c t i v i t i e s for the formation of minis ter ies commenced, 
A congress ministry was formed in the united provinces by Govind 
Vallabh Pant. The congress thus , accepted office in Ju ly , 1937 
and continued to function u n t i l October, 1939. The period of 
congress minis ter ies was, therefore , brief to judge the merit 
of t h e i r achievements and even during t h i s short time they were 
confronted with d i f f i cu l t i e s of a great magnitude and an awful 
character . 
In the f i r s t p lace, there was the congress inexperience 
of ruling vast provinces. Pat tabhi Sitaramayya wr i t e s : "Congress-
men had doubtless administrative experience of various types and 
varying measures of importance. But the ru le r - sh ip of provinces 
which were as big and populous as Bri tain was new to them. Many 
of them were men of outstanding a b i l i t y nnd strength of character . 
But they were u t t e r l y lacking in p rac t i ca l experience of ru l ing 
extensive and populous provinces,"^ Coupland with t h i s , was 
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the unfavourable a t t i t u d e of the permanent s e c r e t a r i e s and 
depar tmenta l heads - mostly members of the I . C . S , i t was , 
t h e r e f o r e , most app rop r i a t e ly s t a t e d t h a t t he m i n i s t e r s "were 
r a t h e r l i k e the dauqh te r - in - l aw of the Hindu home t h a t goes 
t o the f a t h e r - i n - l a w ' s house where she has t o serve a pe r iod 
of app ren t i ce sh ip in which she has t o deal not merely with her 
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spouse but h i s pa ren t s and h i s s i s t e r s and b r o t h e r s as w e l l . " 
Added t o t h i s was the high e x p e c t a t i o n s of the pub l i c 
from the popular government. The H a r i j a n s , the poor , the 
l a b o u r e r s , the down-trodden and the peasan t s hoped for immediate 
r egene ra t i on at the hands of n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s . Moreover, 
S o c i a l i s t s and commumists, s p e c i a l l y in South I n d i a , a s s i s t e d 
the ag ra r i an r e v o l t s . "The a c c e l e r a t e d pace of popular expec-
t a t i o n s in the way of p rogress of ideas and even t s - e s p e c i a l l y 
in the spheres of labour and machinery - was the cause of s t r i k e s 
he re and t h e r e and elsewhere which under t h e very congress 
m i n i s t e r i e s , witnessed ins t ance a f t e r i n s t a n c e of f i r i n g by the 
p o l i c e and m i l l i t a r y , " ^ ^ Bes ides , the g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y arose 
out of the d e s i r e t o b r i n g about co -o rd ina t ion between the 
a c t i v i t i e s of t h e var ious provinces and i t was with t h i s end in 
view t h a t the congress working committee had t o i n s t a l l ' i t s 
pa r l i amenta ry sub-committee or d i r e c t l y had t o undertake the . task 
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of c o - o r d i n a t i o n . ' The sub-committee cons i s t ed of Sardar 
Vallabhbhai P a t e l , Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Maulana Abdul Kalam 
Azad and d i f f e r e n t p rov inces were ass igned t o each one of them 
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' to advise them in a l l the i r a c t i v i t i e s and t o take necessary 
action in any case of emergency. ' 
The release of p o l i t i c a l p r i s ioners was a very important 
item in the congress programme and by vir tue of i t s e lec t ion 
manifesto, the congress was pledge to the i r re lease , A great 
enthusiasm was displayed in t h i s connection. By the middle of 
February 1938, most of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s ioners were released 
in the different congress provinces. But in the U.P. and Bihar 
some were s t i l l behind the bars and when the two premiers 
passed orders for t h e i r r e l ease , the Governors refused t o 
endorse them. The Governor-General, making misuse of section 
126(5) of the government of India Act 1935 also 'prevented the 
execution of the order. ' 
This prec ip i ta ted a c r i s i s and the congress cabinets of 
U.P. and Bihar tendered the i r resignat ion on Feb. 16, 1938. 
But bet ter sense soon prevai led and the viceroy r e a l i s i n g h i s 
mistake, issued a statement on February 22, "He argued that the 
action taken was designed to safeguard the peace and t r a n q u i l l i t y 
of India. He s ta ted , however, t ha t i t was s t i l l open to the 
Minis ters in consultation with the Governors to pursue a policy 
of the released of pr i s ioners and that there should be no 
d i f f icu l ty in securing the ready co-operation of the goverjiors," 
In consequence, negotiat ions were opened and they material ised 
in to an agreement between the governors and the premiers. The 
congress stand was accepted and the tninis ter ies of U.P. and Bihar 
were r e ins t a t ed . I t was a great victory for the congress. 
Z'S'^ 
Civi l l i b e r t i e s were well protected. Freedom of speech 
and writ ing was conceded to as never before under the Br i t i sh 
regime, A b i l l was passed by the Bombay l eg i s l a tu re "author i -
sing the government to re-purchase lands confiscated during the 
c i v i l disobedience movement and return the same to the or ig inal 
owners,""^ In Bihar, ban on 92 books was l i f t e d and freedom 
of the press was ensured. 
A wide la t i tude of speech and wri t ing was conceded by the 
congress government in the N.W.F.P, Similar features characte-
rised a c t i v i t i e s and associat ions and funds and property confi-
scated of these associat ions during the c i v i l disobedience 
campaign was res tored. 
I t can reasonably be remarked tha t no sphere of reform 
worth undertaking in a brief span of two years and a few months 
was l e f t untouched. Useful measures were adopted for the 
improvement of education, the introduction of prohib i t ion , the 
betterment of medical r e l i e f , rad ica l l i b e r l i s a t i o n of local 
self-governments, the improvement of the lo t of peasants and 
agrarian condit ions, the advancement of indus t r i es and for the 
betterment of the condition of labour. The work of ru ra l 
reconstruction was taken up in r ight ea rnes t . Nor was the work 
of Harijan up l i f t and socia l regeneration ignored, reforms in* 
pr is ions were also begun. 
Considering the d i f f i c u l t i e s under which they had to 
function, the work of congress minis ter ies must be pronounced 
commendable. Their work was not directed t o benefit any single 
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party of community. "These benefi ts vjere not confined to any 
pa r t i cu la r community but were for the general mass of the 
people. 
The success was undoubtedly l imited, but i t could not be 
other-wise because of the very nature of the government set up 
under the government of India Act 1935. Rajani Palme Du t t ' s 
a l l ega t ion i s hardly convincing tha t congress minis ter ies in 
the provinces "were, not in any modern parliamentary sense 
governments" and thei r "reforms did not and could not touch the 
main basis of imper ia l i s t power and explo i ta t ion or the main 
causes of the poverty of the masses." 
The minis te rs , insp i te of the assurance given by the 
n r i t i sh government befor acceptance of of f ice , had only a 
precarious hold over events , Mahatma Gandhi in an a r t i c l e in 
the ilarijan in August, 1938, made clear the extreme l imi ta t ions 
of the i r powers. Said he: "The ministers are mere puppets so 
far as the rea l control i s concerned. The col lec tors and police 
may at a mere command from the Governors unset the minis te rs , 
a r res t them and put them in a lock-up." 
I t i s now in the f i tness of things to examine the league 's 
role in the provincial l eg i s l a t i ve assemblies. I t had i t s 
prelude in the important decision token by the congress not to 
have coal i t ion governments in the congress-majority provinces. 
The muslim league was 'wi l l ing to co-operate ' and Jinnah had 
given t h i s indicat ion both in pr ivate and in publ ic . The 
25't 
muslim league leaders could be admitted to the ministry of the 
U.P. on condition of ceasing to function as a separate group 
and of disolvinq the muslim league parliamentary Board, Other 
conditions vtexe also appended and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was 
appointed to negotiate teams of agreement so far as the U.P, was 
concerned. The league did not agree t o the congress demands and 
i t accused the l a t t e r of i t s alleged Hindu a f f i l i a t i o n s and 
inc l i na t i ons . Delivering his p res iden t ia l address at the 25th 
session of the All-India muslim league (Lucknow 15 t o 18 Oct. 
1937), M.A. Jinnah Said; "Wherever they (congressmen) are in 
majority and wherever i t suited them. They refused to co-
operate with the muslim league pa r t i e s and demanded uncondit io-
nal surrender and signing of t he i r pledges. 
The indictment that 'the congress leaders became obsessed 
with the idea that they could ignore the league al together and 
arrogate power for the Hindu Majority' had no foundation in fac t . 
On the other hand, the congress was ready to sacr i f ice the 
i n t e r e s t s of the majority in i t s desire to woo the muslim 
minority. But the impossible could not be achieved. The 
congress did include muslim figures in the provincial cabinets , 
but they were congress muslims or converts to congress ideology. 
Had the congress adopted a different course, I t would have been 
gui l ty of lack of proper comprehension of parliamentary faacm of 
government. Tne principle of j o i n t r e spons ib i l i ty of the 
ministers presupposed systematic exclusion of any discordant 
element. Moreover, the congress was pledged to carry out the 
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promises of i t s e lect ion manifesto and for the r ea l i s a t i on of 
t h i s purpose had only the weapon of tendering res ignat ions to 
deter the executive from unnecessary interference in i t s nat ional 
p ro jec t s . 
Under these circumstances, i t would have been mere folly 
on the par t of the congress to join with the league and inv i t e 
unnecessary trouble at every s tep . The congress a l l iance with 
league at t h i s s tage, without purging i t of a l l i t s communal 
poison, would have meant an a l l iance with the forces of sec te r -
ianism. Expectations of f ide l i ty in the hour of necessi ty from 
the members of an organisat ion, not in sympathy with the congress 
aims and methods, was an imposs ib i l i ty . In addition t o these 
considerat ions , i t would have been in jus t ice to the congress 
musliriB in the l eg i s l a tu res to have ignored the i r claims to 
the posts of ministers and in stead to have included league 
muslims in the cabinets of the provinces. 
Another pre-rrequisite of understanding the league 's role 
in the provincial assemblies i s i t s decisions at i t s Lucknow 
session (15 to 18 Oct. 1937). The very resolut ions adopted 
there indicated the s p i r i t of antagonism to the congress. Defea-
ted in the e lec t ions by the congress, i t reg is te red i t s sense 
of indignation and posed as v ic to rs on i t s own platform. Th^ 
following resolu t ion , among others , i s s ign i f i can t . "The All-
India muslim league deprecates and p ro tes t s against the formation 
0^ minis ter ies in cer tain provinces by congress pa r t i e s in f l ag -
rant violat ion of the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of the government of 
India Act, 1935, and the instrument of ins t ruc t ions and condemns 
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the go\)rernors for t he i r fa i lure to enforce the special powers 
entrusted to them to safeguard the i n t e r e s t of the musalmans 
and other important minor i t ies . 
I t was in t h i s session tha t Ismail Chundriger condemned 
federation 'as a retrograde measure ' . He s ta ted that by jo in -
ing i t , the muslims would only be strengthening the hands of 
the Hindus and a resolut ion t o the effect \Nas passed. fAuninu-
l lah attacked jo in t e l ec to ra tes in local bodies and alleged 
tha t in h is province (n iha r ) , 'The puri ty of the urdu language 
was being a t t acked , ' The Raja of Mahmudabad moving a r e so lu t -
ion on Urdu said ' tha t if musalmans wanted, they could have 
imposed the Arabic language on Hindus when they ruled in India . ' 
Qutubuddin Abdul Wall charged congress 'as an i r r e l i g i o u s body. ' 
No greater d is tor t ion of facts could be coined than the one by 
Aziz Lal j i who level led the al legat ion tha t the congress "vjas 
spreading communalism and socialism only to bring the Hindu 
Raj ." In contrast to the fact that congress measures resulted 
in common benefit or harm to Indians as a whole, Chaudhury 
Kaliquzzaman asked : "Have any of the programme of the congress 
ft 7 
cared for muslimartisans ?" 
These proceedings of the league 's session furnish su f f i -
cient indicat ion of the communal behaviour of i t s members in* 
the provincial l e g i s l a t u r e s . Small wonder, therefore tha t 
I.H, Siddiq moved a resolut ion in the Bombay Assembly on 28 
January, 1938 asking the government tha t the teachings of Koran 
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and Sunna should be made compulsory for muslim boys and q i r l s 
68 in schools and co l l eges in the p re s idency . 
On Feb. 2 , 1938, in the U.P. Assembly, Farooq objec ted 
t o the chief s e c r e t a r y ' s c i r c u l a r i s sued t o d i s t r i c t Mag i s t r a t e s 
t o seek help from the congress o r g a n i s a t i o n s . He contended 
t h a t t h i s was c a l c u l a t e d to c rea te 'a p r i v i l e d g e d p o s i t i o n fo r 
congressmen. ' I t was a l so urged t h a t i t had d i s c r i m i n a t e d 
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aga ins t the l i b e r a l f ede ra t i on and the muslim l eague . • Though 
the c i r c u l a r only imposed a duty on the congress o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 
f avour i t i sm was a l l eged by t he se c r i t i c s of the s tep taken by 
the chief s e c r e t a r y . 
On 7 March, L938, genera l d i scuss ion on t h e budget commen-
ced and while the congress p a r t y members g e n e r a l l y p r a i s e d the 
budget , the members of the muslim league p a r t y s t rong ly c r i t i -
c i s ed the r u r a l development scheme. Zahiruddin Faruqi sa id 
t h a t the agency for working the scheme did not i n s p i r e u n i v e r s a l 
confidence and the e n t i r e scheme was meant t o s t r eng then the 
congress o r g a n i s a t i o n , d i s t r i c t committees being packed. Sven 
the U.P. Tenancy B i l l did not f a i l t o evoke a d e s i r e for r i d i -
culous amendments by the muslim league pa r ty and on Nov. 16, 
1938, K.N. Katju ( m i n i s t e r of j u s t i c e ) had t o c r i t i c i s e vehe-
• 
mently the muslim league demand for the a p p l i c a t i o n of muslim 
pe r sona l law in the tenancy B i l l , He quoted from the books t h a t 
pe r sona l law did not apply t o Mustafa Kemal P a s h a ' s Turkey of 
7 1 
which the muslims were so proud. 
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Besides, an adjournment motion was moved in order to 
discuss the government policy of repression towards the 
Khaksars who had proved a menace to the peace and tranquility 
of the province. Advocating their cause, Zahirul HusHain Lari 
said on Oct. 3, 1939: "Apart from the effect of it there is 
one thing and it is of curtailing civil rights of a certain 
section of the public who go by the name of Khaksars, So the 
government by their policy have infringed the right of free 
72 
association." Fine conception of the right of civil liberty 
and free association .• on Oct 5, 1939, Quazi Muhammad Adil 
Abbasi demanded a list of muslims selected for different posts 
73 by the public service commission since its existence. He 
also inquired about the number of the muslims and Harijan 
teachers employed by the government through education expansion 
department. He further demanded the number of Urdu and Hindi 
74 books purchased for rural libraries and their total costs. 
All this, indeed, constituted evidence of fidelity to muslim 
league ideology, but hardly touched the solution of problem from 
the national point of view. 
The league was eager for the recognition of its exclusive 
claim as the only organisation to represent the muslim community. 
The result of elections to the various assemblies showed that 
this was not the time, yet it objected when its status as the 
sole representative of muslim masses was not recognised. It 
was perhaps, under a sense of frustration that it began to 
2P 
behave awkwardly at t h i s s tage. In the year 1938, Jawaharlal 
made ef for t s to remove the grivances of the muslim 
Nehru_^eague and tough he exchanged correspondence with Jinnah, 
i t did not r e su l t in any subs tan t ia l improvement of r e l a t i o n s . 
Later, at the suggestion of the league leader , Gandhiji i n i t i -
ated personal contact with him. 
The pos i t ion , a l l the same, remained where i t was. Then, 
Subhas Chandra Bose took his chance. But the Muslim League 
leader i n s i s t ed both in his t a l k s with the congress president 
and in the subsequent correspondence tha t an e s s e n t i a l p re -
condition of any agreement between the congress and the muslim 
league on the Hindu-Muslim question was the recognition by 
the congress tha t the muslim league was "the sole au thor i t a t ive 
representat ive p o l i t i c a l organisation of the musalmans of 
7c, 
Ind ia . " The league further ins i s t ed tha t "in any negotiat ion 
between i t s e l f and the congress, the l a t e r should not appoint 
any congress muslim to carry on i t s behest ," This recognition 
of the league's s ta tus meant, by implicat ion, the recognition 
of the congress as a Hindu organisation which i t ce r ta in ly was 
not . The question of the muslim league 's s ta tus never came t o 
the fore in negotiat ions between the league and the congress. 
Another pr inciple which guided the league in i t s action 
and which const i tuted a departure from i t s e a r l i e r a t t i t ude \Ras 
the enunciation of a dogma that muslim masses should be approa-
ched only through i t s own leaders . The congress 'mass contact 
movement' was decided as an attempt to win over the muslims to 
the congress ideology and programme. Delivering h i s p res iden t ia l 
2(5=^ 
address a t the A l l - I n d i a n a t i o n a l convention which opened i t s 
s e s s ion at Delhi on r^arch 19, 1937, J awaha r l a l Nehru a t t r i b u -
t e d , the f a i l u r e of the congress to capture muslim s e a t s t o 
neg lec t of work among the muslim masses and sa id t h a t i t vias 
t ime t o welcome the muslim masses and i n t e l l i g e n t i a t o the g rea t 
77 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
This proposal had i t s immediate r e a c t i o n and in a s t r i c t l y 
c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r w r i t t e n by the muslim p o e t , Muhammad Iqbal 
(on March 20 , 1937, from Lahore) t o J innah i t was s t a t e d : 
" I suppose you have read Jawahar l a l Nehru ' s address t o the 
A l l - I n d i a Nat iona l convention and t h a t you f u l l y r e a l i s e the 
p o l i c y under ly ing i t in so far as Indian Muslims are c o n c e r n e d . . . 
I t h e r e f o r e , suggest t h a t an e f f e c t i v e reply should be given 
t o the A l l - I n d i a Nat iona l convention . . . t o t h i s convention you 
must r e s t a t e as c l e a r l y and as s t rong ly as pos s ib l e t h e p o l i t i -
ca l ob jec t ive of the Indian Muslims as a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l 
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u n i t in the coun t ry . " At the Lucknow sess ion of t h e League 
he ld in October , 1937, J innah echoed I q b a l ' s views when he 
s a i d : " I want the musalmans t o ponder over the s i t u a t i o n and 
decide t h e i r own fa te by having one s i n g l e , d e f i n i t e , uniform 
po l i cy which should be l o y a l l y followed throughout I n d i a . " 
• 
I t was now f e l t necessary to debar from the membership 
those members of the league who were a l so members of the cong-
r e s s . Even d i s c i p l i n a r y ac t ion was taken aga ins t them, though 
t i l l then t h e r e was no bar to such a course. Important men 
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l ike Wazir Hasan and Yakub Khan wero thus sacr i f iced and the 
council took disc ip l inary action against a muslim member of 
the C.P, government. The mi l i tan t character of the muslim 
league was taking shape and efficiency and party d isc ip l ine 
were great ly stressed even at the cost of losing important 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s . The league was becoming aggressive in i t s 
a t t i t u d e against the Congress and i t s own renegades. 
The next important notable step in the muslim league 
programme to disrupt the country was i t s indictment of the 
congress min i s t r i e s . They were openly charged with working 
against the muslims and furthering the exclusive Hindu i n t e r e s t . 
Full play was given to the League's imagination and the charges 
were couched in provocating terms. These are grouped by 
Humaun Kabir under tho following heads: "(a) interference with 
r e l ig ious r i g h t s , Cb) Tampering with cu l tu ra l t r a d i t i o n s , (c) 
attempts to c u r t a i l share in survice and representa t ion , and 
(d) social snobbery." Kabir, however, f e l t convinced to some 
extent of the existence of rea l grivances in the muslim commu-
n i t y . He observed: "The agi ta t ion in the minority provinces 
could not continue unless there was rea l discontent or sense 
of injury behind. The ground may have been imaginary but the 
discontent was r e a l . " 
Humayun Kabir giving an example, adds tha t whereas there 
was use of the criminal law for the prevention of 'cow slaugh-
t o r , ' there was none in the case of music before the Mosques, 
He assigned the most unreasonable muslim opposition t o the 
V/ardha scheme of education and to the 'confusion between 
renaissance and revival ism' which was rampant in the Indian 
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mind. The ques t ion of common language, he argued, s t i l l 
f u r t h e r marred Hindu-Muslim r e l a t i o n s , J innah was the auther 
of t h e s e charges . J innah f i r s t of a l l a l l eged t h a t a l l kinds 
of mal ic ious propaganda was being c a r r i e d out in order t o 
d i s c r e d i t the muslim league.®-^ In h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l address at 
the s p e c i a l sess ion of the league (Held on the 17 and 18 A p r i l , 
1938) he objected t o the use of t h e Bande Matram song in the 
l e g i s l a t u r e s . Then, r e f e r r i n g t o the congress governments, he 
s a i d : "They are pursuing a po l i cy of making Hindi a compulsory 
language, which m u s t . . . des t roy the spread of the development 
of Urdu and what i s worse s t i l l i s t h a t Hindi with i t s Hindu 
S a n s k r i t o u s l i t e r a t u r e and philosophy and i d e a l s w i l l and nnust 
n e c e s s a r i l y beforced upon the muslim ch i ld ren and s t u d e n t s , " 
He added t h a t s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s were p laced in the way of 
muslims enjoying r e l i g i o u s freedom. He was su re ly obsessed 
with the idea of Hindu Raj and he chal lenged t h a t a l l no t i ons 
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and dreams of such a Raj "Must be abandoned." 
Speaking as the p r e s i d e n t of the A l l - I n d i a Muslim League 
(which held i t s sess ion at Patna from the 26th t o 29th of 
December, 1938) , J innah condemned the Wardha Education Scheme 
and the Vidya Mandir Scheme and poured open contempt upon 
Mahatma Gandhi as being t h e i r a u t h e r . He s a i d , "TlhB congress 
i s f i gh t ing for domination over the muslims. I t i s rank madTness*, 
but t h a t has se ized the congress and i t i s aga ins t t h a t des ign-
t h a t mad i d e a l - t h a t I have r e b e l l e d . " ^ 
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The muslim league vias not sa t i s f i ed with t h i s sort of 
condemnation. It i n s i s t ed upon the l a s t pound of flesh and 
appointed an inquiry committee to find out the grivances of 
the musalmans in congress provinces. The report was published 
towards the end of 1938 and was known as 'Pirpur report ' af ter 
the name of i t s chairman Raja Sayyid Muhammad ^fehdi of Pirpur , 
Among other th ings , the report attacked the so-cal led 'c loser 
door ' policy of the congress and declared t h a t parliamentary 
government was unworkable in t h i s country. I t alleged tha t in 
the muslim share of public appointments, due regard was not 
paid to the size and importance of the muslim community. Besides, 
the f l ag , the anthem, the reverence paid to Mr. Gandhi, the 
emphasis la id by the Mahatma himself on 'cow pro tec t ion , ' a l l 
these are evidence of a del iberate and far-reaching at tack on 
the c ivic and cu l tura l r igh t s of the muslim community, but 
" I t s most insidious feature i s the attempt t o extend the use of 
Hindi at the expense of Urdu." 
The Bihar working committee of the provincia l muslim 
league appointed an Enquiry Committee the report of which i s 
known as the 'Shareef Report ' af ter the name of i t s draftsman 
(S.M, Shareef). This committee was consisted to enquire in to 
the grievances of the Bihar Muslims and i t s report also embodi* 
a l lega t ions of a serious character . About t h i s report i t ,was 
r igh t ly said; try^  casual reader of the pamphlet might be forgivb., 
for Supposing tha t something l ike a reign of t e r r o r had been 
established in Bihar,"^^ 
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When the congress governments resigned, Fazl-ul-Haq of 
Bengal issued a statement to the press and i t was l a t e r embodied 
in a pamphlet e n t i t l e d 'Muslim suffering under congress ru l e . ' 
A sample of t h i s vjaiting wi l l reveal the nature and s ty le of 
i t s author. For example, i t incorporated the s tatements: 
"Mother cow must be p r o t e c t e d . . . muslims must not be allowed to 
beef. The re l ig ion of muslims must be humbled because is not 
t h i s the land of the Hindus ? " ^ A league publicat ion of 1946 -
i t shall never happen again-covering a r t i c l e s from Dawn described 
in de t a i l the alleged sufferings of the muslims in the congress-
governed provinces. Refering t o communal r i o t s , i t says; "in 
a l l these r i o t s and outbreaks, muslims were admittedly the 
pr inc ipa l sufferers . This was not merely a chance coincidence 
90 but the r e su l t of del iberate pol icy ." 
Those who have been in touch with the events cannot help 
saying tha t no bet ter brazenfaced l ie could be coined by anyone 
to paint the congress in worse colours. All sor t s of cock and 
bul l s t o r i e s were narrated in these volumes. For example, 
describing the attack on Tirth Bazar, Si tapur , i t s ta ted : 
"on February 12, about 400 Hindus armed with La th is , swords, 
spears and other deadly weapons appeared on the scene with c r ies 
of 'Gandhi Mahatma ki J a i ' and suddenly attacked the muslim • 
shop-keepers and looted and plundered the i r goods. The promi-
nent congress leaders of the place were taking leading part in 
91 the loot and plunder," Describing the happenings in Benares, 
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the publication mentioned that congressmen including the 
secretary, city congress committee, the president congress 
committee and two central MLA's in combination with other 
congressmen divided themselves into groups and each group sat 
at a police station. "Whenever a muslim happened to come with 
a report of some injury done to him or to some other muslim, 
these congressmen would laugh his complaint to seorn, and send 
92 him away without allowing the police to record it." An 
illustration taken from the events of Lalpura village in the 
district of Patna mentions that in the name of village uplift 
congress preachers incited Hindus against muslims. The result 
was that hundreds of Hindus of Lalpura and other places caused 
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a serious riot in which a muslim almost lost his life. 
The culmination of these charges is traceable in an 
article written by Jinnah himself, the crue of which was that 
democracy was unsuited for India. In this article he recoun-
tered the alleged tale of congress atrocities and charged the 
congress with power intoxication. "The congress working commi-
ttee," the article, added, "arrogated to itself the position of 
a parallel central government to whom the provincial governments 
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were responsible." Reffering Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 
Rajendra Prasad and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, to whom different 
provinces were assigned in order to bring about administration 
co-ordination, he laid down: "Regional dictators were appointed 
and the ministers were entirely subject to their orders generally 
and no provincial legislation could be enacted without their 
271 
approval." Mentioning Bande Matram, the congress f lag and 
Hindi, he observed: "In the six Hindo provinces a Kulturkamf 
(cu l tu ra l war) was i n a g u r a t e d . " ^ 
As against a l l these a l l ega t ions , Dr. Rajendra Prasad 's 
observations may be noted. According to him, the league adopted 
H i t l e r ' s t a c t i c s of inventing false charges and of exaggerating 
small ones in to Himalayan blunders and by repeated preachings, 
made l i e s appear as t r u t h . However much Humayun Kabir might 
represent the existence of rea l grievances, the fact remains 
tha t they were en t i re ly baseless . In fac t , he fa i led to take 
* 
cognisance of the value of propaganda in public l i f e . How 
could the discontent be rea l when the ground vjas imaginary ? 
flumayun Kabir a did not advance evidence in support of h is 
contention. Besides, the a l legat ions of M.A. Jinnah and those 
embodied in the Shareef and the Pirpur repor ts e t c . , were meant 
to carryout baseless propaganda against the congress with the 
sole purpose of d iscredi t ing i t and feeding i t s ancient grudge, 
as the league 's demand of coal i t ion with the congress had been 
turned down. 
I t i s also not without significance to note tha t a l l 
e f fo r t s of the league to get i t s s ta tus of being the sole muslim 
representat ive recognised, signally fa i l ed in the attainment o f 
t he i r purpose, because the congress was adament on protec t ing 
i t s l i fe long t r a d i t i o n s of national character and any acceptance 
of the League's demand in t h i s connection would have proved 
ruinous to the congress. Sitaramsyya i s r igh t in his statement 
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"The open antagonism to the conqress and the p rac t i ca l steps 
i t h?d been takinq from time to time in pursui t of i t s avowed 
object and within the l imi ts of tne means set forth in the 
creed, had not commended themselves to the muslim league 
despite the fact thnt the league toohad not commended themsel-
ves to the muslim league despite tiie fact tha t the league too 
had adopted independence aS i t s creed." 
There can be no be t te r probf tha t the league 's a l lega t ions 
had no substance and were no more than false propaganda to 
decive the ignorant muslims masses, and the world outs ide, than 
the fact tha t Jinnah unceremoniously re jected Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad 's offer that the congress was wil l ing to have them inves-
t iga ted through Sir M. Gwyer, chief j u s t i c e of the federal court 
or some other person of similar s t a tus . !1is only reply was tha t 
the viceroy was asked to consider the whole question which meant 
that the door to an inquiry with the common concurrance of the 
97 congress and the league was closed. The congress had already 
i n s t i t u t e d an of f ic ia l inquiry and found the charges nroundless. 
The al legat ion of congress t o t a l i t a r i an i sm on the basis of 
control by parliamentary sub-committee and the occasional i n t e r -
ference of i t s working committee requires explanation. Anybody 
familier with parliamentary procedure can eas i ly understand that ' , 
without leadership, unanimity of action i s unthinahable. Moreover 
the congress iiad not reached i t s goal of achieving complete 
independence. The office-acceptance in 1937-1939 was only an 
in te r lude in i t s long struggle for freedom. I t could not afford 
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t o follow d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s in d i f f e r e n t p rov inces . That 
course vjould have su re ly defamed the o r g a n i s a t i o n and t i e d i t s 
hands in many spl ieres . In the absence of a f e d e r a l scheme 
a t the c e n t r e , some co -o rd ina t ing agency v^as needed for a 
common p o l i c y . I t would, t h e r e f o r e , be a pe rvers ion of f a c t s 
t o descr ibe the congress pa r ty con t ro l over p r o v i n c i a l govern-
ments as d i c t a t o r s h i p . 
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CONCIUSION 
The muslim l eade r sh ip of U.P. did in f luence and d i r e c t 
no t only the p o l i t i c s of U.P . but t h e muslim p o l i t i c s of I n d i a . 
The foundat ion, the s t r u c t u r e and the na tu re and t e n d e n c i e s of 
the muslim p o l i t i c s a f t e r 1358, was l a r g e l y dominated by the 
t i r e l e s s e f f o r t s of Syed Ahmad Khan. His ideology has borne a 
stamp on the muslim l eade r sh ip and i t s p o l i c i e s . In f a c t t h e 
very c i rcumstances which vjere c rea ted on the hor izen of Indian 
p o l i t i c s which were r e spons ib l e for the b i r t h of the muslim 
league may be t r a c e d t o the p o l i c i e s and schemes of Syed Ahmad 
Khan. Ye t , s t r a n g e l y , many s ta tements of Syed Ahmad f i rmely 
dec la red t h a t he was not a suppor te r of s epa ra t i sm . This was 
indeed a paradox. I t i s in the beginning , t h i s r epea ted a s s e r -
t i o n in the subsequent s ta tements tend t o i n d i c a t e t h a t h i s 
main aim was t o s t r i v e for a b o l i t i o n of poverty and backwardness 
of muslim community. He did s t r e s s upon the muslims t o evade 
p o l i t i c s and co-opera te with the B r i t i s h in order t o achieve t h i s 
g o a l . Major i ty of the muslims pursued t h i s p o l i c y . The gloom 
t h a t had overshadowed the muslim community immediately a f t e r t h e 
suppress ion of the g rea t Indian r e v o l t of 1357 began d isappear ing 
under t h e encouraging s p i r i t and o p t i m i s t i c approach of the 
l eade r sh ip of Syed Ahmad Khan. His continued e f f o r t s to difuse* 
t h i s fear and d i r e c t the muslim mind t o the new forces of p rog-
r e s s bore f r u i t s and the muslim energy was d i r e c t e d t o the 
a t ta inment of educa t ion , reform of abuse in the community and 
o v e r a l l the improvement of i t s economic c o n d i t i o n . But a f t e r 
the demise of Syed Ahmad Khan, Indian muslims found them unequal 
i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s with Jbngress and so 
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tliey re?3lised the s t ress inn need of a party l ike muslim league 
to make t h e i r i den t i t y d i s t i nc t at the nat ional l eve l . The 
muhaminadan p o l i t i c s over the period 1906-1910 remained influenced 
by leadership of muslim league. Men such as Sayyid Husain 
Bilqrami, Haji Muhammad Musa Khan, Raja Naushad Ali Khan, Haji 
Riaz IJddin Ahmad and Sahebzada Aftab Ahmad Khan were the leaders 
of the league in U.P. The task set before the new leadership of 
t h i s period v^ 'as therefore to earn a d i s t i n c t i den t i t y for the 
fAohammedan community. The demand for a separate e l ec to ra t e which 
was fu l f i l l ed a l so , can well be regarded as a step on the vJay t o 
the above said goal . 
But after 1911 the Br i t i she r s s t a r t ed to t r e a t muslims 
less circumsnectly. Re-Union of Bengal, re jec t ion of the propo-
sal of Aligarh Muslim Universi ty and the policy towards the 
Turky are the instances of the changed Br i t i sh a t t i t u d e . This 
phase was marked by a struggle for leadership between the two 
groups of the muslim leaders - popularly denoted as the 'young 
p a r t y ' and the 'old p a r t y ' . 
Among the followers of po l i c i e s of the young par ty , there 
v^ as majority of such newly educated but pan-is lamist people who 
were committed to do anything for securing the muslims' i n t e r e s t , 
On the other hand the old party mainly comprised of Zamindars, 
Nawabs and other inf luencia l people who had fa i th in Br i t i she r s 
reforms. Though t h i s party also comprised the persons such as 
j u s t i ce Rafique, Syed Abdur Rauf, Syed Ross Masud and Syed 
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Mahommad Ali , who were from non Zamindar fami l ies . Due to the 
intense devotion tovjards the muslims ' i n t e r e s t the young party 
could succeed in securing ul t imately the leadership and the old 
party disappeared from the scene. 
Over the period between L916-1923, muslim re l ig ious 
order i . e . the Ulamas, dominated the p o l i t i c s and leadership in 
U.P. Their dominance owed to the very po l i c i e s of the leaders 
of the young par ty . During t h i s phase one can notice the Hindu-
Muslim unity in respect of cer tain nat ional issues such as 
khi lafat movement. This unity and accomodation was brought 
about by the appeasement policy of Gandhi towards muslims as 
described in preceeding chapters. Few instances of uni ty have 
been scrut in ised from the point of view of the muslim thinking 
tha t they could secure t h e i r i n t e r e s t s with the help of the 
Hindu co-operation and f r a t e r n i t y . Gandhi also achieved h i s 
motto of Hindu-Nluslim uni ty , though p a r t i a l l y . Under these 
circumstances the Ulama leadership contributed considerably in 
making the muslim p o l i t i c s completly rel igion-motivated. The 
effect of which may be f e l t in the creation of Pakistan and 
existence of present day social circumstance. 
Further the leadership in and af ter 1923 was also motiva-
ted by communal fee l ings . Though, Hindu i n s t i t u t i o n s too , are 
no less responsible for t h i s . But the a t t i t ude to regard the 
muslim community as a separate na t iona l i ty was inculcated 
f i r s t l y by the muslim leadership. The mohammedan leadership 
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of th i s period at f i r s t talked about the muslim nationalism and 
thereaf te r of Indian nationalism. Keeping only muslim i n t e r e s t s 
in view and proclaiming them a 'minor i ty ' , the muslim leaders 
continued with the i r mission of securing ' sa feguards ' , ' r eserva-
t i o n s ' and separate e l e c t o r a t e s ' . They did not have any fa i th 
in democratic feforms and schemes of the nat ional scenario . 
Conclusively, i t can be said tha t the majority of the 
muslim leadership of U.P. over the period between 1906-1937, 
was influenced respect ively by the po l i c i e s of muslim league, 




Appendices I , I I and I I I contain a br ie f l i f e h i s t o r y of 
men who were prominent in p o l i t i c s in the U.P . between 1900-
1937. 
Appendix - I ; The Young Pa r ty 
- Mahomed All (1878 - 1931) : 
Home town Rampur. Sec t -Sunni . Background - In the 
mutiny h i s f a t h e r ' s family rece ived a l a rge p roper ty in 
Moradabad d i s t r i c t for saving English l i v e s , but h i s mo the r ' s 
family l o s t e ighty- two v i l l a g e s . His f a t h e r was in the 
se rv ice of Rampur s t a t e . After the death of h i s f a t h e r 
Mahomed Ali and family was not in a good economic p o s i t i o n . 
Education - R.A. Al igarh . Gold Medal is t and government 
s c h o l a r . He a t tended l i n c o l n c o l l e g e , Oxford from 1R98 t o 
1902, where he get a second in modern h i s t o r y . Occupation -
C iv i l se rvant and l a t e r j o u r n a l i s t and p o l i t i c i a n . 
- Syed Riza Al i (1882 - ) : 
Home town-Kandarki in Moradabad d i s t r i c t , but s e t t l e d in 
Allahabad from 1916. Sec t -Sh ia , Background - From a small 
Zamindari family, he was the f i r s t member t o be educated i n , 
Eng l i sh . Education - B.A., LL.B. A l iga rh . Occupation - L&wye*:, • 
he began P r a c t i c e a t f^oradabad in 1908, but soon moved t o work 
at the High c o u r t . 
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- Shaukat All (1873 - 1938) ; 
Home town - Rampur, Sec t -Sunni , Background - the e l d e r 
Brother of Mahomed Al l . Education - B.A. A l iga rh , Occupat ion-
C i v i l Servant and l a t e r P o l i t i c i a n . 
- Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880 - 1936) : 
Home town - Yusufpur in Ghazipur d i s t r i c t but s e t t l e d 
in D e l h i , 1910. Sect - Sunni. Background - small Zamindari 
backqround. Education - B.A., Madras, 1900; went t o England 
in 19':^!, where he was the f i r s t Indian house surgeon in the 
charing c ross h o s p i t a l . Occuptaion - Doctor and p o l i t i c i a n , 
- Mirza Samiullah Beg : 
Home town - Lucknovj, Sec t , - Sunni . Education - 3 .A. ,LL,B. 
occupation - Lawyer. 
- Major Syed Hassan Bilgrami ; 
Home town - S e t t l e d in r e t i r e m e n t a t A l iga rh . S e c t . -
Sunni, Background - Ha l f -b ro the r of Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk, Syed 
Hosein Bi lgrami , Education - A Doctor l i n g u i s t , he spoke 
French, German, P e r s i a n , Arabic , English and Urdu. Occupat ion-
Re t i r ed from the Indian Medical Se rv i ce , 
- Syed Wazir Hasan (1874 - 1947) : 
Home town - S e t t l e d in Lucknow, Sec t . - Sh ia . Background * 
- Small Zamindari family of Macchl ishahr , Jaunpur d i s t r i c t . 
Education - Aligarh and Muir c e n t r a l co l l ege Allahabad, 
Occupation - Lawyer. 
- H.M. Hay at : 2 S ^ 
Home town - S e t t l e d in Al iga rh . Sec t . - Sunni . Back-
ground - brought up in Lahore, Education - B.A. A l iqa rh , 
L907- i2 , , Occupation - Teacher . 
- Hazi Syed Mohammad Hussain : 
Home town - N'.eerut. S e c t . - Sunni . B d u c a t i o n - R a r i s t e r -
a t - lav j . Occupation - Lawyer. 
- Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman (1889-1973) : 
Home town - Lucknow. Sect - Sunni . Background - Father 
was a Naib T e h s i l d a r . i iducation - D.A., LL.B. A l iga rh , 
Occupation - Lawyer and p o l i t i c i a n . 
- Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1928) : 
Home Town - De lh i , Sec t . - Sunni. Background - From a 
family of wea l th , educat ion and i n f l u e n c e , educat ion - T r a d i -
t i o n a l education in Arabic and P e r s i a n . Occupation - Hakim. 
- Nawab Ismai l Khan (1884 - 1958) : 
Home tovm - ,\1eerut. Sec t . - Sunni, Background - His 
f a the r was a Mughal General and R i sa lda r in S c i n d i a ' s army. 
Education - Al igarh . Occupation - Lawyer. 
- Rafi Ahmad Kidwai (1R96 - 1954) : 
Home town - Massauli in Bara Banki D i s t r i c t . S e c t . - • 
Sunni. Background - His f a t h e r was a government s e r v e n t . * 
Education - Al igarh . Occupation - P o l i t i c i a n . 
- Ivlushir Husain Kidwai (1878 - ) : 
Home town - Lucknow. Sec t . - Sunni, Background - From 
a p e t t y Zamindari fami ly . Education - B a r r i s t e r - a t - l a w 
occupation - Lawyer and p o l i t i c i a n . 
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- ^Auhatnmad Ali Muhammad, Baja of Wahmudabad (1879-1931) : 
Home Town - Mahmudabad in S i t apu r d i s t r i c t . S e c t . - S h i a . 
Background - Family E s t a t e and In f luence . Education - P r i v a t e 
Tutor , Occupation - P o l i t i c i a n . 
- Khwaja Abdul Majid (1885 - 1962) : 
Home town - Al iga rh . Sec t , - Sunni . Background , Zamindari 
family . Education - B.A. Al iqarh . B a r r i s t e r - a t - l a w , Cambridge. 
Occupation - Lawyer and P o l i t i c i a n . 
- Syed Hyder Mehdi : 
Home town - Allahabad. S e c t - S h i a . Background , His Fa ther 
was a prominent member of Allahabad d i s t r i c t bar and was a 
p l ende r . Education - B.A., LL.B. , Occupation - Lawyer. 
- Hsarat M.ohani, Al ia , ^ a z l - u l - H a s s a n (1877 - 1961) : 
Home town - Mohan in Unao d i s t r i c t , but s e t t l e d in 
Kanpur. Sect - Sunni, Background - P e t t y Zamindari family in 
Unao. Education - B.A. Aligarh Occupation - J o u r n a l i s t and 
P o l i t i c i a n . 
- Syed Ali Nabi ( - 1928) : 
Home town - Agra, Sec t - Shia . Education - Agra College 
Occupation - Lawyer, 
- Shulb Qureshi : 
Home town - Rai Bareilly, Sect.-Sunni. Background -
married a daughter of Mohamed Ali. Education - B.A.,LL.B. 
Occupation - Journalist and politician. 
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- Tassadu^ Ahmad Khan Sherwani (— 1935) : 
Home town - Al iga rh . S e c t . - S u n n i . Background - A member 
of the Bilona Branch of t h e Sherwani Pathan Family. Educ a t i o n -
B.A. Al igarh . B a r i s t e r - a t - l a w , Cambridge, Occupation - Lawyer 
and p o l i t i c i a n . 
- Hazi Musa Khan Serwani (1372- ) : 
Home town - Al iga rh . Sect - Sunni. Background - A member 
of t h e D a t a u l i branch of the Sherwani Pathan Family. Education-
- Al igarh . Occupat ion- Scholar and p o l i t i c i a n . 
- Manzur All Sokhta : 
Home town - Allahabad. S e c t . - Sunni, Background -
fat i ier was themanager of t he Nehru Household and l i v e d in a 
house in the Nehru Compound, Education - B.A. ,LL,B. , Occupa-
t ion - Lawyer. 
Appendix - I I : The Old P a r t y 
Ibni Ahmad : 
Home town - Allahabad. S e c t . - Sunni. Background - Land-
owner of Budaun. Education - B.A. and 3 a r r i s t e r - a t - l a w , 
Occupation - Lawyer p r a c t i s i n g a t t h e Allahabad high c o u r t , 
- Syed Mahomed Ali (1863 - ) ; 
Home town - Al iga rh . S e c t . - S u n n i , Background - Grandson 
of Syed Ahmad Khan's e l d e r b r o t h e r . Education - B.A, Al igarh 
Occupation - Government s e r v a n t , 
Muhammad Bash i r -ud -d in : (1857 - ) : 
Home town - Etawah, S e c t , - S u n n i , Backgroujid - From a 
i aminda r i fami ly . 
- Nawab Hafiz Ahmad Said Khan of Chhatari (1888 - ) : 
Home town ~ Chhatari in Aligarh District.. Sect.-Sunni, 
Background - From a Estate family. 
- Sheikh Mohammad Habibullah (1871- ): 
Home town - Lucknow, Education - B.A., Lucknow. 
Occupation - Government servant. Gackground - A Taluqdar of 
Saidanpur in Bara Banki district. 
- Syed Aga KHaider : 
Home town - Allahabad, Sect - Sh ia , Background -
Described as a Rais of Saharanpur. Education - D.A., Cambridge 
and B a r r i s t e r - a t - l a w . Occupation - Lawyer a t Allahabad High 
Court . 
- Nawab Mehdi Ali Hasan, Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837 - 1907) : 
Home town - Al iga rh , Sect - Sunni , Background - A Shia 
by b i r t h converted t o Sunnism. He was from a Noble but poor 
family. Education - Home t u t o r . Occupation - Government 
s e rvan t . 
- Syed Mehdi Hasan : 
Home town - Lucknow. Sect- Shia, Occupation - Naib 
Tehsildar, 
- Mufti Haider Husain : 
Home town - Jaunpur, Sect. - Shia, Background - proviaeo 
Muftis for the Sharqu Kings of Jaunpur, Education - Traditio-
nal toccupation - Mukhtar and landowner. 
2V 
- Navjab Mustaq Husain, Viqar-ul-Mulk (1814-1917): 
Home town - Al iga rh . S e c t - Sunni . Background - Belonged 
t o an old Amrotha family , severa l of whom had gained d i s t i n c -
t i on in government s e r v i c e . He had an e s t a t e of f ive mahals 
four of which were revenue f r ee . Education -r Educated in 
P e r s i a n , Urdu and Arabic . 
- Syed Karamat Hussein (1852-1917) : 
Home town - a l l ahabad . Sect - Sh ia . Background - A minor 
t a luqda r of Sandi la in Hardoi . Education - Arabic , Engl ish and 
Sc ience . Occupation - Lawyer a t the Allahabad High Cour t . 
- Tassaduq Rasul Khan, Raja of Jehangi rabad (1851-1921): 
Home town - Lucknow, S e c t . - S u n n i , Background - Holder of 
an e s t a t e of 193 v i l l a g e s based on Jehangi rabad in Bara Banki 
d i s t r i c t . Education - L i t e r a t e only in Urdu. Occupation -
Landlord. 
- Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan (1867-1930) : 
Home town - Al iga rh , Sect - Sunni , Background - His 
f a t h e r was an o f f i c i a l in Gwalior E s t a t e . Education - B.A. 
Al igarh . Ba r r i s t e r - a t - l aw-Cambr idge . Occupation - Lawyer 
at Al iga rh . 
- Nawab Mohamed Ishaq Khan (1860-1918): 
Home town- Meerut. S e c t . - S u n n i , Background - From a Zami-
ndar family , Occupation - Government Se rvan t . 
- Nawab Maulvi Abdul Majid. (1859 - 1924) : 
Home town - Allahabad, S e c t . - Sunni , background - He was 
.• head of the Jaunpur family of Maulvis . E d u c a t i o n - B.A. 
Aligarh and B a r r i s t e r - a t - l a w , Occupation - Landlord and lawyer. 
2R« 
- Syed Ross Masud (1889 - 1937) : 
Home town - Al igarh . Sec t , - Sunni . Background - Grandson 
of Syed Ahmad Khan, Education - R.A. A l iga rh , B a r r i s t e r - a t -
law. Occupation - Government Servan t , 
- ^Auhammed Faiyaz Ali Khan, Nawab of Pahasu (1851-1922): 
Home town - Al iga rh . S e c t . - Sunni , Background - From a 
Nawab fami ly . Education - L i t e r a t e in Eng l i sh . Occupation -
Landlord, 
- Syed Abu J a f a r , Raja of P i r p u r . (1872-1927): Home town- P i r p u r , 
Sect - Sh ia , Background - Nawab fami ly . Education - Arab i , 
Phi losophy, Eng l i sh , Occupation - Landlord, 
- Nawab Patch Ali Khan Qiz i lbash (1862 - ) : 
Home town - Lahore, S e c t . - S h i a , Background- Zamindari 
family. Education - Engl ish Occupation - Landlord, 
- Hamid Ali Khan, Nawab of Rampur, (1875-1930) : 
Home town - Rampur, Sec t , - Sh ia , Background - Ruling 
family . Education - P r i v a t e Tu tor , Occupation - Admin i s t r a t ion . 
- Syed Abdur Rauf : 
Home town - Allahabad, Sect.-Sunni, Education - Lawyer 
at the Allahabad High Court, 
- Nawab Muhammad Abdus Samad Khan of Talibnegar (1862 - ): 
Home town - Aligarh, Background - Zamindari family. 
2 S M 
Aooendix - I I I ; The Ulama 
Abdul Bari (1878 - 1926) : 
Home town - Lucknow, S e c t . - S u n n i , School - F i r a n g i Mahal 
Madarassa Nizamia Sec t ion . Occupation - Teacher , Wri te r & P i r . 
Abdul Hamid ( - 1932) ; 
Home town - Lucknow, S e c t . - S u n n i , School F i r ang i Mahal, 
Bahr-ul-Ulum Sec t ion , Occupation - Teacher . 
Wilayat Husain : 
Home town - Allahabad. S e c t . - S u n n i , School S i a r a Shah 
H a j a t u l l a h , Occupation - Teacher , 
Ahmad Raza Khan (1855 - 1921) : 
Home town - B a r e i l l y , Sec t . - Sunni, School B a r e i l l y , 
Occupation - Teacher, 
Abdul Majid Badauni ( - 1931); 
Home town - Badaun. S e c t . - Sunni , Occupation - Teacher , 
School - followed Abdul B a r i . 
. S h i b l i Nomani (1857 - 1914) : 
Home town - Azamgarh. S e c t . - S u n n i . School - Nadvjat-ul-
Ulama, Occupation - Teacher and Scholar , 
Salamatul lah : 
Home town - Lucknow, S e c t . - Sunni , School - FM Madrassa 
Nizamia Sec t ion , Occupation - Teacher , 
ObeiduUah Sindhi (1872-1944): 
Home town - Bom in Punjab, S e c t . - S u n n i , School Deoband, 
Occupation - Teacher and scho la r , 
Azad Sohani (1873 - ) : 
/ Home town - Kanpur, S e c t . - S u n n i , School •% followed Abdul 
Bar i , occupation - Teacher and p o l i t i c i a n . 
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